Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to New Delhi last month for the BRICS summit prompted speculation that India and China are moving toward a reset. Some see an opening for rapprochement, while others attribute the renewed engagement to deteriorating India-U.S. relations. Both interpretations overstate the shift in bilateral ties. Xi’s visit was important, but it did not mark a turning point.

Xi came to New Delhi for the BRICS summit in September, which also gave him an opportunity to meet Prime Minister Narendra Modi. India and China’s participation in BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) should not be mistaken for an alignment of interests. India’s engagement within multilateral organizations is a longstanding feature of its foreign policy, and China has not been a decisive factor in that approach.

Since the 2020 Galwan clashes, India has sought to stabilize ties and manage differences with China. These efforts have gained momentum amid U.S President Donald Trump’s increasingly hostile policies toward India and much of Asia. Yet the reasons for renewed engagement with Beijing go beyond the state of India-U.S. relations.

The resumption of high-level dialogue, leadership meetings, and direct connectivity are important developments. Another Galwan-like border confrontation would carry heavy domestic costs and could be difficult to recover from. Preventing a recurrence of such violence is a priority. But this does not require India to reconsider its position on the underlying differences.

It is also important to note that India never abandoned dialogue with China after Galwan. Keeping communication channel open has remained part of its approach, even as tensions persisted along the border. The latest meetings continue that policy; they do not demonstrate that the relationship or India’s approach to it has fundamentally changed.

The border remains the principal obstacle. China’s recent statement that it does not recognize the Union Territory of Ladakh underlined the depth of the disagreement. There is little basis for expecting a reset while the two sides remain so far apart on territorial issues. Nor is the border the only source of friction. China’s relationship with Pakistan and the persistent trade imbalance remain contentious issues, too. There is little evidence of progress on any of these fundamental differences.

The separate readouts issued after the Modi-Xi meeting offered further evidence of the distance between them. There was no joint statement. The Chinese readout included a reference to Tibet and Taiwan that was absent from the Indian account. Beijing described India as a partner, but the Indian readout did not use the same language. The differences in wording hardly suggest a shared political understanding.

Deteriorating India-U.S. relations and uncertainty over Washington’s commitment to Indo-Pacific security have shaped the circumstances in which New Delhi engages Beijing. But it would be a mistake to explain India’s China policy primarily through its relationship with the United States. India has its own reasons to avoid another border crisis, and its willingness to maintain dialogue with China predates the current difficulties with Washington.

The suggestion that worsening ties with the U.S. have left India isolated, or made the Indo-Pacific less relevant, also overlooks the agency of regional countries. Their security concerns remain, regardless of changes in Washington’s priorities. The U.S. remains important to collective regional security, but uncertainty over its commitments does not remove the need for cooperation among countries in the region. The more immediate concern for Washington is the effect of its policies on its credibility among regional allies and partners. If confidence in the U.S. weakens, the consequences could extend across the Indo-Pacific. 

India’s security interests do not begin and end with its relationship with the U.S. Even as ties with Washington come under strain, New Delhi must contend with its own regional challenges. This does not mean India and China will draw closer. New Delhi can manage relations with Beijing while reassessing its ties with Washington; neither relationship necessarily dictates the other. Efforts to manage differences with China are consistent with India’s longstanding approach of preserving options without compromising its security concerns.

China-India relations are still short of their pre-2020 status quo. Security cooperation is limited, and military exercises such as Hand-in-Hand remain suspended. The trust needed for closer cooperation has yet to be restored, and the prospects seem far-fetched for now. 

For India, the unresolved border dispute remains a central security concern. The Galwan clashes changed India’s view of and threat perception from China and raised serious questions about the viability of the existing arrangements in ensuring peace along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). High-level meetings can help manage tensions for the time being, but they cannot substitute for progress on the ground. India is also unlikely to return to its previous position on the One China policy without some reference to, or assurance regarding, a corresponding One India policy from Beijing. Such an assurance appears unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Just a couple of years ago, a meeting between Xi and Modi on Indian soil seemed difficult to imagine. That is one of the reasons why their meeting drew so much attention. But it has not changed the scope or nature of the issues dividing the two countries. For now, both sides are trying to prevent another crisis while their core disagreements remain unresolved. Until those differences are addressed, dialogue may keep the relationship from deteriorating further, but it will not put China-India ties on the path to a reset.