On August 16, U.S. President Donald Trump posted another photograph of himself with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on Truth Social. Trump noted that the two did not look particularly friendly in that image, but added that they actually “get along GREAT.” The next day, Trump again invoked his relationship with Kim while describing North Korea as having been “unthreatening and respectful” during his presidency. 

This was not the first time Trump had posted similar messages. There is little doubt that Trump wants to meet with Kim, as he did three times during his first term in office. The more interesting question is whether the interest is mutual. Would Kim also want to meet Trump again?

Many analysts seem to believe that he would not. Kim is in a stronger position today than he was during his summit diplomacy with Trump in 2018 and 2019. Russia’s military and economic cooperation with North Korea has reduced Pyongyang’s urgency to obtain sanctions relief from Washington. Moscow has also significantly weakened the United Nations sanctions regime by vetoing the renewal of the Panel of Experts to monitor sanctions implementation. Meanwhile, China has been restoring its relationship with North Korea, while bilateral trade has returned to pre-pandemic levels. Kim therefore has less immediate need for a deal with Washington.

Yet there are still at least six compelling reasons why he might want to meet Trump.

First, a summit with Trump could help Kim further consolidate North Korea’s status as a nuclear-armed state. Trump has repeatedly described North Korea as a nuclear-armed country. On October 24, 2025, before his Asia tour, Trump was asked whether he would recognize North Korea as a nuclear state. He responded that North Korea “already” had many nuclear weapons. He had also previously referred to North Korea as a “nuclear power.” Such remarks do not amount to formal U.S. recognition of North Korea as a legitimate nuclear-weapon state. Nevertheless, from Kim’s perspective, Trump may be the first – and perhaps the last – American president willing to negotiate with him on the basis of North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons. Another summit could further consolidate North Korea’s status as a de facto nuclear state, even in the absence of formal recognition.

Second, Kim could use negotiations with Trump to reduce the security threat posed by U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). Trump has long argued that U.S. allies should assume more responsibility for their own defense. His recent Truth Social message suggested that this view continues to influence his approach to Korea. Citing the high cost of South Korea-U.S. military exercises, Trump said that he had instructed Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth to “substantially reduce the Joint Military Exercises.” For Pyongyang, which has long portrayed these exercises as rehearsals for invasion, such a reduction would have obvious strategic value. Trump may not withdraw U.S. forces from South Korea altogether, but Kim could reasonably expect him to reduce the size of USFK, as well as its role and activities on the peninsula.

Third, renewed summit diplomacy could reduce Kim’s fear of direct U.S. military action against him. Recent American operations, including the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro and the war with Iran, have demonstrated Washington’s ability to combine precise intelligence with sophisticated military capabilities. Pyongyang has long worried about the possibility of a U.S. “decapitation” operation targeting the North Korean leadership. North Korea’s nuclear arsenal provides powerful deterrence against a major attack, but Kim cannot entirely disregard the possibility of a decapitation attack against him during an extreme confrontation. Restoring personal diplomacy with Trump would substantially reduce such a risk.

Fourth, improving relations with the United States would give North Korea greater room to maneuver in its relationship with China. Pyongyang has long sought to exploit competition among great powers to preserve its autonomy, and China is no exception. North Korea depends heavily on China’s economic support, but dependence has never meant complete political trust. Its nuclear weapons are primarily intended to deter the United States, but they can also give Pyongyang greater autonomy from Beijing. North Korean leaders have occasionally suggested that better relations with Washington could serve a similar purpose. Former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recounted separate conversations held decades apart, in which Kim Jong Il and then Kim Jong Un expressed concerns about China and an interest in closer relations with the United States as a counterweight.

Fifth, a breakthrough with Washington could help Pyongyang isolate South Korea diplomatically. In early 2024, North Korea formally abandoned its longstanding commitment to reunification and began defining South Korea as a separate and “hostile” state. Pyongyang has since shown little interest in reversing this approach. It has rejected the Lee Jae-myung administration’s persistent offers of dialogue while maintaining an adversarial posture toward Seoul. A Kim-Trump meeting could reinforce this strategy. By dealing directly with the U.S. president, Kim could demonstrate that major issues concerning the Korean Peninsula can be negotiated between Pyongyang and Washington without Seoul playing a role. 

Sixth, another summit with Trump could strengthen Kim’s domestic legitimacy. The political benefits could be even greater than those of the previous summits in 2018 and 2019. As discussed above, if Kim can indeed improve relations with the United States while retaining his nuclear weapons, reducing the U.S. military presence in South Korea, balancing against China, and sidelining South Korea, he could claim an achievement worthy of being called a “strategic genius.” This would be particularly useful at a time when Kim may face domestic questions about the costs and casualties associated with North Korea’s military deployment to Russia. A successful summit could provide an important new source of prestige and political legitimacy.

One remaining question is how China would view another Kim-Trump summit. Pyongyang has not always been obedient to Beijing’s demands, and it would be difficult for China, in principle, to prevent North Korea from pursuing a summit with the United States. Still, Beijing would want to ensure that its influence and interests are reflected in any North Korea-U.S. summit. This is one reason why Xi Jinping traveled to Pyongyang for the first time in seven years to meet Kim Jong Un in person. If Kim is going to meet Trump, North Korea and China would have incentives to coordinate strategically to extract the greatest possible concessions from the United States on issues such as U.S. military activities on the Korean Peninsula and near the Taiwan Strait.

In short, Kim Jong Un has more reasons to pursue a meeting with Trump than to hesitate. Although it is difficult to predict the exact timing, the probability of another Kim-Trump meeting remains high. This is why analysts need to closely watch the structural changes that a new North Korea-U.S. summit could bring to East Asia, as well as the strategic intentions of the countries involved.