South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s approval rating stands at 59.8 percent, according to Real Meter’s latest survey, and the ruling Democratic Party (DP) enters the June 3 local elections as the overwhelming favorite. It is widely expected to capture at least 15 of 17 metropolitan governorships. By nearly every conventional measure, this should be the political equivalent of a victory lap. 

Instead, the DP is contending with a self-inflicted distraction in the form of the party’s leader, Jung Chung-rae.

The latest episode came on May 3 when Jung was campaigning in Busan on behalf of Ha Jung-woo, the DP’s candidate for the by-election of the National Assembly seat. Footage captured Jung approaching a first-grade girl and prompting her, twice, to address Ha as “oppa,” a Korean term of endearment typically used by younger women toward men close to their own age. Ha is 49 and Jung is over 60. 

Opposition lawmakers were swift to condemn the exchange as inappropriate, with some characterizing it as a form of child coercion. Both Jung and Ha subsequently issued apologies, though the framing of those apologies drew a second round of criticism from the opposition and the media. Their apologies were centered on the child having been “placed at the center of controversy” rather than on the conduct itself. 

It was not an isolated lapse. During the 2025 presidential campaign for then-candidate Lee, Jung was filmed approaching a group of young women, taking one by the hand, and asking them to call him “oppa.” The pattern of uninvited physical contact, performative familiarity, and the reduction of bystanders to props in a political moment has recurred often enough that it can no longer be dismissed as spontaneous awkwardness. 

What makes Jung’s conduct particularly damaging is the timing. On May 4, the day after his episode in Busan consumed the political news cycle, South Korea’s benchmark KOSPI closed at 6,936, above the 6,900 mark for the first time in history, placing the psychologically significant 7,000 threshold just 63 points away. The market success story, driven by surging semiconductor stocks and sustained foreign inflows, was precisely the kind of headline the Lee administration would want leading the news. Instead, it competed for attention with footage of Jung badgering a primary schooler. 

This dynamic has happened before as well. On January 22, the KOSPI surpassed the 5,000 mark for the first time in history, a milestone Lee had made a signature campaign promise. On the same day, Jung held an emergency press conference to announce a merger proposal with the minor Rebuilding Korea Party – a move the DP’s own senior leadership had been informed of only 20 minutes before it was made public. The announcement triggered an immediate internal revolt. Three elected DP Supreme Council members went on record in opposition, and dozens of lawmakers signed statements of protest. The merger proposal was eventually withdrawn weeks later but the damage to the party’s internal cohesion was already done – and the KOSPI milestone was completely buried in the resulting controversy. 

Ha’s very candidacy was a subject of disagreement within the DP. Ha is not a career politician. He served as the “senior secretary to the president for AI and future planning,” a position created specifically by Lee to lead the administration’s artificial intelligence policy agenda. Lee once publicly signaled his reluctance to see Ha leave during a Cabinet meeting but Jung pressed Ha’s candidacy forward. Among Lee’s core supporters, the episode registered as a misjudgment: why pull the administration’s AI architect out of government to contest a by-election?

The answers point uncomfortably toward Jung’s own political calendar. The DP’s next leadership convention is scheduled for August and Jung is widely understood to be seeking re-election as chairman. His push for the one-member-one-vote reform, which he secured through the party’s central committee in February, is broadly seen as having strengthened his position among the rank-and-file membership at the expense of the parliamentary bloc, which has historically been less sympathetic to him. The earlier merger overture toward the Rebuilding Korea Party would also have expanded the pool of voters favorable to Jung in any future leadership contest. Both moves followed an internal logic that had less to do with governing and more to do with consolidating the chairman’s own institutional base. 

In this context, core Lee supporters have asked Prime Minister Kim Min-seok to run in the DP’s chair election to block Jung from reassuming the party leadership post. 

Despite Jung’s repeated missteps, the consequences for the June 3 local election may be contained. The DP’s structural advantages are substantial enough that Jung’s missteps are unlikely to cost the party its expected majority across gubernatorial and mayoral races. But the margin of victory matters. A narrower-than-expected result, particularly in competitive by-elections running concurrently with the local government votes, would have a ready-made explanation, given that Jung’s missteps have reliably overshadowed the government’s record.

Some observers have begun saying that the most useful thing Jung could do between now and election day is stay off camera. That is a damning assessment of any party leader and it reveals the central paradox of the Jung risk. In a political environment this favorable to the Democrats, the chair’s greatest contribution to the party’s victory in the elections may be his absence. 

Lee has built something genuinely significant. The KOSPI’s historic run, South Korea’s sustained diplomatic engagement, and a domestic political coalition that has held together under pressure are achievements that any party leader should be overjoyed to showcase. However, Jung keeps calling attention to himself and the government’s record keeps getting buried in the noise, raising questions among the core Lee supporters within the DP on why Jung is not fully supportive of Lee’s statesmanship. 

The August party convention will force a reckoning. If the June 3 local election results underperform expectations, the case against Jung’s re-election writes itself. If the results are strong, Jung will claim credit and likely press for another term, potentially alongside a renewed push to absorb the Rebuilding Korea Party into the DP – a move that would further consolidate his electoral base while deepening tensions with the party’s pro-Lee wing. 

Either way, the fundamental tension between the chair and the president’s supporters remains.