New Delhi’s initial silence on the Iran conflict, followed by its alignment with Washington amidst strains in India-U.S. relations, indicates its prioritization of Indo-Pacific partnerships as a core geoeconomic strategy. The Israel-U.S. strikes on Iran have forced New Delhi to confront the tension between its strategic autonomy – which enabled engagement with Washington’s adversaries – and its commitment to the Indo-Pacific framework. Yet, the long-term durability of India’s pro-Washington stance is questionable due to the rise in anti-U.S. sentiment in India. Washington’s America First foreign policy has threatened the Indian economy and undermined the United States’ global influence.

Over the past decade, New Delhi’s pursuit of strategic autonomy – aimed at reducing economic dependence on China and countering its military expansion – increased its cooperation with Washington under the Indo-Pacific framework. Following the Cold War, Indian governments had strengthened ties with Washington, but the Narendra Modi administration critiqued its predecessor’s non-alignment approach and placed the partnership at the center of its geoeconomic strategy. As a significant step, the administration backed the revival of the Quad (the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia) to counter China’s growing influence and aggression in the Indian Ocean. The 2020 Galwan clashes with China pressed India toward deeper defense cooperation and economic ties within the Indo-Pacific framework. 

Yet, global power competition, combined with India’s economic pressures and historical experiences, led New Delhi as a middle power to use strategic ambiguity to sustain and manage multiple partnerships that at times diverged from Washington’s stance. The 1962 losses to China and the 1971 war with the U.S.-backed Pakistan have continued to influence strategic thinking and public sentiment. India’s contemporary energy and geopolitical interests preserved engagement with Iran despite U.S. sanctions in recent years. Indian media frequently interpreted these calculated alignments as evidence of Modi’s diplomatic flexibility and pursuit of strategic autonomy.

The Trump administration’s return to the White House in 2025 and the implementation of its “America First” priorities highlighted New Delhi’s strategic ambiguity. Washington’s aggressive use of tariffs to challenge India’s Russian oil imports and relations with Iran placed stress on India’s economic and strategic planning. Paradoxically, India’s increased oil purchase from Russia were due to the Ukraine War, which drove down the price of Russian oil. These were purchases that Washington had previously approved. The Trump administration also revoked the sanctions waiver on India’s work on the Chabahar Port project in Iran, which provided India with access to Central Asian markets.

By December 2025, New Delhi’s acquiescence to Washington’s pressure was apparent, notwithstanding its public assertions of strategic autonomy. India curtailed its imports of Russian oil and deepened its engagement with Israel to align with Washington’s strategic preferences.

The February 28 strikes on Iran further illuminated the differences in New Delhi and Washington’s position in regional conflicts. New Delhi followed the example of other Quad members by declining to condemn the Israel-U.S. strikes while avoiding military involvement. In March, it clarified its position by rejecting Russia’s U.N. ceasefire resolution and supporting Bahrain’s proposal condemning Iran’s counterstrikes on its neighbors. India’s moves underscored its prioritization of Indo-Pacific partnerships, a position welcomed by the Trump administration, which faced domestic and allied criticism.

Notably, New Delhi’s emphasis on Indo-Pacific partnerships took place against the backdrop of China’s increased global influence in 2025, as a consequence of Washington’s tariff strategy. In addition to increasing economic growth, Beijing successfully confronted Trump’s attacks on the global economic system, producing expanded trade agreements with other countries also seeking to bypass Washington’s tariffs. Furthermore, the India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025, following a terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir, demonstrated the depth of Beijing’s defense commitment to Pakistan and exposed India’s strategic vulnerabilities. These developments pressed New Delhi to pursue greater balancing through the Indo-Pacific framework despite the confounding signals from Washington. Deeper defense cooperation required further alignment to U.S. priorities. 

Despite such signals of commitments to Washington, New Delhi’s pursuit of a closer alignment with the United States to counter China is likely to face a range of domestic and strategic constraints. Foremost is the rise of anti-U.S. public sentiment in India following the strikes on Iran. Negative public opinion is only partially due to the attack on Iran, a longstanding cultural and historical partner for India. Rather, the negative perceptions at the grassroots are due to the rising economic and security concerns that are a consequence of the Washington’s policy toward India and the region.

The Israel-U.S. strikes on Iran triggered an energy crisis in India, causing gas shortages and rising food costs. While the government pursued short-term measures to ease the strain – especially in a year of important state elections – the stress was displayed on the streets when migrant laborers started to return to their villages due to reduced work and the rise in the cost of food. Meanwhile, the long-term impact of the crisis upon the agriculture sector due to the rising cost of fertilizer has yet to materialize. 

A recent International Monetary Fund report dropped India’s ranking among large global economies, adding to the perception of a crisis. The report highlighted broader concerns in the economy, including energy security, weakening manufacturing, unemployment, and inflation, which are expected to be exacerbated by the crisis. Despite noting adequate growth, the IMF’s lowered global ranking of India fueled criticism of Modi, relating it to U.S. trade agreements and the weakening rupee.

A related factor shaping public sentiment and the trajectory of India-U.S. relations was the Modi campaign’s central promise to elevate India’s global influence – an agenda that resonated strongly with the nationalist elite. In 2025, a combination of actions by Trump – including threats of sweeping tariffs on New Delhi, disparaging remarks about India, and challenges to India’s claims during the India-Pakistan conflict – fueled anti-Trump sentiment and intensified doubts about the Modi government’s influence in Washington. The comments by Trump’s MAGA constituency in regard to Indian workers also produced a backlash in the country.

More recently, Pakistan’s important role in the Iran-U.S. ceasefire negotiations compounded these sentiments and complicates Modi’s position as Washington’s partner. India’s exclusion from the processes may be due to New Delhi’s apparent pro-U.S. and Israel stance, yet the Indian public received it as a slight and a sign of Washington’s preference for its adversary, a reminder of the 1971 war. Such mistrust translates into criticism for Modi’s foreign policy.

Markedly, the Iran war threatens to also weaken New Delhi’s other relations in Indo-Pacific. Broadly speaking, numerous countries in Asia face significant shortages and oppose the Israel-U.S. strikes. ASEAN nations that are central to India’s Act East and the Quad’s Indo-Pacific strategy of balancing China may reassess their engagement with Washington and Beijing, and the overall value of the Indo-Pacific framework. 

While Washington’s foreign policy over the past year – particularly its decision to strike Iran alongside Israel – compelled New Delhi to reduce ambiguity in its strategic choices, these developments place the administration in a bind with its domestic constituencies that will have a long-term effect on its partnerships.