When Indonesia and China held their first “2+2” dialogue between foreign ministers and defense ministers in April 2025, the meeting marked a new chapter in the bilateral relations of the two countries. The two countries held the 2+2 dialogue again on August 21, 2026, in Jakarta. 

However, the significance of the 2+2 should not be measured solely by its symbolism. The strategic value actually lies in how far both countries can use the forum to manage differences while still maximizing their respective national interests. Already, this year’s 2+2 dialogue resulted in an agreement increasing the intensity of joint military exercises and plans to open joint munition factories in Indonesia, in line with the current national interests of both countries.

The relationship between Indonesia and China has fluctuated throughout history. Indonesia severed diplomatic relations with China entirely during the period from 1967 to 1990. Since ties were restored, the relationship between the two countries has continued to develop, and China has even become Indonesia’s largest trading partner. 

The closeness of the two countries in economic aspects influences the Indonesian public’s perception of China. According to “The State of Southeast Asia” survey released by the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, if the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China in the region were to escalate into an open conflict and Indonesia were faced with a scenario of having to choose sides, the majority of respondents from Indonesia would choose China. The preference for siding with China reached its highest point in the latest survey, at 80.1 percent.

However, China’s important economic position for Indonesia and even its clear “win” in survey results do not mean that Beijing can rest on its laurels.

China still has a lot of homework to do if it wants to secure its influence in Indonesia, especially when it comes to defense and security. When it comes to economic influence and public opinion, China significantly outperforms the United States – but in the defense sector, China is far behind. This lag is evident in both quantity and quality.

The data shows the gap in at least two aspects. First, the bilateral joint military exercises between the two countries. Based on IISS data, during the 2003-2022 period, Indonesia and China conducted joint exercises only four times. This number is far behind the 110 joint military exercises held between Indonesia and the United States during the same period.

Moreover, amid China’s emergence as one of the world’s top arms exporters, it can be said that Indonesia has not yet adopted Chinese weapons. According to data from the Laboratorium Indonesia 2045, throughout Indonesia’s history, its military has only operated three types of Chinese-made defense technology.

Both bilateral military exercises and the arms trade have long been believed to be instruments of defense diplomacy as well as strategies for exerting influence. And both metrics indicate that the defense cooperation ties between China and Indonesia are arguably weak. 

Beyond the statistical data as mentioned earlier, the defense cooperation between Indonesia and China is arguably weaker compared to that between Indonesia and the United States in terms of substance as well. The defense relationship between Indonesia and the United States appears to be more institutionalized, as shown most recently by the Major Defense Cooperation Agreement signed in April 2026.

Stronger relations are also evident from the resilience of cooperation between Indonesia and the United States. Although it experienced setbacks due to the imposition of an embargo and the suspension of Indonesian military officers’ participation in the International Military Education and Training (IMET), the defense relationship between the two countries was able to return to normal and continues to develop to this day. This is different from the China-Indonesia defense relationship, which is described as underdeveloped.

Considering the reality of the relatively weak defense relationship between Indonesia and China, the agreements reached in this year’s 2+2 dialogue will be important for both countries. The two key agreements are the commitment to increase the intensity of joint military exercises and the plan to build joint munition, rocket, and missile factories in Indonesia.

As previously mentioned, the intensity of military interactions between the two countries is still very minimal. China certainly does not want this situation to continue, especially in the context of geopolitical competition with the United States in Southeast Asia today. After all, Indonesia is often referred to as the natural leader of ASEAN. 

Increased joint military exercises will serve as an instrument for China to strengthen its defense relations and influence in Indonesia. The establishment of ammunition and rocket factories in Indonesia is certainly a strategy by China to increase the sale of Chinese weapon technology to Indonesia, which is still very limited. Moreover, Indonesia requires technology transfer in every purchase of arms technology from other countries. The joint factories would make it more tempting for Indonesia to acquire Chinese-made arms technology.

Meanwhile, for Indonesia, the increased intensity of joint military exercises with China can also be utilized as a form of strategic hedging. As a country that adheres to an “free and active” foreign policy, Indonesia does not want to be seen as being aligned with any particular power bloc. Therefore, Indonesia needs to ensure that its defense diplomacy with both the United States and China is equally strong. The establishment of joint munition, rocket, and missile factories can also provide alternative sources of new arms technology for Indonesia, which is actively modernizing its armaments. In particular, Indonesia is currently paying more attention to the utilization of missiles to implement an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy.

However, translating these agreements into mutual gain requires Jakarta to carefully manage accompanying strategic risks. Establishing joint munition, rocket, and missile factories with Beijing introduces complex challenges, including potential anxiety among ASEAN neighbors, technical friction regarding interoperability with Indonesia’s existing Western-heavy hardware, and scrutiny from Western defense partners. To maintain its non-aligned posture, Indonesia must ensure these joint ventures remain strictly focused on sovereign defense modernization and technology absorption, rather than creating strategic vulnerabilities or unintended geopolitical commitments. 

Ultimately, the China-Indonesia 2+2 dialogue reflects a convergence of pragmatic interests. For Beijing, it offers a key mechanism to deepen defense engagement in a vital region. For Jakarta, it provides a strategic opportunity to bolster their defense industry capacity and balance major power relations. If managed with strategic clarity and rigorous risk mitigation, the 2+2 dialogue can evolve into a pivotal mechanism for shaping regional stability and reinforcing Indonesia’s strategic autonomy.