Last month’s parliamentary election in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) in the southern Philippines, the first ever, has settled one question but opened another.

The election results are now clear. The Bangsamoro Federalist Party (BFP) secured 31 seats across the party and district races, the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP) 30, and the BARMM Grand Coalition (BGC) 15, with the remaining seats going to other parties and sectoral representatives. No party has the 41 votes needed to elect the chief minister. The 80 elected members of the first regular Parliament are set to assume office on October 30, marking the formal transition from the interim government to the first elected Bangsamoro government.

Most attention has understandably been directed at the question of which parties might come together to form the “Government of the Day”. But whatever its composition, the coalition that eventually emerges will offer an early indication of what kind of political order is taking shape in the Bangsamoro.

The September 14 election marked a transitional milestone from a negotiated peace settlement to elected government. The election results bring together political forces with different origins. BFP is composed of former combatants of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), including local political figures. The UBJP is associated with the MILF, while BGC brings together established political parties and clan-based political networks.

The poll also reflects the changing place of the Moro National Liberation Front,  a Moro armed movement that signed a separate peace agreement with the Philippine government in 1996, in this political order. Its two political parties from its two major factions – the Mahardika and the Bangsamoro Party – did not secure seats as Sulu, where the MNLF has historically had a strong political presence, is no longer part of the BARMM electorate. But MNLF-linked voices have entered the new political order through other parties and individual representatives.

For the BFP, its coalition choice means defining what its break from the UBJP political camp means for the next phase of Bangsamoro politics. A BFP-UBJP alliance would bring together the two largest parties, potentially forming the “super majority”. The two share roots in the broader MILF political tradition but have since taken different political paths, particularly after President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. appointed Abdulraof Macacua,  then chief of staff of the MILF’s armed wing,  the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, as BARMM’s interim chief minister in 2025.   Macacua later joined BFP and became its chair and president.

Such a coalition would test whether political differences within the former movement can be managed within the institutions created by the peace process.  It could also allow BFP to broaden its political base through UBJP’s strong showing in the sectoral races, while bringing BFP’s relationship with Manila into a broader governing coalition.

For UBJP, a BFP coalition would likewise have significant implications. The party remains closely associated with the MILF and the peace agreement that produced the BARMM. An UBJP-BFP coalition could provide continuity with this political project within the new parliamentary system. BFP’s perceived close relationship with Malacañang could help move some of the remaining normalization commitments. At the same time, such a coalition would require UBJP to navigate the question of national government influence, which has contributed to political divisions within the MILF.

For a Bangsamoro public that has long been sensitive to Manila’s role in BARMM governance, the stakes would extend beyond securing a parliamentary majority.  The two political strands that emerged from the MILF would have to work together without blurring the distinction between cooperation with the national government in implementing the peace process and preserving political autonomy for the Bangsamoro.

The BGC faces a different choice. With 15 seats, it has the numbers needed by either BFP or UBJP to form a majority. It has already indicated that it is open to working with either party, and its political forces bring established parties, local networks, and experience in governing into an arena increasingly shaped by MILF-linked politics. As such, it could bring familiarity with local government and the political relationships and practices that have shaped the region for decades. At the same time, its ranks include emerging political voices who may bring different priorities and forms of representation to the new Parliament. Depending on its choice, the BGC’s role in shaping the first elected government could either reinforce established ways of exercising political power or broaden what the new parliamentary system can represent.

BFP has since announced that it has secured enough support to form a majority, although coalition discussions among the parties are continuing. This makes the coalition combinations less hypothetical. A BFP-UBJP coalition signals an effort to reconcile competing strands of the MILF political project. A BFP-BGC or UBJP-BGC coalition would demonstrate how movement-linked politics and established political networks are negotiating power within the new parliamentary system. Much will depend on what the parties ask of one another in exchange for governing together and what they are prepared to commit to the Bangsamoro public. But the burden now falls more heavily on BFP to show what this majority is assembled around. Securing votes is one task; building a coalition with a shared governing agenda is another. A coalition can be politically viable without necessarily being ideologically coherent.

If the BGC and the established political networks aligned with it are central to the new government, that would not necessarily mean a reversal of the political transformation envisioned by the peace process. It could instead show that the new political order is becoming a negotiated space between movement-linked politics and longstanding sources of local political power.

However, the coalition question cannot be separated from the environment in which the new government will have to govern. As I noted before the polls, the challenge was not simply avoiding localized violence but ensuring that political disputes could still be contained through the institutions and relationships established by the peace process.

In Cotabato City, election-related violence before and on election day left several people dead and injured. Shortly after the election, localized fighting in BARMM’s Special Geographic Area prompted the deployment of joint Philippine government-MILF security mechanisms. These incidents exposed the complexity of the transition currently taking place in BARMM.

Another issue that may become more visible is the relationship between the new Bangsamoro government and Manila. With an elected government taking shape, the Bangsamoro public has stronger expectations that the BARMM should have greater political space to determine its leadership and governing arrangements. The issue will be how Manila’s involvement is perceived: as a support for Bangsamoro institutions or as an attempt to shape their political outcomes. If the latter perception takes hold, it could complicate the new government’s efforts to establish its own political authority.

For the incoming government, the mandate should extend beyond running the regional administration. It will also have to demonstrate a clear commitment to completing the remaining normalization commitments under the peace process, working closely with the MILF as a peace partner while maintaining a constructive relationship with the national government – while not becoming so closely identified with either that it loses the political space needed to govern in the interests of the Bangsamoro people.

The peace process in the southern Philippines sought to create institutions through which political authority could be acquired, exercised, and contested. The challenge for the new government will be to remain autonomous enough to govern in the interests of local people, but engaged enough to sustain the peace process.