With the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a critical node of the Belt and Road Initiative in Pakistan, entering its second phase, insurgent and terrorist networks in Pakistan are strategically positioning themselves in areas critical to CPEC’s future.

CPEC connects China’s western Xinjiang province with the Arabian Sea. It enters Pakistan from the northern Gilgit-Baltistan area and culminates at Gwadar Port in Balochistan province.

While the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is gradually increasing its footprint in Pakistan’s northern belt, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has ramped up attacks in Balochistan, multiplying China’s security challenges.

The deteriorating security situation in southwestern Balochistan and northern Pakistan is expected to disrupt future CPEC projects and China-Pakistan economic cooperation, thereby weakening Pakistan’s economy. The timing of militant buildup in these areas is vital; it is happening against the backdrop of intense U.S.-China competition over critical minerals in Balochistan.

Currently, China and Pakistan are discussing $1.8 billion in financing for the realignment of the Karakoram Highway’s (KKH) Thakot-Raikot section. In May 2028, when Diamer-Bhasha Dam becomes operational, a 280-kilometer section of KKH will be submerged in water. China has been delaying financing these projects for economic and security reasons. Concurrently, TTP has been increasing its presence in the area along the KKH.

It is important to mention that in July 2021 and March 2024, two unclaimed suicide attacks targeting buses carrying Chinese nationals working on the Dasu Hydropower Project took place along the KKH. Though no terrorist group officially claimed these attacks, individuals and militant networks involved in these attacks had past affiliations with TTP.

In December 2025, while disclosing its organizational restructuring, TTP announced a separate Wilayat (shadow province) for Kashmir, even as it split its Wilayat Gilgit Baltistan into two: Wilayat Diamer and Wilayat Darel. Then, in April 2026, TTP claimed responsibility for attacking police in Gilgit Baltistan’s Chilas area.

Concurrently, TTP’s network has re-emerged in Malakand Division, which abuts Gilgit Baltistan. On August 2, TTP claimed a suicide attack outside a police station in Swat, which killed 17 people and wounded dozens of others. Together, Gilgit Baltistan and Malakand Division are critical for CPEC’s future.

Critically, the recent U.N. Monitoring Committee on Al-Qaeda and ISIL report indicates reconcentration of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)’s fighters in northern Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province, which shares a border with Gilgit Baltistan. The near-simultaneous moves by TTP and ETIM to increase their footprints in Gilgit Baltistan, Malakand Division and Badakhshan, respectively, are not coincidental. These are synchronized moves by these militant groups to strategically position themselves in areas vital to China’s future economic interests.

Separately, in July 2026, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA) broke away from TTP and is now working independently. The exit frees JUA from TTP’s code of conduct and organizational discipline to freelance.

In the past, JuA has carried out attacks in Pakistan on behalf of the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP).

In 2014, JuA’s Omar Khalid Khorasani wanted to become the emir of the Islamic State’s Wilayat Khorasan. However, the Islamic State turned down his demand and appointed Hafiz Saeed Khan Orakzai as the first emir, hence ending their short-lived partnership.

In the past, JuA has threatened China’s economic interests in Pakistan. In 2014, the 9^th issue of JuA’s propaganda magazine Ihya-e-Khilafat ran an article titled “The Hidden Motives Behind the Chinese Investment in Pakistan,” written by its then spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan.

On its part, ISKP is the most vocal anti-China terrorist group in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. It has attacked Chinese nationals and interests in Quetta, Kabul, Kunar, Takhar, Nuristan and Badakhshan. Keeping in view their overlapping anti-China postures, ISKP could once again outsource its anti-China campaign to JuA.

In Balochistan, the southwestern stretch of Pakistan, BLA has been hitting Chinese nationals and interests both vocally and physically since 2018. The recent spate of violence is strategically directed against Chinese economic interests. The alarming rise in BLA’s attacks in Chagai district has created security and logistical issues for Chinese state-owned Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC), which is jointly mining gold and copper from the Saindak Copper and Gold Mine with Pakistan-owned Saindak Metals Limited since the early 2000s. Following the deteriorating security situation and hazardous road conditions in Chagai, especially on the N40 Highway, the MCC has written a letter to Pakistan’s Energy Ministry to ensure the sustainability of supply chains. Otherwise, it has warned that the mining operations could be halted.

Likewise, in April, BLA’s first-ever attack on a patrol boat of the Pakistan Coast Guard (PCG) in the Arabian Sea near Jiwani, and the Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) assault targeting a PCG check post in the same area in July point to new operational capabilities. After attacking the PCG boat, BLA formally announced its naval unit, the Hammal Maritime Defense Force.

The terror group has also used weaponized Chinese commercial drones for attacks in Gwadar. Together, the uptick of violence and new operational capabilities in Chagai and Gwadar, where strategic mines and Gwadar Port are located, ostensibly underline a new phase of the Baloch militants’ anti-China campaign in Balochistan.

Pakistan will have to revamp its internal security framework to ensure security of Chinese projects and nationals in the country. Intelligence coordination among various security institutions, a robust understanding of terrorist networks in areas like Gilgit Baltistan, Malakand, Chagai and Gwadar, will help them devise tailored security frameworks to deter such attacks. At the same time, paying attention to genuine local grievances through a participatory development approach and giving local communities stakes in upcoming CPEC projects will also act as an extra layer of security for China and Pakistan. Increasing the stakes and involvement of local communities in these projects will undermine the ability of terrorist groups to exploit their grievances and recruit them for attacks.