In recent months, the Australia government has been incredibly active on the diplomatic front, from new security agreements with multiple Pacific Island countries to visits to Australia by the Japanese, Indian, New Zealand, and Vietnamese leaders. This week Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul made his way to Australia. 

For both Canberra and Bangkok, there is a desire to build more substantive regional relationships as a hedge against both a more unreliable Washington and a more assertive Beijing – as well as buttress against the rippling effects of the competition between the two superpowers. The Australia-Thailand relationship is therefore less about alliance-building than about building greater resilience through diversifying partnerships, and creating a latticework of cooperation within the Indo-Pacific region.

The two prime ministers signed a series of agreements during Anutin’s visit that sought to give this strategy practical substance. These included deepening cooperation on transnational crime, including online scams, cybercrime, money laundering, human trafficking, and narcotics. The purpose of these agreements is to enable greater information sharing and coordination between the two countries’ law enforcement agencies. 

Alongside this, the prime ministers committed to deepening economic engagement. Since the signing of the Thailand-Australia Free Trade Agreement in 2005, trade between the two countries has tripled, with Thailand becoming Australia’s fifth largest source of imports. But both countries believe there is room for expansion. They highlighted that cooperation across agriculture, clean energy, education, healthcare, critical technologies, resources, creative industries, and the digital economy were areas of greater ambition. 

The other major announcement was the establishment of a biennial defense ministers’ meeting. The two countries have had a longstanding, but low-key, defense relationship. A bilateral military exercise called Thai Boomerang was established in 1992, and Thailand has participated in major multilateral exercises in Australia like Talisman Sabre. But consultation on defense policies has been limited. The establishment of a regular forum for the defense ministers to meet and coordinate is a positive elevation of the partnership.

It is unlikely that the two countries will become treaty allies anytime soon. Instead the deepening of the partnership is part of a strategy of diversifying partners, as well as an understanding of security in more holistic terms. 

Anutin highlighted this in his August 18 address to the Lowy Institute in Sydney, titled “Beyond the Thailand-Australia Bilateral Strategic Partnership: Advancing International Order through Regional and Minilateral Cooperation.” In the speech, he argued that geopolitics, economics, and technology are becoming increasingly intertwined, leaving middle and smaller powers facing far more uncertainty. Rather than choosing sides in great power competition, Anutin argued that countries like Thailand and Australia have an interest in strengthening cooperation with each other and through regional institutions and smaller groupings.

There is also a recognition that the great powers are unavoidable. Thailand maintains strong ties with the United States, while also valuing its relationship with China. But when trust in a great power is low – as it is at present – other multilateral and minilateral institutions and cooperation gives middle and smaller powers greater options, more flexibility and room to maneuver.  

This is particularly important as the concept of security becomes broader. Anutin described traditional defense cooperation alongside economic resilience, supply chains, technology, and energy as interrelated elements. He highlighted that this is increasingly a concern in Southeast Asia where there is a confluence of disrupted trade and energy flows, transnational crime, cyber threats, technological competition, and armed conflict. Australia stands as a trusted and low-friction partner able to help navigate this complexity. 

For Australia, while the bilateral relationship is important, the more valuable element is further integration into the regional architecture. Australia’s ability to be seen as a trusted and important partner for ASEAN is vital for Canberra’s diplomatic priorities. The creation of the Office of Southeast Asia in 2022 within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) was an indication of this priority. Alongside the Office of the Pacific, there is a level of senior coordination and bureaucratic focus that other regions are not afforded within Australian foreign policy. 

This may seem odd given Australia’s security ties to the United States, its vast trading relationship with Northeast Asia, and its cultural links to Europe. But it’s a statement of where Canberra wants to be. The building of collaboration with countries like Thailand is central to Australia’s long-term strategic vision. This effort may be piecemeal and focused on practical cooperation, but it builds the relationship brick by brick, rather than through any single grand gesture.