There can be no denying that BRICS is a fractious grouping, with China exercising overweening influence | Photo Credit: Rushikesh More

To India’s credit, the just concluded BRICS summit in New Delhi was surprisingly purposeful given the differences between the 11 member countries in the wake of two ongoing wars, in the Persian Gulf area and Ukraine. The joint declaration reflects a mature attempt to create a common ground among the Global South to promote wide-ranging technological and social sector collaboration overriding divergent strategic interests. A disruptive US could well have acted as a catalyst here.

There can, however, be no denying that BRICS is a fractious grouping, with China exercising overweening influence. Even so, BRICS has managed to position itself as a countervailing force to the US accounting for 40 per cent of global GDP and 26 per cent of world trade. The US has been hostile to BRICS for strategic and economic reasons. First, BRICS is seen as a platform for China and Russia to expand their influence. Second, it posits an alternative global governance system, with a greater say for developing countries in ‘western’ institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, UNSC, UNFCC and WTO. Third, BRICS has been working at non-dollar settlement systems, at least to transact within its members and 10 partner countries.

It is notable that the declaration expresses the need in West Asia to maintain ‘smooth flow of global trade, supply chains and energy in accordance to international law’. Iran and the UAE, both BRICS members but in opposite camps, have signed on to this, even as the conflict has escalated in the region — a testimony to BRICS’ potential. Without naming US as an aggressor in any context, BRICS has called it out with respect to attacks on Occupied Palestine. It has assailed “indiscriminate” tariffs and non-tariff measures, and “protectionism under the guise of environmental objectives”, targeting both the US and EU. A BRICS currency has more or less been shelved, but settlement systems in local currencies have already picked up, more so in the shadow of sanctions on Russia after 2022. India has been at pains to clarify that it is not part of any ‘de-dollarisation’ project. But it can reduce transaction costs if it is able to trade in its currency and those of BRICS member countries. It has been doing so with Russia. However, this effort has to turn multilateral so that the third party demand for currencies other than the yuan increases even as technology makes such arrangements easier.

Meanwhile, China’s Cross Border Interbank Payment System, which is both a messaging and settlement network, has expanded in scope since February 2026 to allow multi-currency settlements. China accounts for over 60 per cent of BRICS trade and its surplus with the BRICS members, including India, has been rising over time. India surely cannot be comfortable with yuan emerging as the de facto BRICS currency. Its neutrality in BRICS lends credibility to the grouping. For BRICS to truly grow in stature, it must be less China-driven than it is now.

Published on September 13, 2026