The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Eyck Freymann – Hoover Fellow at Stanford University, non-resident research fellow at the U.S. Naval War College, and author of “Defending Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War with China” (Oxford 2026) – is the 505th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”

Explain Xi Jinping’s goals and strategy for “reunification” with Taiwan.

Xi Jinping’s preferred path to “reunification” isn’t invasion – it’s coercion that forces Taiwan to capitulate without firing a shot. His goal is to secure control over Taiwan’s political future and economic assets, particularly TSMC’s semiconductor facilities, while avoiding a catastrophic war that could threaten the Chinese Communist Party’s rule.

Beijing’s strategy relies on “gray zone” operations that stay below the threshold of armed conflict. The most dangerous scenario is a “quarantine” – using China Coast Guard vessels as customs inspectors to control who comes and goes from Taiwan, rather than a naval blockade that would constitute an act of war. This traps the United States in an impossible dilemma: do we shoot at Coast Guard vessels to avoid a customs inspection? If we hesitate, China effectively seizes Taiwan without triggering our defense commitments.

Xi is also counting on strategic patience and salami-slicing tactics – redefining the status quo incrementally through military exercises, airspace incursions, and diplomatic pressure. His bet is that Washington’s “strategic ambiguity” will fade into American paralysis, and that Taiwan’s people will lose faith that we have their backs.

Identify key variables precipitating cross-strait conflict scenarios.

Four variables matter most. 

First, Taiwan’s domestic politics and resilience: if the Taiwanese people lose confidence in U.S. support or fail to invest adequately in asymmetric defense, Beijing’s incentives to apply coercive pressure increase dramatically. Taiwan could also just fold. 

Second, America’s alliance commitments and military posture. If our access to bases in Japan and the Philippines becomes uncertain, or if our allies doubt our resolve, China’s calculations shift. Deterrence requires a coalition and credible communications of U.S. resolve. 

Third, economic interdependence and supply chain vulnerabilities. Our continued dependence on China-based manufacturing gives Beijing leverage, while our dependence on Taiwan’s semiconductors creates mutual vulnerability. The longer we delay moving critical supply chains out of China, the more constrained our options become in a crisis.

Fourth, China’s internal stability and Xi’s personal calculus. A rational Xi seeks to stay in power into his old age and secure his legacy. That makes him risk-averse. But if he faces domestic pressure or perceives a closing window of opportunity, his risk tolerance could increase.

Examine the four pillars of deterrence.

Effective deterrence against China requires four integrated pillars.

First, political deterrence. In what I call “structured ambiguity,” we should maintain our One China Policy but warn Beijing privately that every act of coercion will trigger a proportionate deepening of our relationship with Taiwan. The message: salami-slicing won’t work because we’ll match your escalation. We also need better diplomatic coordination with Taiwan and our core allies.  

Second, military deterrence. Taiwan must invest in asymmetric capabilities that make invasion prohibitively costly. The United States needs to maintain access to regional bases, work with allies to rebuild its defense industrial base, and bet on the right emerging technologies. But military strength alone, while necessary, is insufficient.

Third, strategic deterrence. That goes beyond nuclear weapons to include space, cyber, and AI. We need to stay ahead technologically. 

Fourth, economic deterrence. This isn’t nuclear-grade sanctions, but what I call “avalanche decoupling” – a coordinated effort with allies to systematically move critical supply chains out of China over time. Avalanche decoupling would use ratcheting tariffs to reduce our vulnerability gradually, focusing on our most critical supply chains first. Xi fears assured long-term economic stagnation more than he fears acute but temporary economic pain.

Analyze the threats of mutually assured economic destruction and evaluate its limited strategic deterrent value.

“Mutually assured economic destruction” sounds powerful but fails as a deterrent strategy because it’s a suicide pact nobody thinks we’ll actually choose. 

If we impose comprehensive sanctions on China at the outbreak of conflict, we don’t just hurt Beijing. We trigger a global depression and a meltdown in our own financial system. Our allies won’t follow us into economic suicide, and neutral countries like India and Brazil will keep trading with China regardless. 

Also, we couldn’t sustain it. The global economy today depends on China in ways it never depended on Russia. Cutting off that integration on Day One means supply chain collapse, inflation spirals, and domestic political backlash. Beijing knows this.

If we have to decouple, we need to do so in a way that offers third countries – which won’t completely cut off their economic relationships with China – a pathway to gain manufacturing opportunities and economic security by working with us. A more gradual approach is more credible because it creates winners, not just losers, and because it operates on a timeline markets can absorb. It aligns the world’s incentives to cooperate against China. 

Xi Jinping is a rational actor who wants to stay in power. He’s not deterred by threats we obviously won’t follow through on. He is deterred by the prospect of permanent, irreversible decline – watching China become economically hollowed out while a U.S.-led coalition thrives. 

What would an integrated U.S. strategy of economic, military, and political deterrence for defending Taiwan look like and how might it shape the global order?

An integrated strategy combines all these elements into a unified framework that works across both peacetime and crisis. 

We need the military ability to defeat China in a high-intensity war. But we also need a contingency plan to secure our interests. If relations with China collapse, what do we want the global order to look like? What will we need to do to protect our economic security? To deter our adversaries from further aggression? To maintain the economic basis for prosperity and a secure homeland? This is the conversation we need to be having. It will require working with allies, but also being clear about our own national interests, values and priorities. 

An integrated strategy also prepares to deter a crisis, not just for war. The hardest scenarios to deal with aren’t when China has shot first. Once Americans are dead, the politics get simpler. The hard part is knowing when to draw a red line if China tries to squeeze Taiwan to death. If we don’t have a robust contingency plan for what happens after, we won’t draw the line. That means we won’t have a war – but we won’t have an honorable peace, either. China will take over Taiwan, the region, and in time the world. An integrated strategy offers another way.