Much has changed since September 2021, when the European Union launched its Indo-Pacific strategy. In less than five years, armed conflicts in Ukraine and in the Middle East have shocked Europeans who know they can no longer fully rely on the close protection of their traditional ally, the United States. Although the U.S. remains NATO’s largest military power, Washington’s recent signs and messages have brought confusion to Europe. In some ways, East Asia faces a similar situation, where Japan and South Korea are now looking at diversification options.

Meanwhile, the EU is trying to “pivot” toward Asia, and has developed multiple ties with Japan, India, South Korea, and ASEAN. In that context, Taiwan remains a special case due to its unique situation as the world’s premier producer of high-end semiconductors. As Europe seeks to diversify supply chains and reduce vulnerabilities in strategically important sectors, Taiwan’s comparative advantages have become increasingly aligned with European interests.

Within this broader transformation, Taiwan has emerged as a significantly more important partner for the EU than at any previous point since diplomatic relations between the EU and the People’s Republic of China were established, 41 years ago. Once viewed primarily as a trading partner constrained by the EU’s adherence to the “One China” policy, Taiwan has increasingly been incorporated into European discussions on semiconductor resilience, critical technologies, cybersecurity, digital governance, and Indo-Pacific stability. 

In the past five years, Europe has become acutely aware of the importance of Taiwan. European delegations, from Brussels to EU member-states, have visited Taipei frequently; the number of engagements has surged by 20 percent since the COVID-19 pandemic, according to the EU-Taiwan Tracker by CEIAS. Cooperation projects in technology and education have multiplied. The Taiwanese authorities have been welcoming and open to collaboration. 

In addition, the EU also started to engage with Taiwan through costly commitments. On December 1, 2025, Taiwan and the German manufacturer Merck announced a “Semiconductor Solutions Site” in Taiwan’s Kaohsiung city. Similarly, in July 2023, the ribbon was cut for ASML’s Linkou campus in Taoyuan city. This shows that while geopolitical uncertainty lies ahead, economic ties still manage to form. 

Despite the tricky waters both countries find themselves in, the numbers are clear: Taiwan’s Overseas Community Affairs Council (OCAC) announced that between 2016 and 2025, Taiwan investment in the EU amounted to US$13.88 billion, a 650 percent surge compared to just US$1.85 billion between 2006 and 2015.

As the EU is facing an increasingly challenging conversation with China over a trade deficit that reached 360 billion euro in 2025, Taiwan can stand out as a promising dialogue partner in the matters of technology and economic security. However, figuring out how to make the EU-Taiwan collaboration sustainable is more important than simply pouring in truckloads of investment.

While EU-Taiwan interaction is built on commercial activity, China has a long history of punishing any actor who shows the slightest friendliness toward Taiwan. Take the example of Japan: since a comment made by Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae in November 2025 suggesting that a Taiwan crisis might be a question of national survival for Japan, Beijing continuously slapped sanctions on Japanese companies. China added 20 Japanese firms to its export control list in February 2026, with another 20 added to the watchlist in June 2026. To use the Chinese axiom, Beijing is “killing the chicken to scare the monkey” – not only punishing Japan, but sending a warning to any country that might be tempted to follow suit. 

Takaichi has refused to back down. However, there is a major difference between the EU and Japan: the EU is not one single country, but a conglomerate of sovereign states. Whether the EU could handle such pressure by Beijing without scattering apart is not only under scrutiny by Taiwan but also a potential weakness to exploit for China. 

Although the EU will probably never become a conventional security actor in the Taiwan Strait, increasing concerns regarding economic coercion, supply chain disruption, cyber threats, and hybrid warfare have expanded opportunities for cooperation in non-traditional security domains and led to a shift in thinking. Consequently, EU-Taiwan relations increasingly resemble a form of functional strategic partnership, whereby cooperation develops through economic security, technological resilience, and institutional coordination, despite the lack of either formal diplomatic recognition or collective defense agreements.

As Europe is gearing up for multiple economic and technological conflicts in the months to come, Taiwan could become a promising partner for the EU in key areas. It is time for both the EU and Taiwan to use their respective strategic leverage and seize the opportunity. 

However, that is easier said than done. Not only is the EU divided by country, but attitudes toward China are also polarized in terms of party affiliation in each EU member state. Take Germany’s CDU/CSU-SDP coalition for example. While both governing parties support continued economic engagement with Beijing, their approaches differ. The SPD, with longstanding ties to trade unions and traditional industries heavily exposed to the Chinese market, places greater emphasis on balancing “de-risking efforts” with preserving commercial interests. By contrast, the CDU/CSU has adopted a stronger focus on industrial competitiveness, supply-chain resilience, and technological autonomy. Consequently, it has been more supportive of deeper semiconductor and high-tech cooperation with Taiwan, increasingly viewing Taiwan as a strategic partner in Germany’s economic-security agenda. This exposes another layer of complexity in terms of the heterogeneity of China-dependence on both inter- and intra- state levels.  

Hence, building on the above-mentioned observations, the issue is the underlying proposition of tying EU-Taiwan relations to EU-China relations. The argument here is that EU countries should pursue EU-Taiwan relations in parallel with EU-China relations, not subsequently. Taiwan, on the other hand, has sought to separate its cross-strait relations from its foreign policy since the Tsai Ing-wen presidency (2016-2024), emphasizing establishing international relations despite the cross-strait situation. However, this will only become effective if allies reciprocate the endeavor by showcasing support for Taiwan, disregarding the incrementally mounting pressure from Beijing. 

Taiwan has shown that the establishment of so-called non-red supply chains is possible, if one doesn’t lose the support of close allies. Economic deterrence is now even more effective than military and political coercion. The idea of resilience might vary by country, but for Taiwan, raising the cost of invasion for China could most effectively balance power asymmetry in the strait. With Chinese efforts to cut off Taiwanese international engagement rising and becoming more diverse and intricate, the EU should stand firm on its policy of competing on fair ground and not having to swim between two great powers during times of murky waters. 

While what lies ahead seems uncertain for the EU and Taiwan, one thing is for sure: a friend in need is a friend indeed.