ASEAN Beat | Diplomacy | Southeast Asia

Myanmar’s latest pledge to repatriate 300,000 Rohingya refugees cannot be viewed as a credible commitment. It’s yet another iteration of a well-established diplomatic pattern. 

On July 29, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim remarked that Myanmar had agreed to repatriate 300,000 Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh and 5,000 from Malaysia. Subsequently, Malaysian and Bangladeshi media outlets enthusiastically disseminated the news. However, the very next day, Bangladeshi State Minister for Foreign Affairs Shama Obaed stated that Myanmar had forwarded no such proposal to Bangladesh, and while the two sides maintain contact, the topic of the repatriation of 300,000 refugees has not been discussed. 

While people may be tempted to view this event in the context of the domestic politics of Malaysia, it, in fact, confirms a long-standing pattern of behavior on the part of the Myanmar government toward the protracted Rohingya crisis.

In 2017-2018, the Myanmar government orchestrated “cleansing operations” in northern Rakhine State, leading to the exodus of more than 750,000 Rohingyas to neighboring Bangladesh. There they joined some 300,000 Rohingya refugees, who had been residing in Bangladesh since the late 1970s or the 1990s. The exodus of the Rohingyas was accompanied by disturbing reports of war crimes — massacres, sexual assaults, arson, plunder, and others — committed by the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw, against the Rohingya. The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) deemed Myanmar’s actions to be “ethnic cleansing,” while the United States recognized it as a “genocide.” Currently, Bangladesh hosts some 1.5 million Rohingya refugees, making it one of the largest hosts of refugees anywhere in the world.

Bangladesh’s own precarious socio-economic conditions preclude the possibility of successful local integration of Rohingya refugees. And no third country is willing to resettle them en masse. Therefore, the only realistic option for the resolution of the protracted refugee crisis is the safe, voluntary, dignified, and sustainable repatriation of the refugees to their homeland. Accordingly, from the very outset, Bangladesh has sought to ensure the return of the refugees to Myanmar. Dhaka has resorted to bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral mechanisms to bring this about, but in each instance, Myanmar has delicately skirted responsibility for the Rohingya.

For instance, on November 23, 2017, Bangladesh and Myanmar concluded a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on the repatriation of Rohingya refugees in Naypyidaw. Myanmar pledged to initiate the process of repatriation within two months, and agreed to take back 300 refugees per day. However, not a single Rohingya refugee was repatriated under the MoU. Nevertheless, Naypyidaw used the MoU to deflect strong international criticism of their actions, portray the crisis as a “bilateral issue” between Myanmar and Bangladesh, and demonstrate their commitment to the resolution of the Rohingya crisis.

Upon the failure of the bilateral MoU, on April 13, 2018, Bangladesh and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) concluded an MoU on the repatriation of the Rohingya, and the UNHCR and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) signed an MoU with Myanmar on June 6, 2018, in a similar spirit. That MoU was extended for a year in May 2019, and again in May 2020. Through this, Myanmar accepted responsibility for taking back the Rohingya, and demonstrated a lot of activities, such as the verification of tens of thousands of refugees and the opening of transit centers. However, no Rohingya refugees were officially repatriated during this period, as the refugees themselves were apprehensive of repatriation without guarantees of the protection of their rights. Naypyidaw was unwilling to provide such guarantees.

Upon the failures of the U.N.-mediated MoUs, in March 2023, Bangladesh and Myanmar, through Chinese mediation, announced a “pilot program” repatriating small groups of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar. Again, Myanmar demonstrated its commitment to repatriation through the dispatch of officials to Rohingya camps in Cox’s Bazar and the identification of 1,140 Rohingyas for repatriation. However, the process was soon stalled, and the proposed repatriation did not take place. Afterward, the outbreak of war in Rakhine State between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army put the issue of Rohingya repatriation on the back-burner.

On April 4, 2025, after negotiations between Bangladesh and Myanmar, the latter expressed its willingness to repatriate 180,000 Rohingya refugees who had been verified by Myanmar between 2018 and 2020. However, by that time, Myanmar had effectively lost control of some 80 percent of Rakhine State, including the Maungdaw District where the majority of the refugees used to live. Hence, Myanmar was in no position to implement its own pledge. In fact, it is possible that Myanmar made this symbolic concession to Dhaka to decrease the latter’s interest in the U.N.-proposed “humanitarian channel” to Rakhine State via its territory. As soon as the interim government of Bangladesh, owing to substantial internal and external pressures, abandoned the proposal, Myanmar demonstrated no further interest in the repatriation of the 180,000 refugees.

After analyzing the behavior of Myanmar since 2017, a distinct pattern emerges. Whenever Myanmar is faced with political or strategic pressure, either from Bangladesh or the international community or local actors, it appears willing to make concessions and repatriate the Rohingya refugees. However, it has consistently reneged on its commitments and displayed that it has no serious intention of taking back the Rohingya. This pattern has been repeated after the bilateral MoU in 2017, the U.N.-mediated MoU in 2018-2021, the Chinese-mediated “pilot program” in 2023, and the bilateral understandings of 2025.

The recent statements about the prospective repatriation of 300,000 refugees from Bangladesh must be viewed through Myanmar’s patterned behavior. Malaysia hosts more than 126,000 Rohingya refugees, and recently, anti-Rohingya sentiments are on the rise among segments of Malaysia’s population. Hence, Malaysia, a member-state of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), is exerting diplomatic pressure on Myanmar for the repatriation of the refugees at least partially on the basis of its own domestic political pressure. Bangladesh has consistently sought the support of ASEAN in general and Malaysia in particular to accelerate the repatriation of the Rohingyas. In response, Naypyidaw has made big promises about the repatriation. However, considering that 90 percent of Rakhine State is under the control of the Arakan Army now, Myanmar is currently in no position to repatriate the Rohingyas to their homeland. Hence, Myanmar’s promises of repatriating 300,000 Rohingyas from Bangladesh is rhetorical at best.

Beyond questions of capacity, Myanmar also currently lacks the political and legal conditions required for safe and sustainable repatriation. Sustainable return of the Rohingyas should be linked to guarantees of citizenship, freedom of movement, physical security, access to livelihoods, and independent international monitoring – conditions that remain absent. The fragmentation of authority in Rakhine State between the military-controlled Union Government and the Arakan Army-controlled Arakan People’s Revolutionary Government (APRG) further complicates the implementation of any repatriation arrangement, regardless of diplomatic declarations. Hence, announcements of large-scale returns function primarily as instruments of political rhetoric for Myanmar rather than concrete commitments. Until these structural impediments are addressed, periodic pledges of repatriation are likely to remain diplomatic narratives instead of executable policy.

Myanmar’s latest pledge to repatriate 300,000 Rohingya refugees should therefore be interpreted not as a credible commitment but as another iteration of a well-established diplomatic pattern. Since 2017, Myanmar has responded to successive bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral initiatives with symbolic concessions without meaningful implementation, enabling Naypyidaw to ease external pressure while avoiding substantive responsibility. Current military realities in the beleaguered Rakhine State, coupled with the absence of legal protections, security guarantees, and unified territorial control, further diminish the feasibility of Myanmar’s proposed large-scale repatriation. Accordingly, durable resolution of the Rohingya crisis depends not on periodic political declarations but on verifiable structural changes within Myanmar and sustained international engagement that ensures any future repatriation is safe, voluntary, dignified, and genuinely sustainable.