Only two Japan-North Korea summit meetings have ever been held, both between Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and former North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, in September 2002 and May 2004. Since then, an inter-Korean summit was held in October 2007, followed by three more in 2018. U.S.-North Korea summits were held in June 2018, February 2019, and June 2019. Yet Japan and North Korea have not met at the summit level in over two decades.

What makes summit dialogue uniquely difficult for Japan is the abduction issue. From the 1970s through the 1980s, North Korean agents abducted a large number of Japanese citizens. The abduction of Megumi Yokota, a middle school student at the time, especially shocked Japanese society, and resolving the abduction issue has been declared a “high-priority issue” by every successive administration.

Japanese sanctions on North Korea are the heaviest in the world, yet they have not led to the return of a single abductee to Japan since the five abductees came home in October 2002. Japanese public opinion nonetheless persistently calls for heavier sanctions, driven by anger and distrust. This is despite the fact that it was dialogue, not sanctions, that secured Koizumi’s signal achievement: an apology from North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and the return of five abductees and their family members.

The issue is serious and complex. Even if North Korea were to allow Japanese nationals to return, claiming that “new abduction victims have been identified,” that would not produce unqualified satisfaction on the Japanese side. Distrust toward a country that has long insisted “the abductions have been resolved” would only deepen; and even if ten people were to return, the Japanese public would suspect there may be still more abductees. Japan has struggled for years with the question of what would constitute a “resolution” of the abduction issue, but it proved an impossible task given that human lives were at stake.

The key figure who made Koizumi’s historic visit to North Korea possible was Tanaka Hitoshi, the then Director-General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He conducted nearly thirty secret meetings with the North Korean agent known as “Mr. X,” in China and other third countries. The meetings were so secret that even Shinzo Abe, then Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, was not made aware of them.

After Kim Jong Il admitted to and apologized for the abductions and the five abductees were returned to Japan, public anger fell not only on North Korea but also on Tanaka. Not all abductees had returned, and it emerged that Tanaka had accepted a North Korean suggestion for a “temporary return” of roughly two weeks rather than permanent residency for the five abductees.

Tanaka likewise attracted Abe’s ire. Having taken a strong personal interest in the abduction issue, Abe could not forgive Tanaka for advancing negotiations without informing him. Tanaka was ultimately summoned to Diet deliberations, where he broke down in tears under withering criticism of how the negotiations had been handled. Despite having acted on the prime minister’s instructions, Tanaka received no defense from Koizumi, perhaps because public opinion was too hostile. Koizumi’s diplomacy toward North Korea deserves a more positive assessment than it has received, and it is regrettable that this episode cast such a long shadow. Tanaka was so thoroughly pilloried by Japanese conservatives as a “traitor” that this once-promising diplomatic ace never became vice-minister for foreign affairs or ambassador to the United States.

The affair had lasting consequences. It taught subsequent administrations that even if they were to seriously pursue North Korea diplomacy, public support would be hard to secure given widespread skepticism toward dialogue, and that even partial success, short of a “full resolution” of the abduction issue, would expose them to harsh criticism regardless.

Having witnessed the keelhauling of Tanaka, even the most talented Foreign Ministry officials will not actively pursue North Korea diplomacy. Japanese civil servants are divided from the moment of hiring into elite “career” and specialized “non-career” tracks, with the hierarchy between the two tracks never reversed. Career diplomats rotate postings every two to three years and are guaranteed advancement if they handle North Korea safely without taking risks. The perverse result is that the most capable diplomats are the least likely to actively pursue dialogue with Pyongyang.

This structural problem must be addressed before Japan can make progress on any of its outstanding issues with North Korea. Ultimately, overcoming the problem requires strong political leadership from the prime minister.