April 23 marks the 77th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and the celebration events throughout China showcase Beijing’s expansion of domestic port calls. Some 40 warships participated in anniversary events across 10 cities, from Qingdao and Shanghai to Guangzhou and Sanya. 

These visits are normalizing naval engagement at home and reinforcing political messaging. This inward effort helps familiarize the Chinese public with the PLAN and build confidence in the service.

The PLAN traditionally uses overseas port visits to enable global operations and further diplomatic objectives. Domestic visits are now more frequent. PLAN port visits throughout coastal China have increased over the past two years, with at least 15 visits accounting for 20 percent of total port calls. An increase in domestic port calls points to a priority of making the navy visible at home and reinforcing political legitimacy.

A central feature of these visits are the large “open to the public” ship tours. The tours provide civilians access to modern warships and crew, just like U.S. Navy public engagements during Fleet Weeks. Both navies utilize the visits to educate the public on their missions. While such engagements also likely boost PLAN recruitment, similar to the U.S. Navy, the broader goal is familiarity, making the PLAN’s power both routine and visible.

PLAN public ship tours are not new. The PLAN has historically offered such opportunities to the public during major holidays and the PLAN anniversaries. It is just that these events are growing in scale and reach. Activities have extended beyond traditional fleet concentrations to major population centers and key maritime economic zones. This helps make the PLAN’s capability something tangible rather than an occasional show of force on China Central Television’s Defense and Military Channel, CCTV-7.

The PLAN 2025 anniversary demonstrates the change. Thirty warships visited and hosted public tours throughout coastal China. Notably, newer warships like the Shijiazhuang (DDG 106), the Kaifeng (FFG 124), and the Chengdu (DDG 120) participated and were opened to the public. The PLAN used several methods to attract interest, such as widely reported inflatable pandas on the Chengdu, linking the warship to the famous panda reserve in the namesake city.

China’s strategy aims to make naval activity a routine aspect of daily life rather than simply a gesture of transparency.

Visits are also used to advance domestic economic and development objectives. The Yulin (FFG 569) visited the new Yulin City commercial port in Beihai during the 2024 National Day Golden Week. Yulin is landlocked; the commercial port in Beihai – funded by the Yulin City government – helps connect the inland city to maritime trade. State media highlighted the visit to promote regional development and emphasized the importance of maritime infrastructure in China’s domestic Belt and Road-linked initiatives. The PLAN thus became a symbol of economic integration and progress, as well as security.

Concurrently, port visits serve a more specific national security purpose. The Shandong (CV 17) visited Hong Kong in July 2025 for the 28th anniversary of the handover. Public access to the Shandong, China’s first domestically built aircraft carrier, reinforces national identity. It also underscores central authority. Here, naval presence supports political messaging more directly. PLA editorials emphasized this by calling the Shandong’s visit a show of military strength and political symbolism. 

Commentators saw the carrier’s visit as highlighting the connection between national security and Hong Kong’s stability. Public ship tours were also described as promoting national identity and strengthening confidence in governance after the National Security Law. Collectively, the visit was portrayed as showcasing CCP achievements and reinforcing Party legitimacy.

Ultimately, these activities show a clear domestic push. What was once primarily outward-facing naval diplomacy is now expanding inward. The PLAN is being woven into China’s political narrative and social fabric. This has external implications. A public more familiar with naval power may be more supportive of its use.

As the PLAN continues to grow in size and operational capacity, this inward focus matters. Domestic naval engagement aids in the recruitment of more technically sound personnel needed to operate the PLAN’s modern platforms. It also familiarizes the Chinese public with the PLAN and helps build confidence in the service as it maintains a more consistent presence beyond China’s shores, especially in times of crisis or conflict.