On March 19, Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae will face President Donald Trump at the White House. Her summit meeting with Trump will be the biggest foreign policy challenge for her to date. She must successfully execute a seemingly impossible task – walking out of the meeting with Trump and being able to call the summit a “success” when she and Trump has serious disagreements over approaches to Iran.   

A “successful” summit was clearly within her grasp. Her trade minister, Ryosei Akazawa, has been busy shuttling back and forth, finalizing the agreement on the first tranche of  Japan’s investments in the United States in sectors that are critical for the two countries’ economic security and supply chain resiliency, including AI data centers, energy infrastructure, and artificial diamonds. Takaichi also plans to “deliver” 250 cherry blossom trees from Japan as a gift to celebrate America’s 250th birthday the day before the opening of the National Cherry Blossom Festival in Washington. Most importantly, she will face Trump as a “big winner,” following her landslide victory in the lower house election in February.  

Then, the unthinkable happened – the United States, in a joint operation with Israel, launched an offensive against Iran on February 28. Despite Trump’s repeated claims that the U.S. is “ahead of schedule” in its military campaign against Iran, and the war will over “soon,” the fighting continues, now entering in its third week.  

The global oil market faces grave disruption as Iran has effectively shut down the Strait of Hormuz, while Tehran keeps up with its attack against oil facilities in the Gulf countries. Gasoline price are surging worldwide, putting additional economic pressure on consumers – many of whom have been struggling with inflation, including the United States and Japan.  

The conflict, which started as a “war of choice” by Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, is beginning to look like a “war of necessity” to re-open the Strait of Hormuz. Desperate to reign in on oil prices, Trump called on U.S. allies to send their naval assets to escort oil tankers. Japan was among the countries Trump specifically named, along with England, Australia and South Korea.  

This is a deja vu moment for Japan. In 1991, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the United States, then under the Bush administration, put together a multinational force to support Kuwait and repel the Iraqi invasion. Japan was asked to participate in the multinational coalition force, but it opted not to send the Self-Defense Force (SDF) while the military operation continued. Instead, it contributed over $900 billion to support the multinational coalition forces and the war-affected countries in the Gulf region.   

At the time, Japan was criticized for its unwillingness to send the SDF; its financial contributions were mocked as “checkbook diplomacy.” This experience has haunted Japan’s national security establishment. It was this “Gulf War trauma” that prompted Japan to begin its effort to modernize its national security policy infrastructure, which continues to date.  

Because of its “Gulf War trauma,” Japan’s knee-jerk response to Trump’s demand is to scramble to find a way to respond. However, Japan has a big problem this time. Despite many changes that have been made to Japan’s national security policymaking since the 1991 Gulf War, Japan has no legal framework that allows Tokyo to deploy the SDF to support a war that Japan is not part of. Until the fighting stops, there is no mechanism or legal interpretation that Japan can rely on to justify sending Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) destroyers to the Strait of Hormuz to answer Trump’s call.  

In fact, while the circumstances in the two wars look eerily familiar, Trump’s demand for action by U.S. allies takes place in a fundamentally different context. As many in the United States have pointed out, this war was a “war of choice.” Trump did not consult with any allies other than Israel before he decided to attack Iran. Unlike the Bush administration at the time of the 1991 Gulf War, he did not go to the United Nations Security Council for authorization of a coalition operation. 

For these reasons, Japan is not alone in deciding against sending its naval vessels to the Gulf at this time – the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Australia, the European Union and NATO all have indicated they have no plan to send their navies while the fighting continues.  

That said, Takaichi should impress upon Trump that there are many things Japan can and is willing to do once the hostilities stop. In fact, Japan, upon coordination with its European partners, can lead international efforts to “maintain peace” in the Strait of Hormuz. Such an international coalition can monitor the security situation in the strait, clear mines to ensure safe passage, and escort commercial ships upon request. Tokyo can also lead the charge in forging a multinational coalition to offer assistance to war-affected countries in the Gulf, just as it co-chaired the Afghanistan Reconstruction Assistance Conference in 2002 in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Taliban following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.    

These initiatives all play to Takaichi’s strength, as she has actively developed personal relationship with the leaders of Japan’s diplomatic partners since she took office last fall.  They are also measures Tokyo needs to be seriously examining for its own reasons, to safeguard Japan’s energy security.  

Takaichi may be uniquely positioned to play such a role. She, like her late mentor Abe Shinzo, is one of few leaders that can get along with Trump. Having a good investment deal ready to sign at the summit on March 19 will allow her room to put these proposals on Iran to Trump. If she can pull that off, it would be a testament of her true leadership quality.