In July 2025, my feature titled “Scripts and Power: How Russian Media Frame the Latinization of the Kazakh Language” was published in The Diplomat. There, I argued, based on my analysis of over 200 articles, that Russian media views Latinization through a politicized lens and relies on conspiratorial, colonial, and nostalgic narratives in commenting on Kazakhstan’s script reform. 

Shortly after, Russian outlet Ritm Evrazii published a piece, “Latin Poison for Kazakhstan,” as a direct response to my feature. Its author, Vladislav Makarov, discussed “the bewilderment among Russians caused by Kazakh officials’ stubborn desire to ban the Cyrillic alphabet.” Makarov further argued that Moldovan or Azerbaijani cultures have not become known worldwide because of their switch to Latin and that the new alphabet serves to “tie [post-Soviet republics] to their new overlords.” 

This piece does not mean that my feature caused a significant stir in Moscow. Nevertheless, it is interesting evidence of how, in responding to an English-language feature about Kazakhstan’s script reform, Makarov reproduced the same Russia-centric narratives described in the original feature. In his words, Kazakhstan has been “connected to the Russian World for centuries,” thus justifying Russia’s commentary on Latinization.  

The script reform in Kazakhstan, aimed at transitioning the Kazakh language from Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet, has been ongoing since 2017. Among the official reasons for the script change are the intentions to strengthen Kazakh identity and language and to rectify the true Kazakh pronunciation, which was affected by the Soviet-imposed Cyrillic script. Conceived under Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, Latinization is to be fully implemented by 2031.

Current President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called for a cautious approach to Latinization. The latest version of the alphabet was presented in 2021, which shares similarities with the common Turkic alphabet adopted by the Organization of Turkic States in 2024. With less than five years left, the alphabet is yet to be finalized. A recent statement by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education assured that the work to improve the latest alphabet version was underway. 

Latinization is intended for the Kazakh language only. So why does Kazakhstan’s script reform, which does not touch Russian at all, provoke such a strong reaction among Russian media? Makarov’s take on the reform sheds light on how Russia perceives Kazakhstan as part of the Russian world, and following this logic, any change within the Russian world affects Moscow. 

The Russian world can be conceptualized as a socially constructed ideological and geopolitical order, which Russia uses to foster belonging, political loyalty, and hierarchy. It rests on the understanding that what unifies the Russian world are the Russian language, the Cyrillic alphabet, and shared history. Its proponents argue that the Russian world is a diverse community representing a multitude of cultures, with Russia holding a legitimately central position.

The Russian world is not a fixed construct and can be adjusted to align with Moscow’s political motivations. It is often juxtaposed with the Western world, portrayed as a civilization in decline. In practice, Moscow uses the Russian world at a variety of levels. One such use is the Russian World Foundation, a state-run institution primarily aimed at promoting and expanding the Russian language, literature, and culture abroad, particularly in Central Asia. Conceptually, Russian media employ the Russian world notion to perpetuate the ideas of Russia’s symbolic and civilizational power. 

My analysis of 77 articles covering Latinization published between 2001 and 2025 by both mainstream (such as Gazeta.Ru, Lenta.Ru, Kommersant) and fringe nationalist outlets (Regnum, Ritm Evrazii) shows how Russian media instrumentalizes the Russian world to engage discursively with the Kazakh alphabet reform. 

Latinization as a Tool to Exit the Russian World

Kazakhstan’s portrayal as a legitimate and natural part of the Russian world is foundational in Russian media coverage of Latinization. Kazakhstan’s presupposed membership in the Russian world enables Russian outlets to present Latinization as a tool Astana is using to exit this transnational civilizational community. Headings such as “Non-Russian World: Kazakhstan is replacing its ‘big brother’” or “Passive defense against the ‘Russian World’” illustrate how Russian media interprets Latinization as a threat to the Russian world’s integrity. The alphabet reform is argued to have the potential to erode the “common cultural space,” which is one of the “invisible links tying together the CIS countries.” The CIS refers to the Commonwealth of Independent States, an intergovernmental organization formed following the dissolution of the Soviet Union that counts among its members most, though not all, of the former Soviet republics.

At the same time, the idea of the Russian world is fused with both the imperial and Soviet past, demonstrating the concept’s flexible nature, and this fusion has a variety of effects. First, as discussed in a 2021 article published by Lenta.Ru, Kazakhstan’s very existence is portrayed as an outcome of Soviet politics, since it was the Bolsheviks “who turned Kazakhs into a nation and gifted them a state.” According to the article, Kazakh “statehood, culture, and script were all created in Moscow.” This framing of Latinization not only links Kazakhstan’s nationhood to the Soviet regime but also presents the alphabet reform as a sign of ingratitude to Moscow, which perceives itself as a successor of the Soviet Union.

In another Lenta.Ru article, from 2017, the authors expressed frustration with how Kazakh history books critically approach the Soviet past, one of the outcomes of which was the devastating famine of the 1930s, claiming the lives of over 1.5 million people (one-third of the ethnic Kazakh population of that period). They labeled Latinization as a “symbolic distancing from Russia’s legacy in Kazakhstan,” signs of which they also see in changing the Soviet geographical names to Kazakh. Hierarchical narratives can be observed in a 2017 Vedomosti article, which calls Russia “a metropole,” from which post-Soviet countries are trying to separate out of fear of being “swallowed by the ‘Russian world.’”  

Within the Russian world framework, the Russian language holds a central position and serves as a link that ties Kazakhstan to this transnational community. The Russian language is inseparable from Cyrillic, which Russian media treat not as a mere script but as a symbolic and visual representation of the Russian world. In presenting Latinization as a threat to both the Russian language and its alphabet, Russian media follow the mechanism that scholar Lara Ryazanova-Clarke defined as an “inverse transnational pride.” This mechanism explains that Moscow treats the Russian language as a shared transnational commodity benefiting a majority of communities across the Russian world. These narratives change once a foreign government starts implementing policies that Russia perceives as hostile, which shifts the perception of Russian from a shared commodity to an object requiring Moscow’s protection. 

