For years, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been presented as a set of trade routes. While infrastructure projects are crucial for growth, another part of China’s work in Central Asia gets much less attention: the links between universities and laboratories.

Uzbekistan is a good example. In October 2026, the second meeting of the Uzbekistan-China Expert Council convened in Tashkent to discuss “Digital Partnership: Artificial Intelligence and the Next-Generation Data Economy.” The meeting demonstrates that China’s engagement with Central Asia does not neglect knowledge networks and scientific cooperation. This matters because scientific partnerships often outlast commercial projects and can shape who trains future researchers and provides access to advanced technologies. Indeed, such meetings start a recurring mechanism through which Chinese and Uzbek academics and technology specialists formulate ideas, standards, and research priorities together. 

According to Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, trade with China reached $13.07 billion in 2024. Uzbekistan exported goods worth $2.64 billion and imported goods worth $10.43 billion. Yet trade figures alone reveal only part of the relationship. Increasingly, Beijing and Tashkent are investing in knowledge production. In September 2025, the two governments signed a cooperation program that links the “Uzbekistan–2030” strategy with the BRI. They also signed agreements on training people and on the digital economy.

In November 2025, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Higher Education, Science, and Innovation reported that universities in the two countries had launched 29 joint study programs in 2024-2025. Another development was the creation of the Muhammad al-Khwarizmi International Mathematical Center at Urgench State University, in partnership with Peking University.

Universities can train talent but their impact ultimately depends on the infrastructure available to convert research into practical outcomes. This is where laboratories are becoming increasingly important. In May 2025, Uzbekistan’s national news agency reported an agreement with a Chinese agricultural technology company to set up a food safety laboratory center. It also reported talks on a laboratory with the Tashkent Institute of Chemical Technology and Xi’an Petroleum University.

We should read such news with care. An agreement or a plan is not the same as a working laboratory that produces research. Still, these reports show where institutions plan to spend their time and money.

By 2026, laboratory initiatives had become part of a broader institutional effort to define priority areas. At the seventh meeting of the Uzbekistan-China subcommission on science and technology cooperation, officials agreed to expand joint projects in artificial intelligence (AI), digital technologies, agricultural biotechnology, new materials, and green energy. They also agreed to work on research facilities, systems that help turn research into business, joint funds, technology parks, and exchanges for young researchers. The key question now is how many of these plans will become real programs with clear results.

Building scientific capacity also requires systems that can protect and commercialize new ideas. Intellectual property (IP) is therefore another important part of the picture. In July 2026, during the meetings of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in Geneva, China’s National Intellectual Property Administration signed two documents with Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Justice. The first is a memorandum on IP cooperation. The second is a Patent Prosecution Highway agreement, which helps patent offices in both countries review applications faster. These agreements open the door to closer patent cooperation. But on their own, they do not show that the two countries now file more joint patents or sell more joint technologies. The official sources used for this article do not give regular data on joint patents, licensed technologies, or research results that have reached the market.

The same shift from traditional cooperation to knowledge-based cooperation is visible in emerging technologies. In July 2026, Uzbekistan became a founding member of the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization. This should not be seen as only a China-Uzbekistan success, because the organization includes many countries. More directly, in October 2026, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Digital Technologies met China’s ambassador to discuss cooperation in AI, data security, and university training. On October 19, the second meeting of the Uzbekistan-China Expert Council in Tashkent discussed AI rules, digital infrastructure, technology transfer, investment, and skills. 

Yet, as elsewhere in the partnership, discussions and agreements remain easier to identify than measurable outcomes. It is important to separate three things: an agreement, an activity that has started, and a measurable result. Announcing a new research center shows ambition. A joint degree program shows that work has begun. Patents, published papers, trained graduates, new technologies used by companies and income from licenses show real results. Without reliable and detailed data, it is too early to say that one country has pushed another out of Uzbekistan’s science system.

One of the most widely used indicators is scientific co-authorship. Chinese universities increasingly promote international co-authorship to expand research networks, raise global visibility, and strengthen their presence in leading scientific databases. When researchers in Uzbekistan collaborate with Chinese institutions, Chinese universities gain not only publications but also a stronger position in setting research agendas, defining priority fields and coordinating long-term research networks. Scientific leadership today is often built through repeated collaboration, access to funding, laboratory infrastructure, doctoral training and publication networks. Co-authorship therefore serves not only as a measure of cooperation but also as a mechanism for accumulating scientific influence over time.

The United States and European countries still play an important role in Uzbekistan’s universities and science ecosystem. A fair comparison would need the same kind of data for each partner: joint publications, citations, researcher exchanges, scholarships, jointly funded laboratories, patents, and links between universities and industry. This data should also be open to checking. It should state which database was used, how author affiliations were counted, which years were covered and when the data was collected. This article does not attempt such a comparison, but future studies should.

For Beijing, science cooperation is a way to stay engaged in the region over the long term. It is less visible than a railway, but it may last longer. For Washington, Brussels, and other partners, it is a reminder that their role in Central Asia should be judged not only by infrastructure loans or security talks, but also by the opportunities they offer young researchers and universities. These partnerships do not exclude each other. Uzbekistan can benefit from science cooperation with many countries at once.