In May, Gwadar Port handled a 53,277-ton steel billet shipment aboard a Chinese vessel whose original destination was Sohar Port in Oman. The ship was diverted to Gwadar and the Pakistani port benefited. Since the start of the U.S. war on Iran in February, Gwadar Port has welcomed several such diverted transshipments.

Over the last decade, Gwadar has struggled to attract business and maintain its economic viability on the global stage. Despite funding from China for its construction, development and connectivity as part of the larger China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), it is only in recent months that Gwadar is attracting business and seeing increased activity.  The U.S. war in Iran and the uncertainty in the Strait of Hormuz has brought in business to Gwadar that otherwise may have gone to other ports in the region.

Discussions about Gwadar Port’s potential often focus on the economic benefits to be reaped. However, it is Gwadar’s strategic location and relevance, which cannot be measured solely through the volume of cargo it handles, that makes it a prize attracting several countries.

Gwadar is situated just outside the Strait of Hormuz and across the Arabian Peninsula. Its location has been historically important from a security, trade, and geopolitical perspective.

The Iran-U.S. war has dealt a severe blow to security in the region, increased maritime trade disruptions, and thrown up geopolitical challenges. For Gwadar, the war has brought more business and, importantly, made it the focus of interest of near and distant countries. One country whose interest in Gwadar has grown since the Israel-U.S. attacks on Iran started is the United States

Washington recognized Gwadar’s importance long before Beijing’s investment in the port and CPEC began. It was, in fact, the U.S. Geological Survey of Balochistan that identified Gwadar in 1954 as a suitable location for the development of a seaport. At the time, even though it was undeveloped and small, Gwadar was already an active seaport along the Arabian Sea and was part of the maritime trade networks of the region. It was an Omani enclave until 1958, and was later transferred to Pakistan.

The United States has long considered the maritime routes in the Gulf and surrounding waters as among the most strategically important in the world, particularly because of their role in global energy supplies and shipping.

Therefore, the U.S. has maintained its presence in the waters near the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Peninsula since the 1940s. The U.S. Navy first established a regular presence in West Asia through the creation of the U.S. Navy Middle East Force (MEF) in 1949. Since then, the U.S. has established its naval presence throughout the region.

One of the closest such arrangements to Gwadar is in Oman. In 2019, the United States and Oman signed a deal in which Oman allowed the U.S. Navy to use the ports of Duqm and Salalah.

Hence, Gwadar’s proximity to the Strait of Hormuz, Iran, and the wider networks of strategically important maritime routes have made it very relevant to Washington’s regional interests.

This importance increased when China’s interest in the region began to grow. China’s investments in Gwadar over the years, its development of CPEC, and its maritime ambitions for Gwadar, as well as Pakistan’s close relationship with both Iran and China, added another layer to Gwadar’s importance in Washington’s eyes.

Hence, the U.S. always kept an eye on Gwadar. Now, as Gwadar’s importance surges amid the rapidly changing geopolitics in the region, it is occupying a central place on Washington’s radar.

A report from the U.S. Naval War College also identified Gwadar as a potential candidate for expanded Chinese naval operations. The report cited Pakistan’s close political, military, and economic ties with China as factors raising future possibilities for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) at Gwadar Port.

Meanwhile, in an effort to balance its relations with China and the U.S., and amid Washington’s growing interest in Gwadar, Pakistan in September 2025 offered Washington its Pasni port, located just 100 kilometers from Gwadar.

There are also reports that, as part of the U.S. ambition to expand its maritime influence in the region and in response to concerns over China’s growing control of global port infrastructure, the Trump administration is seeking to weaken China’s influence. The U.S. plans to do so by bringing strategically important ports controlled by China under Western influence. Although the report mentioned 23 such ports, it did not identify all of them.

At the same time, the Sino-U.S. relationship is also evolving. On the one hand, relations seem to be stabilizing, even improving. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the U.S. and his meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump hold out the possibility of cooperation between the two nations. However, this diplomatic engagement does not eliminate competition between the two big powers.

For Washington, China’s long-term and uninterrupted interest and investment in Gwadar Port and CPEC is of concern, particularly because it fears that China plans to develop strategic and military interests in the region. It has often accused China of attempting to use foreign ports owned by Chinese companies, such as Gwadar, to project naval power.

As for China, although it has not yet benefited economically from Gwadar Port, it does not want to let go of Gwadar. This is because Gwadar Port and CPEC ease China’s “Malacca Dilemma.”

While it is clear now that Gwadar’s geographic and geopolitical value far exceeds its economic benefits, whether Washington will translate its interest in Gwadar and the region around it into a policy toward establishing a presence around Gwadar remains unclear. Whether it has accepted Pakistan’s proposal for Pasni Port’s development has not been made public yet.