The idea that Latinization is threatening the Russian language and Cyrillic is present across the pieces analyzed. Kazakhstan’s alphabet reform is called “an offensive against the Russian language and Cyrillic” in several articles, and the choice of this specific militaristic term aims at equating Latinization with a military operation against the Russian world’s most valuable commodity. Such an offensive is reported to cause an outmigration of ethnic Russians from Kazakhstan, thus drastically altering the country’s demography. Moreover, Latinization is expected to split “the Kazakh nation into two parts” since there will be people refusing to consume information in Latinized Kazakh who will turn to Russian. 

Media call Latinization “a problem for Russia” and view the reform as a broader trend toward the worldwide decline of the Russian language. At the same time, Russian media frames Latinization’s negative impact on Russian as affecting the Kazakh language as well. To support this assumption, Russian media introduce a linguistic hierarchy, whereas they present Russian as superior and more resourceful compared to Kazakh, which is portrayed as subordinate. Kazakh and languages of other post-Soviet countries are called “colloquial in nature,” with Russian media claiming that it would be impossible for scholarship in these countries to develop without a proper proficiency and use of Russian, which provides access to global knowledge. Interestingly, this assumption seems to be internalized by Kazakhs as well, as a Regnum article in 2017 quoted famous Kazakh publicist and writer Seydakhmet Kuttykadam stating that “the Kazakh language and literature will fade away without its donor-language,” which is Russian.  

Equally, Russian media securitize Latinization’s impact on Cyrillic. Latinization is called “terrible news for Russia” because it will no longer be able to “formulate cultural codes” through the alphabet, meaning that Kazakhstan will drift further toward the West. Such narratives help us understand how Russian media view Latinization not as a linguistic reform but as a geopolitical reconfiguration impacting Russia’s standing as a regional superpower. In discussing alleged effects of Latinization on Russian and Cyrillic, authors rarely discuss the practical implications of the new alphabet but rather defend the hierarchical and symbolic order created by Russia and perpetuated through the Russian world notion.  

Latinization as Externally Driven

Another salient theme present in the Russian media is Latinization’s framing as administered externally by the Western powers or Turkiye. Through such narratives, it becomes more evident how Russian media contrasts the Russian world with competing civilizational entities. 

This theme relies heavily on conspiratorial language. For instance, coverage by KM.Ru in 2010 claimed that the planned alphabet change means “preparations for a transformation of public consciousness to adapt it to European civilizational standards.” Similarly, Nezavisimaya Gazeta in 2021 referred to “Anglo-Saxons” who, through imposing the Latin alphabet, want to gain “total control over defeated and enslaved peoples.” 

Turkiye, on the other hand, is seen as a greater civilizational competitor, since it offers Kazakhstan kinship based on Turkic identity, culture, and religion. Media portray Latinization as an outcome of Turkiye’s interference in the internal affairs of Russia, communicated through such headings as “Turkiye is displacing Russia in the post-Soviet space” and “A yatagan in the back. Turkiye is edging ever closer to Russia’s borders.” There seems to be awareness in Russian media that between Turkic and post-Soviet identities, Kazakh people might prefer the former.

Makarov, in his 2025 Ritm Evrazii piece, asked, “Will the Latin alphabet bring the Kazakhs closer to the Turkic world they consider their own? But would a Turk from Istanbul really feel closer to a Kazakh than a Russian from Chelyabinsk?” In asking these questions, he assumed that Latinization was developed in Astana to draw Turkiye and Kazakhstan closer. Such questions are intended to emphasize proximity between Kazakhstan and the Russian world, which is natural and historical, unlike Kazakhstan-Turkiye relations, which are, in this view, politically manufactured rather than based on genuinely shared culture. 

Externalization of Latinization indicates that Russian media view Kazakhstan as subjugated either to the West or Turkiye. Such subjugation is branded as inappropriate and malicious, as these powers seek to meddle in Kazakhstan’s affairs through Latinization. At the same time, the hierarchical positioning of Kazakhstan in relation to Russia is also subjugated in nature, even though never explicitly named as such or criticized. Instead, it is portrayed as beneficial and legitimate.

The outcome of such rhetoric is that Russian media strips Kazakhstan of any agency in carrying out its domestic linguistic reform. By presenting Latinization as a plot by Western or Turkish powers, Russian media negate Kazakhstan’s sovereign decision to reform the alphabet for the Kazakh language on account of its own interests and aims. 

Conclusions

Makarov’s article was never about Cyrillic or Latin. It was about the anxiety across the Russian media over Kazakhstan’s distancing from the hierarchy Makarov and other authors assume to be natural. Readers familiar with Russian foreign policy will not be surprised by the imperial narratives Russian media produce in relation to the Russian world, the Russian language, and Cyrillic. What might be surprising is that such narratives are activated by the script reform intended for the Kazakh language. 

At the same time, among the fear-mongering articles about the destructive consequences of Latinization, there are rarely concrete examples of why the reform would impact Russian and Cyrillic. Instead, Russian media primarily focus on the superiority of the Russian language and its alphabet and on delegitimizing Latinization as an externally driven project by foreign actors. In the end, Russian media is not defending the Russian language or the Cyrillic alphabet, but the symbolic, ideological, and geopolitical hierarchy of the Russian world.     

This feature is based on the author’s ongoing doctoral research on Kazakhstan’s script reform. All data and analysis are from the author’s original corpus and critical discourse analysis. Quotes are translated from Russian to English.