As Israeli-U.S. strikes on Iran continue, as does Iran’s retaliation targeting other Gulf states, the crisis is quickly evolving into more than a regional security issue. It is becoming an important test of the political coherence and strategic maturity for BRICS, an alliance that increasingly presents itself as a pillar of an emerging multipolar order. The developments in the Gulf region raise a difficult question: can BRICS translate its shared rhetoric about multipolarity into meaningful coordination when its members’ geopolitical interests diverge?

The grouping today is far more complex than the loose economic coalition it once was. With its expansion in 2024 to include new members from the Middle East and Africa, BRICS now represents a diverse constellation of political systems, strategic priorities and regional alignments. While this expansion has enhanced the bloc’s global weight, it has also introduced new fault lines. The Iran crisis illustrates these contradictions starkly.

Iran itself is a member of BRICS, having joined during the expansion in 2024. Founding BRICS members Russia and China have taken positions that broadly favor Tehran’s strategic autonomy and resist Western pressure campaigns. India, by contrast, has adopted a far more cautious posture. New Delhi’s approach reflects its long-standing attempt to balance relationships among competing powers in the Middle East while safeguarding key economic interests. Among these, the development of Iran’s Chabahar Port has been a central pillar of India’s strategy to expand connectivity with Afghanistan and the broader Central Asian region. 

These differing responses are not surprising; they reflect the reality that BRICS members remain sovereign actors pursuing distinct national interests. The challenge for BRICS lies precisely in its ability to manage such divergence without eroding the broader project of multipolar cooperation.

The Iran crisis also intersects with a deeper structural concern: the vulnerability of global energy supply chains and financial networks to geopolitical disruptions. Iran’s periodic threats to disrupt traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint through which nearly a fifth of global oil supply passes, highlight the fragility of energy security for many emerging economies. For major energy importers such as India and China, disruptions in this route carry significant economic implications. Around half of India’s crude oil and LNG imports, and nearly 40 percent of China’s oil supplies, pass through the strait.

It is in this context that discussions within BRICS about alternative financial and logistical infrastructure are gaining renewed attention. Proposals such as the BRICS Pay platform, expected to evolve over the coming years, seek to reduce dependence on Western-dominated financial systems such as SWIFT. The broader aim is not merely financial autonomy but resilience against the growing use of sanctions and financial restrictions as instruments of geopolitical leverage.

However, building such parallel systems is far easier in theory than in practice. Financial networks derive their strength from scale, trust, and regulatory compatibility, elements that cannot be rapidly replicated. Even within BRICS, significant differences remain in financial governance, technological standards, and monetary policy frameworks. Moreover, most member states remain deeply integrated with the existing global financial architecture, making a complete decoupling neither feasible nor desirable.

Instead, what appears more realistic is a gradual diversification strategy: creating complementary mechanisms that allow transactions in local currencies while maintaining engagement with global markets. India’s own approach to rupee-based trade settlements reflects this cautious pragmatism.

Another dimension of the current debate concerns the evolving technological and infrastructural landscape shaping global economic power. Telecommunications networks, digital payment platforms, and logistics systems are increasingly becoming arenas of strategic competition. China’s technological expansion, from 5G infrastructure to digital payment ecosystems, has already demonstrated how economic connectivity can also translate into geopolitical influence.

For BRICS, the question is whether such technological capacities can be leveraged collectively rather than becoming sources of rivalry within the bloc. This issue becomes particularly sensitive in the case of China-India relations, which remain marked by measured engagement and lingering mistrust.

Despite recent diplomatic efforts to stabilize China-India ties after the Galwan clashes of 2020, deep structural mistrust persists. Trade between the two countries remains substantial, but it is increasingly characterized by structural asymmetries and political sensitivities. For India, concerns about technological dependency and supply chain vulnerability have increasingly shaped policy decisions.

Nevertheless, there remains a compelling argument for limited but pragmatic cooperation. Both China and India share common interests in energy security, stable trade routes, and reform of global financial institutions. In a world where traditional Western-led institutions face legitimacy challenges, the ability of emerging powers to coordinate even partially could have significant systemic implications.

Apart from immediate strategic calculations, BRICS also seeks to articulate a broader vision for alternative models of development and governance. For decades, policy prescriptions for the Global South were dominated by the Washington Consensus, emphasizing liberalization, privatization, and fiscal austerity. While these policies produced mixed outcomes, they also exposed structural vulnerabilities in developing economies.

In response, several BRICS members, particularly China, have emphasized more pragmatic and state-led development models. These approaches prioritize infrastructure development, industrial policy, and long-term strategic planning. The emphasis is less on ideological purity and more on experimental policymaking guided by measurable outcomes.

Whether such models can be translated into a coherent multilateral framework remains uncertain. The diversity within BRICS itself means that no single development template can be universally applied. Yet the very discussion reflects a broader shift in global economic discourse, where emerging economies are increasingly asserting intellectual as well as political agency.

The coming months may therefore prove pivotal for the grouping. If tensions in the Middle East deepen, BRICS will face pressure to articulate positions that go beyond general calls for dialogue and stability. Its credibility as a platform for Global South cooperation will depend on its ability to manage internal differences while contributing constructively to international crisis management.

Equally important will be its capacity to move from declaratory diplomacy to institutional innovation, whether through financial mechanisms, technological partnerships or coordinated development initiatives.

Multipolarity, after all, is not simply the redistribution of power among several states. It requires the construction of institutions and norms capable of sustaining cooperation amid diversity.

For BRICS, the Gulf crisis may therefore serve as an early test of whether the grouping can evolve into such a framework or remain primarily a forum for symbolic alignment among emerging powers navigating a turbulent global order.