On October 28, Taiwanese media reported that the Secretary for Relations with States of the Holy See, Archbishop Paul Richard Gallagher, addressed the progress of negotiations regarding a Vatican office in China at an event with journalists in Rome. When a reporter asked about the status of these talks, Monsignor Gallagher responded: “The idea is to have some type of cultural presence in Beijing. But, as with everything in a negotiation, there would be a price to pay and, for the moment, we are not willing to pay that price.”

The report drew significant attention in Taiwan and Hong Kong media. This was partly because it cited earlier reporting by the Italian daily Corriere della Sera that, during the tenure of the late Pope Francis, the Vatican’s Secretariat of State repeatedly expressed a long-standing desire to establish a “permanent office” in China. Corriere della Sera also noted that Beijing proposed a precondition, demanding that the Vatican first sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. 

The Taiwanese news outlet ETtoday followed up, using the headline, “Beijing Proposes ‘Severing Ties with Taiwan’ in Exchange for an Office? Vatican Foreign Minister: Not Prepared to Pay the Price for Now.” Meanwhile, Hong Kong’s TVB provided an in-depth report headlined, “Vatican Foreign Minister: Sino-Vatican Bishop Agreement Flawed, Holy See Has No Intention of Setting Up Office in Beijing.” Archbishop Gallagher’s remarks about establishing an office have undoubtedly struck a sensitive nerve in cross-strait relations.

However, while Archbishop Gallagher mentioned that “there would be a price to pay,” he did not explicitly state what that “price” entails. A report by INFOVATICANA simply noted, “The archbishop did not wish to specify what the demands would be to reach such an understanding. Currently, the Holy See maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan and has a study mission in Hong Kong, but does not have official diplomatic representation in the People’s Republic of China.” 

Reuters’ reporting focused solely on Gallagher’s admission of the provisional agreement’s flaws, quoting him as saying: “It’s not easy, the dialogue is not easy. The imperfections of the agreement are evident, but there is a commitment to persevere in dialogue… and that is what will continue to happen.”

Comparing Chinese and English media reports, the assertion that the “price” the Holy See must pay – but is currently unwilling to – involves severing ties with Taiwan seems to be an interpretation by Chinese-language media of past Italian reporting, which in turn reflected the Chinese Communist Party-led government’s stated position. 

Beyond the political maneuvering between Taiwan and China over formal Vatican recognition, what is the Holy See’s real motive for establishing an office in China? Is it to forge diplomatic relations, or is it a procedural step in negotiating the agreement on the appointment of bishops? 

I believe it is necessary to clarify the significance of this “office” through the lens of the Holy See’s pastoral mechanism for China – specifically, the appointment of bishops. The Vatican’s effort to establish a presence in Beijing should not be oversimplified as “the Holy See rejecting China’s demand to break ties with Taiwan” or “the Holy See currently having no intention of opening an office in Beijing.”

As to whether this issue will return to the Sino-Vatican negotiating table, some scholars believe that the issue of setting up an office is unlikely to be discussed in near-term negotiations, now that the policy position is clear. I disagree; establishing an “office” will almost certainly remain an active topic of discussion. My primary argument is that an on-the-ground presence is necessary to properly implement the Sino-Vatican agreement. A Papal delegate’s presence in Beijing is necessary for good governance over the episcopal appointment process. Beijing is deliberately misinterpreting the purpose of this “office” as a matter of diplomatic negotiation over cross-strait relations, masking its true reluctance to loosen its control over the Catholic Church’s religious freedom.

While traveling in a devoutly Catholic European country, I had the privilege of attending its National Day reception. During the event, I met a senior Holy See diplomat assigned to that nation. Out of curiosity, I asked, “Father, what does your daily work entail? Being in such a devout Catholic country, is your work fairly smooth?” The diplomat replied, “Not exactly. 90 percent of my work involves investigating bishop appointments. I need to understand the backgrounds of so many clergy members to determine who is suitable to become a bishop.” This Holy See diplomat’s statement truthfully outlined the core mission of a papal diplomat. Fulfilling pastoral care in a local Catholic Church includes vetting candidates for the episcopacy as a primary task.

The Holy See and the People’s Republic of China signed a provisional agreement on the appointment of bishops in 2018, and renewed it in 2024 for another four years, until 2028. Since the signing of the agreement, the Pope has appointed several bishops in China, resulting in an increasingly rejuvenated Chinese Catholic episcopate. However, the process by which China selects bishop candidates remains a black box. Because there is no true religious freedom in China, the Catholic Church remains under severe control of the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work Department. 

Scholars note that, even without a formal Holy See-Vatican office in China, certain civic organizations operated by religious orders may play intermediary roles. Yet these unofficial mechanisms are far less institutionalized than establishing a direct, official office in Beijing. Regarding the Holy See’s process for selecting bishop candidates, a significant concern is whether the background of every episcopal candidate can be vetted in a diverse and transparent manner. If the Holy See does not have an official delegate in China – and if that representative cannot investigate freely while possessing completely uncontrolled personal liberty – then establishing a Holy See-Vatican office in Beijing is a false proposition, one that merely falls into the CCP’s diplomatic narrative of coercing the Holy See over whether to sever ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan).

In the article “Diplomacy and Divided Nations: The Holy See’s Approach to China and Taiwan,” published in the journal Issues & Studies, Yun Wang and I analyzed the distinction between a Papal Delegation and an Apostolic Nunciature. The core differences lie in the presence of “Diplomatic Recognition” and whether the primary counterpart for engagement is the “local government” or the “local church.” These two terms represent entirely different tiers of diplomatic tools the Vatican uses across varying political environments and historical periods. Whether the Holy See-Vatican is pushing to establish a Papal Delegation or an Apostolic Nunciature in Beijing becomes clearer when we look at another Asian communist state the Holy See engages with: Vietnam. 

The office in Beijing is truly intended to be a Papal Delegation, an ecclesiastical rather than diplomatic office. However, the CCP cleverly conflates the two. When the Holy See proposes a Papal Delegation to China, Beijing counters that establishing an Apostolic Nunciature requires “first severing ties with Taipei.” This is a malicious interpretation to disguise China’s basic lack of religious freedom.

This year marks the 400th anniversary of Catholicism’s arrival in Taiwan. The Chargé d’Affaires of the Apostolic Nunciature to China (Taipei), Monsignor Stefano Mazzotti, has attended multiple events marking the anniversary. “This year marks the 400th anniversary of the arrival of the first Catholic missionaries in Taiwan to evangelize,” he said in one such speech. “Today, the Catholic Church has taken deep root and become an indispensable part of Taiwan’s diverse society. The Holy See will work hand in hand with the international community, including Taiwan, to continue to develop and consolidate the Church’s mission within the framework of ‘security and freedom,’” 

As my previous article “Taiwan-Vatican Ties: The Dynamic Interplay Under Pope Leo XIV” indicated, amid shifting Sino-Vatican dynamics, Taiwan has no reason to worry. In the eyes of the Holy See, Taiwan remains an undeniably “precious” presence. I firmly believe Taiwan can be decoupled from the Sino-Vatican negotiation narrative, and indeed, it must be. Neither Taiwan nor the Holy See should fall into the narrative trap maliciously set by the Chinese Communist Party.