The 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea was held in February, showcasing with great aplomb achievements across a range of fields over the five years since the 8th Party Congress. Meanwhile, a new Five-Year Plan was announced with the goal of the “all-out development” of a socialist state. The new plan revealed no significant deviations from the conventional path. Indeed, one could argue that the primary feature of the Congress was that it established the format of a regular meeting once every five years, demonstrating to domestic and international observers alike that North Korea enjoys a stable government.

During the Kim Il Sung era, the Party Congress was held once a decade. Under Kim Jong Il, when the economy was in turmoil, it was not held once. Kim Jong Un was able to hold it in 2016, for the first time in 36 years. At the 7th Party Congress, Kim, the party’s First Secretary, was given the new position of Chairman, and then at the 8th Party Congress he was named General Secretary. This time, he was simply re-elected as the incumbent General Secretary. Likewise, at the Supreme People’s Assembly in March, he kept his title of President of the State Affairs Commission as head of state.

Kim used the summit to highlight his achievements, declaring that the economic plan for the past five years had been “basically completed,” a very different position compared to the previous time when he frankly admitted a failure of economic policy. The previous five-year plan, which was drafted in 2021 during the COVID-19 pandemic, necessarily defined low targets amid uncertainty about the future. Since then, though, in addition to the gradual transition to living with COVID-19, North Korea has enjoyed a boost from special wartime demand owing to a deepening of its relations with Russia.

A second feature was the non-disclosure of decisions. The early days of the Kim administration saw many initiatives to make North Korea more transparent. The 2012 military parade welcomed a number of Western media outlets, while a failed satellite launch was immediately announced. Kim himself frequently appeared on stage, and the full texts of his speeches were made public.

By contrast, much about the two recent meetings remains undisclosed. Last time, a number of new executive titles were announced, including “Director of the Organization and Guidance Department” and “Director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department” in the Party Central Committee, but this time they were uniformly referred to as “directors,” without specifying their departments. The sole exception was Kim Yo Jong, Kim’s younger sister, who was named Director of General Affairs.

Although it was announced that the party rules would be revised, no specific new provisions have been released. The Supreme People’s Assembly made major revisions, including a change to the name of the constitution for the first time in 54 years, but here too the new text remains unpublished. The country is becoming increasingly vigilant both domestically and internationally.

In terms of foreign policy, we have no idea what Kim had to say about Russia or China, but his criticisms of the United States and South Korea were made public. Kim mentioned that if the United States shows respect to North Korea and retracts its “hostile policy,” the latter would be willing to improve relations. That the prospects for U.S.-North Korea relations are “dependent entirely on the attitude of the United States” is a repetition of past arguments, showing that, for its part, North Korea will not budge.

Going forward, the focus will be on whether U.S. President Donald Trump will consider major concessions such as disarmament negotiations and the normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and North Korea, perhaps with his political legacy in mind. For now, though, it would seem that Washington is fully occupied with the situation in Iran. Even if the United States and North Korea were to reenter negotiations and make significant progress, Trump is highly unlikely to win over the Norwegian Nobel Committee. Absent the motivation of his coveted Nobel Peace Prize, the president would seem to have little incentive to reach out to North Korea.

North Korea has yet to comment on the American detention of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro or the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Even as Pyongyang condemns the “terrorist acts” of the United States, it would seem that it is being careful not to cause any major provocations. It is noteworthy, for example, that Kim’s speech criticizes “the United States” without making a single mention of Trump. For North Korea, extracting some major concessions from Trump would of course be ideal, but if it can manage to keep developing weapons without provoking Washington, then it knows that Trump will be gone anyway in three years.

Kim stated that North Korea has “the most hostile state-to-state relations” with South Korea, warning Seoul about attempting reunification through absorption. He also instructed his military to “fortify” the border with South Korea as soon as possible. The plan is to preserve the current system through coexistence similar to that of East and West Germany during the Cold War, with South Korea recognizing North Korea as a sovereign state in exchange for Pyongyang recognizing the Republic of Korea.

Kim meanwhile asserted that possessing nuclear weapons is “the only way to put an end to the imperialists’ ambition for aggression” and that North Korea stands at the center of “building a fair and just multipolar world.” Japan, the United States, and South Korea have previously called for North Korea to “irreversibly” abandon its nuclear weapons, yet now North Korea has expressed that what it will establish as “irreversible” is its status as a nuclear power. Given that, the Kim’s medium-term plan is simply to wait for significant concessions from the United States and South Korea.