China inaugurated an air force support and training center in Laos on September 29, marking China’s third overseas military facility. Analysts have noted that the arrangement could expand the People’s Liberation Army’s military presence in Southeast Asia and strengthen China’s regional interests, although there is currently no evidence that Beijing has deployed large-scale forces at the site.

According to China’s Ministry of National Defense, the China-Laos Joint Support and Training Center and the China-Laos Friendship Aviation Academy have formally begun operations at Ban Keun Airport. The two facilities are mainly intended to assist in the training of Lao Air Force pilots and will be jointly maintained and operated by China and Laos. Beijing has not disclosed details regarding the number of Chinese personnel or the equipment stationed there.

China has emphasized that the facilities comply with the laws of both countries and with international law, and that they are “not directed against any third party.”

Ban Keun Airport is significant because it is China’s first publicly acknowledged overseas military facility centered on airpower. This differs from China’s overseas facilities in Djibouti and Cambodia, which have largely been associated with naval operations.

China’s continued use of the “joint training center” model – also used in Cambodia – suggests that the PLA may be pursuing a gradual approach to expanding its overseas military presence. Ban Keun Airport may initially operate as a jointly used China-Laos facility, while allowing the Chinese presence to increase over time.

Geographically, Ban Keun Airport is located in Vientiane Province in northwestern Laos, around 45 kilometers from the capital, Vientiane. During the Vietnam War and the Laotian Civil War in the 1970s, the area had been part of the local airfield network used for tactical support operations, but it later ceased operations.

Satellite imagery suggests that construction work began around October last year, and by September this year the facility had already reached a considerable scale. Its longest runway is approximately 2,000 meters. From a geographic perspective, Ban Keun occupies an important location near the center of mainland Southeast Asia. It is also close to the China-Laos Railway, just north of Vientiane, giving the site convenient transportation access. This means that personnel and equipment sent from China would not necessarily have to rely solely on air transport. The China-Laos Railway could also be used to move personnel and certain equipment into Laos. For an overseas joint support base, this logistical advantage is highly significant.

A similar consideration may also apply to China’s other joint support facility in mainland Southeast Asia, at Ream in Cambodia. To a considerable extent, the future possibility of railway links extending directly into southern Cambodia may also enhance the logistical value of such a facility.

From the perspective of operational radius, however, Ban Keun Airport is unlikely to be primarily intended for operations in the South China Sea. China already has military facilities on Woody Island that can serve as forward bases for power projection in the area.

The greater significance of Ban Keun lies in its potential role as a transit base for the PLA Air Force. From this location, Chinese forces would have a certain level of operational reach toward Myanmar and farther south toward Singapore. For this reason, outside observers may view the airport’s most important function as providing the PLA Air Force with an additional staging and transit airfield for operations in Southeast Asia.

For the same reason, although Ban Keun currently poses only a limited direct threat to Taiwan Strait security, it still has significance for China’s broader ability to project military power abroad and to place pressure on U.S. naval forces operating around Singapore. For the United States, Singapore and Thailand are both important logistical and replenishment locations, particularly during periods when U.S. aircraft carriers are rotating or undergoing maintenance. These locations would potentially fall within the operational range of aircraft operating from Ban Keun. 

From a broader strategic perspective, China’s decision to establish a military airfield near the center of mainland Southeast Asia is therefore noteworthy. In the future, the facility could also be used to complicate U.S. military operations in the Gulf of Thailand, the Andaman Sea, and even the Strait of Malacca. This is the broader geostrategic significance of Ban Keun Airport.