Vietnam organizes its foreign relations into a three-tier hierarchy: Comprehensive Partnerships (CPs) sit at the base, Strategic Partnerships (SPs) in the middle, and Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships (CSPs) at the top. This sits alongside a category of special relationships with Cold War-era allies Laos, Cambodia, and Cuba.

Hanoi’s “bamboo diplomacy,” flexible in form but firm at its roots, has expanded all three categories at a remarkable pace. As of early 2026, Vietnam has 15 CSPs, following the upgrade of relations with the European Union in January 2026, alongside 15 SPs and 17 CPs. This network now touches every continent and every major power center, from Washington and Beijing to Moscow, Brussels, London, and Canberra.

The question that naturally follows is: who is next? Vietnam has not filled every available slot on its diplomatic hierarchy, and Hanoi has made clear – through the CPTPP chairmanship it holds in 2026 and the APEC hosting role it takes on in 2027 – that it intends to keep climbing. There are three reasons why Canada may be the next nation in line for a diplomatic upgrade.

The first is structural. Vietnam’s diplomatic strategy increasingly resembles that of other “middle powers” – states too large to be ignored but not seeking hegemony, which instead build resilience through diversified, non-aligned partnerships. Analysts have already grouped Vietnam alongside Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and Switzerland as countries capable of maintaining deep ties with rival great powers simultaneously. If Vietnam is consciously cultivating this identity, it has an incentive to deepen ties specifically with other middle powers that share its instinct for strategic autonomy rather than bloc alignment — and Canada is one of the clearest examples of that category on the world stage today.

The second reason is geographic. Vietnam’s CSP network is heavily concentrated in Asia and Europe. Of its 30 SPs and CSPs, only two are in the Americas: the United States as a CSP and Brazil as an SP. For a country pursuing “multi-directional” diplomacy and actively courting new markets to reduce its dependence on any single economy, this is a conspicuous gap. Creating a second North American SP or CSP would meaningfully reduce the imbalance and enhance Vietnam’s global footprint and give it a more credible claim to truly global reach.

Third, Vietnam already holds strategic-level partnerships with six of the seven G-7 members, namely the United States (CSP), Japan (CSP), Germany (SP), France (CSP), the United Kingdom (CSP), and Italy (SP). Canada is the only G7 economy with which Vietnam has not yet formalized a strategic-tier relationship; the two countries currently sit at the lower “Comprehensive Partnership” level. In the meantime, Vietnam’s foreign policy attaches importance to promoting relationships with “major powers and important partners.” Obviously, Vietnam sees Canada as “an important partner.”

Taken together, these three reasons converge on a single conclusion: among Vietnam’s plausible next upgrades, Canada is the most logical choice.

Indeed, what makes this more than a hypothesis is that Hanoi and Ottawa are visibly moving in this direction already. In January 2026, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney delivered a widely noted address describing a “rupture” in the rules-based international order and calling on middle powers to cooperate more closely to protect their interests as great-power rivalry intensifies. His argument – that middle powers need to band together as the old order frays — dovetails almost precisely with the logic Vietnam has been applying to its own diplomacy.

On the Vietnamese side, the signals have been just as direct. On June 29, Vietnamese Prime Minister Le Minh Hung told Canada’s ambassador that Hanoi “always regards Canada as an important partner” and pressed for expanded cooperation in trade, artificial intelligence, quantum technology and semiconductors. Hung also told the guest that Vietnam “wishes to elevate ties with Canada to a new level.”  In the meantime, Vietnam’s National Assembly Chairman voiced confidence that the two sides would bring their partnership “to new heights.”

Most recently, on August 22, Vietnam’s Foreign Minister asked his Canadian counterpart “to work closely to materialize the upgrade of ties as anticipated by leaders of both sides.” The Canadian Foreign Minister responded positively. Both capitals are actively laying groundwork for an upgrade.

The upgrade of ties is not a one-way wish. In fact, the logic runs both ways. Canada is a developed, technologically advanced economy that can support Vietnam’s ambitious “centennial” development goals – Hanoi’s targets, tied to the 2030 and 2045 anniversaries of the Communist Party and the state, for becoming a high-income, technology-driven nation. Canadian officials have flagged priority cooperation areas including AI, semiconductors, nuclear energy, aerospace, and high-quality workforce training – precisely the sectors Vietnam needs to climb the value chain.

Trade figures reinforce the case. Vietnam is now Canada’s largest trading partner within ASEAN, and bilateral merchandise trade has grown rapidly. Two-way trade reached roughly $15.7 billion in 2024 by Canadian measures, with Vietnam’s exports to Canada surpassing $10 billion for the first time that year. Growth has continued into 2026, driven increasingly by machinery, electronics and other high-value goods rather than low-cost manufactures – a shift that signals a maturing, higher-value trade relationship. The first seven months of 2026 saw Vietnam’s cumulative export value to Canada exceed $5 billion, an increase of more than 20 percent over the same period in 2025. For Vietnam, Canada represents both a resilient market amid global trade uncertainty and a hedge against overreliance on the United States, especially as Washington’s tariff policies have grown less predictable.

None of the above-mentioned arguments and figures guarantee a diplomatic upgrade is imminent. Vietnam moves deliberately, and any new CSP or SP requires sustained high-level engagement. But the underlying structural logic, the rhetorical alignment between the two sides, and the diplomatic signaling from both Hanoi and Ottawa in 2026 suggest that such a move may just be a matter of time.