On October 2, the Philippine Coast Guard commissioned BRP Sarangani, a retired Taiwanese Coast Guard cutter formerly known as the Kinmen. The transfer is unusual because Taiwan only transfers decommissioned vessels to states that officially recognize Taiwan’s statehood, which the Philippines does not. 

Furthermore, the vessel did not sail from Kaohsiung to Manila under the Taiwanese flag, government-to-government, the way Taipei’s other patrol-vessel donations have gone to Palau, the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu – states that recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan). Instead, the Philippine nongovernmental organization We Protect Our Seas (WPS) Foundation quietly acquired the Kinmen, renamed it, repainted it, and handed it to the Philippine Coast Guard in a ceremony that never mentioned where the ship had come from.

The reason for this indirect approach is obvious: the Philippines adheres to the One China policy and would not like to provoke China. Unofficial engagements with Taiwan, carried out by states like the United States, France, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and Germany that formally recognize China, are a global default. China explicitly tolerates their economic and cultural relations with Taiwan. 

So what makes the Philippines’ engagement with Taiwan different, and why is Manila engaging with Taiwan so extensively now when its relationship with China is tenser than in the past two decades? 

The Philippines as a Distinct Case

For most of the above-mentioned states, Taiwan policy is about standing up for democracy and alliance management, conducted at a safe distance – being geographically far away from the immediate threat of military conflict with China. However, the Philippines is in close proximity to Taiwan. The Philippine province of Batanes lies south of Taiwan, near the Bashi Channel, placing it closer to spillover from the Taiwan conflict. 

Adding to this are 200,000 Filipino workers currently in Taiwan, whose evacuation during a Taiwan crisis would pose an emergency for the Philippine government. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has publicly stated that Taiwan’s security is inseparable from the Philippines’ own, making clear that Taiwan is a national security question rather than an elective foreign policy stance.

Yet Manila must tread carefully. Anything it does with Taiwan that upsets China is directly visible in Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, affecting Filipino sovereignty and fisheries. 

The Philippines’ increased engagement with Taiwan predates the Marcos administration. Taiwan is the Philippines’ ninth-largest trading partner, with established cooperation in education, agriculture, and healthcare and growing interest in semiconductors and start-ups. Under Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte (in office from 2016-2022), the Philippines and Taiwan signed a bilateral investment agreement in 2017 – the first major investment agreement in the last 25 years – under Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy, with cooperation extending across trade, investment, education, and labor mobility. But this engagement made sense given that the Philippines was in a state of rapprochement with China. 

What has changed now is the strategic significance of Philippines-Taiwan engagement. Economic and cultural ties are increasingly accompanied by institutional and maritime cooperation. In April 2025, the Philippines eased restrictions on official exchanges with Taiwan, facilitating travel for economic and trade-related purposes. This was highlighted by Taiwanese Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung’s visit to Manila, the second such foreign minister visit to the Philippines since 1975. Taiwan’s subsequent proposal to open a second representative office in Cebu to deepen the “Taiwan-Philippine Corridor” further signaled an effort to deepen institutional engagement. 

Maritime cooperation has become increasingly apparent. What began as crisis management following the 2013 killing of a Taiwanese fisherman by Philippine personnel has created a basis for maritime cooperation, despite the absence of diplomatic recognition. 

The WPS Foundation confirmed that the recently transferred vessel, BRP Sarangani, will support maritime patrols, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and training. The transfer of vessels between two coast guards without requiring an overt government-to-government transaction demonstrates how institutional informality can create political space for cooperation that formal diplomatic relations might otherwise constrain.  

Last year, the Philippine and Taiwanese Coast Guard conducted patrols in the Bashi Channel. Taiwan’s Coast Guard is also planning to send vessels to visit the Philippines in 2027, the first visit since the Philippines switched its recognition from the ROC to the People’s Republic of China in 1975.

But why is the Philippines doing this now, when China has become more assertive? One plausible explanation is that the Philippines sees little benefit in restraining its engagement with Taiwan. Chinese pressure in the South China Sea continued despite Manila’s previously cautious approach to Taiwan, giving Philippine policymakers fewer reasons to believe that restraint will win China’s goodwill. 

At the same time, the Philippines cannot match China militarily or economically. Deepening ties with Taiwan offer the Philippines a way to widen its strategic and economic options at a relatively low cost. Manila can strengthen cooperation with a partner that provides investment, technology, and security benefits, while also engaging with an issue that China considers highly sensitive. Whether this amounts to deliberate tit-for-tat is difficult to establish, but the effect is clear: the Philippines has less incentive than before to keep its Taiwan relationship within narrow limits simply to avoid displeasing China. 

Keeping It Under the Threshold 

While the Philippines has steadily expanded its engagement with Taiwan, it has stopped short of turning that engagement into overt alignment, as seen in the vessel transfer through a non-governmental organization and the Philippine government’s refusal to publicly recognize it as a formerly Taiwanese vessel. Manila has repeatedly affirmed that its One China policy remains “consistent, clear and unchanged” and that “economic, cultural, and functional cooperation with Taiwan” does not violate it. Military and security engagements such as tabletop exercises or patrols are consistently described as “unofficial and informal.” Even the April 2025 easing of visa restrictions excludes visits and exchanges over defense- and security-related issues. Furthermore, no agreements, Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), exchange of notes or similar documents can proceed without clearance from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and, where necessary, an authorization from the Office of the President. 

This caution reflects Manila’s awareness that spillover from a Taiwan crisis would be unavoidable. Under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, U.S. forces could rely on Philippine bases to support operations in a Taiwan crisis. Yet Filipino officials have been explicit that they do not want the Philippines drawn into such a conflict – a position echoed by the public, with roughly 86 percent of Filipinos saying that they want the country to remain neutral in a China-Taiwan conflict. Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Thersea Lazaro has said that Manila is open to discussions with China over evacuation plans for its citizens in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. 

The throughline is consistent: Manila wants to preserve its One China policy so Beijing has less reason to treat Philippine security as fair game in any future crisis.