The Indian Army recently announced the operationalization of the first-batch of long-overdue Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs), the idea for which was first conceived in 2004, under the aegis of the limited-war doctrine known as the Cold Start Doctrine. 

Why is the Indian Army again tilting toward establishing IBGs when the more agile Rudra brigade concept was introduced last year? Will IBGs replace the Rudra brigades? When will they be deployed, who will lead them, and what would be their composition?

Since the inception of the IBGs, they have been framed as formations to launch offensive operations against Pakistan under the nuclear overhang. As such, the status of the IBGs has security implications for Pakistan.

The idea of an IBG was copied from the Soviet Operational Maneuver Group (OMG), which was tasked with piercing through an adversary’s well-guarded defenses. The Indian Army began to consider adapting to a new, small, and mobile combined force after the swift mobilization of its bulky strike corps failed during Operation Parakaram in 2001-02. The composition of an IBG will depend on the terrain where it is deployed. However, their numbers are expected to remain between 5,000 and 6,000. 

As far as command of the IBG is concerned, conflicting reports have circulated in the Indian media. As its size is nearly equal to two brigades, it is expected that a major general will have operational control of an IBG, with a brigadier-rank officer possibly serving as the chief operations officer. The rationale behind the appointment of a major general is to reduce operational and, especially, bureaucratic red-tape, thus allowing the IBG commander to act independently and in coordination with the higher chain of command in real time. 

The Indian Army is expected to roll out four IBGs along with a fire support group (FSG) in the initial phase, with the first IBG to be carved out of the Panagarh-based Mountain Strike Corps XVII, based in West Bengal. The remaining three are likely to be established in the coming months. The FSG will play an important role operationalizing towed/self-propelled rocket artillery assets and long-range loitering munitions to provide additional fire support to advancing IBGs. 

An important question is why the Indian Army decided to establish IBGs when a similarly agile formation, the Rudra brigade, is already operational. This decision was undertaken because the Indian Army identified inherent structural issues after standing up at least two Rudra brigades. For instance, the sanctioned strength of 3,000 personnel was too small for the range of missions. Operations in the deserts of Rajasthan and plains of Punjab, for example, require mechanized formations to conduct rapid assaults. Dislodging the adversary from their entrenched, fortified positions requires a sizeable mechanized force, along with other arms, to overwhelm the defending forces. 

As mechanized formations are involved, this requires additional petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) stocks, as well as swift replenishment of ammunition and specialized equipment, to clear mine fields before the commencement of military operations. All of this demands additional troops in a supporting role. 

Therefore, the Indian Army shifted back to the IBG concept, because such groups provide the desired force to act decisively.  

The arrival of IBGs on the horizon does not imply that Rudra brigades will be disbanded; rather, they are likely to continue to exist but with a different role. They can be used as rapid-response units to assist Indian Army troops deployed along the border. The rationale is simple: A Rudra brigade is an all-inclusive mobile force, which can be sent as a quick response unit for a shorter duration to not only repulse an attack but, with a limited offensive capability, to prepare the ground for a counterattack to be exploited by the incoming IBGs or other strike formations from the Indian Army’s strike corps. 

Another key question is under what circumstances will the Indian Army deploy the IBGs. Given the history of the IBGs’ conception, they are expected to be deployed when tensions between India and Pakistan reach an all-time high. Given India’s actions in 2019 and 2025, it is expected that, in order to achieve an operational advantage, India’s political and defense leadership may authorize the launch of IBGs to conduct pre-emptive operations. They are expected to make a shallow penetration inside Pakistan’s territory because they were conceived and designed to conduct offensive operations against Pakistan on a moment’s notice. However, this founding design does not mean that they couldn’t also be used against China. 

New Delhi appears to be keeping its options open with regard to the Pakistan threat and not pre-emptively restricting its responses to merely using non-contact warfare assets such as fighter jets, stand-off weapons, and drones. India wants to keep its options open to launch a ground offensive. Such an endeavor will divert Islamabad’s focus and resources during a crisis, which India can further exploit. In addition, Pakistan may divert resources during peacetime to prepare for a response, conduct in-field exercises, strengthen defensive positions, and induct new weapons to thwart a possible ground invasion. 

The rolling out of the first IBG is just the beginning. The Indian Army’s current approach is focused on creating rapid-response fighting formations capable of operating independently, including addition IBGs. Pakistan will be closely monitoring these developments. 

The ultimate goal of establishing the IBGs is to retain an operational edge over Pakistan by maintaining an all-time combat-ready capability to conduct swift strikes under the nuclear overhang. India is clearly looking at different options to expand operational conventional space vis-à-vis Pakistan. Besides non-contact warfare, IBGs would provide India with a viable military option that can be deployed as a next step in future crisis between the two states.

But this is likely to have an adverse effect on the existing conventional deterrence between India and Pakistan. It could act as a catalyst, triggering a situation that gets beyond the control of New Delhi, spiraling into an all-out nuclear conflict.