Pakistan’s improved relations with Washington rest almost solely on the relationship between Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and President Donald Trump. Allies of the United States, from Europe to East Asia, have faced Trump’s tariffs and been publicly criticized by the U.S. president. Trump, however, praised Sharif during his address to the U.N. General Assembly. Trump’s praise of a world leader, however, means little without a U.S. institutional partnership, and Pakistan has done little to secure that. With the U.S. midterm elections scheduled for November 3, if the Republican Party loses its majority in either house of Congress, as polls suggest it might, the limits of this “reset” will be harder to ignore.

The “reset” has been more of a closer relationship between two people than between two countries. Field Marshal Asim Munir earned Trump’s endorsement as his “favorite field marshal” after Munir visited Trump at the White House. At the same time, the democratically elected government of Pakistan has worked in close coordination with the army leadership. The tactics of Pakistani foreign policy were made clear when Pakistan credited Trump for ending the May 2025 war with India, a claim India has denied. Similarly, Pakistan’s nomination of Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize has pleased the U.S. president but hasn’t won favor with anyone else in Washington. With an approval rating at 30 percent and widespread expectations that Republicans will lose control of Congress, Pakistan’s foreign policy has pursued a sinking political ship.

Few tangible benefits have materialized from the public fanfare surrounding Pakistan’s relations with the United States. In July 2025, the U.S. reduced tariffs on Pakistani goods from 29 to 19 percent. While some analysts see this as a win for Pakistan, others say these reductions benefited Pakistan very little. The memorandums of understanding (MOUs) signed since 2025 remain largely on paper, including those for critical minerals and cryptocurrency. A trade pact has also not been signed. Even worse, some of these deals include companies related to Trump’s circle, while a drone partner Pakistan took on also sells drones to India. Islamabad has received no assurances, and, in the meantime, has given away a lot through commercial favors.

Pakistan’s brokering of the April 2026 Iran-U.S. ceasefire and Tehran talks shows the limitations of negotiating a single major crisis. The window for follow-up talks closed without renewal. On October 20, Munir made his fifth visit to Tehran, but it yielded no results. A go-between is valuable only if both sides want to talk, and Pakistan has no control over this. Islamabad staked much of its relevance on something it has little control over.

A change in the U.S. Congress could expose how narrow Pakistan’s base in Washington truly is. Even though foreign policy largely resides with the executive, Congress controls the purse strings, reviews arms sales, and sets the terms of debate through its oversight and hearings. Analysts in Islamabad expect that a Democratic Congress would mean a shift in policy toward New Delhi and American treaty allies. Critics in Washington argue that Trump’s successor would feel no obligation to uphold the promises Trump has made to Munir. After nearly two years of cultivating a relationship with one person, Pakistan has few friends in the institutions that will outlast him.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s domestic politics make it an easy target for those who would roll back the reset. The current government in Islamabad, already under fire at home from critics who accuse it of sidelining political opposition, is likely to face increased scrutiny from the next U.S. Congress. Under a Democrat-controlled Congress, oversight committees would routinely examine these concerns. For Democrats looking to distinguish themselves from Trump, Pakistan is a case study of diplomacy based on personal relationships and deal-making

There are legitimate criticisms of U.S. policy toward South Asia as well. Fostering long-term stability on the subcontinent and in the region, particularly with Pakistan’s huge and growing population and its nuclear weapons, is clearly in the U.S. interest. However, successive U.S. administrations have focused solely on near-term interests when dealing with Pakistan and addressing South Asia. Each has developed and strengthened relationships with Pakistan’s security establishment. Washington has also prioritized security cooperation with Pakistan, providing economic and military assistance in return for short-term alignment, which critics argue has come at the expense of Pakistan’s civilian institutions. As a result, what the United States has developed with Pakistan has ultimately served to weaken U.S. interests in the region. It has also fostered the sentiment in Washington that building relationships with Pakistan is a zero-sum game.

If Pakistan wants the recent improvements in its relationships with Washington to grow, then, like the U.S., it needs to shift from a “closing” to a “developing” relationship with Washington and the rest of the world. Nothing would better demonstrate Pakistan’s seriousness than finishing the trade deal now under negotiation and turning its mineral memorandums into real contracts. Such steps would create supporters in U.S. farm states and boardrooms whose interest in Pakistan does not depend on who sits in the Oval Office.

The weeks after November 3 will test whether Pakistan’s moment in Washington was a strategy or a stroke of luck. Some analysts warn that a weaker Trump could mark the beginning of the end of Islamabad’s current importance. In contrast, others argue that alienating Pakistan would shut the door on much of U.S. influence in the region. Islamabad should stop counting on Trump’s Republicans to hold on and start building ties that can survive their defeat.