Okinawa’s September 2026 election made headlines as incumbent Denny Tamaki was ousted by the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) preferred candidate, Koja Genta. Koja became the first LDP-backed candidate to win the position since Hirokazu Nakaima in 2006. 

Tamaki and his predecessor, the late Onaga Takeshi, vocally opposed the expansion of the U.S. Marine Corps’ Camp Schwab in Henoko and were generally critical of Okinawa’s excessive base burden, relative to other Japanese prefectures. Newly-elected Governor Koja was perceived by the LDP-led Japanese government to be more favorable to the U.S. bases in Okinawa, specifically the completion of the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Ginowan City to Camp Schwab. 

Perhaps most emblematic of the shift in the Okinawan Prefectural Office was Koja’s abolition of the Henoko New Base Construction Issue Countermeasures Division, the office that had handled legal, environmental, and political issues surrounding the construction. Instead, Koja’s administration created the Early Return Countermeasures Office, which is less overtly critical of the Henoko project. 

Only days after his inauguration, however, Koja has had to confront the same perennial problem that his predecessors faced: crimes (allegedly) committed by U.S. military personnel in Okinawa and their impacts on the Japan-U.S. alliance. 

On October 3, Okinawan police arrested a U.S. Marine on suspicion of murdering Anna Yagi, an Okinawan woman. While it remains to be seen if the U.S. soldier is convicted of the crime, this incident represents an unfortunate continuity of crimes committed by U.S. soldiers in Okinawa, particularly against women. In recent years, for instance, a U.S. Marine was convicted of attempted rape, and a U.S. Air Force member was found guilty of the kidnapping and rape of a minor; in both cases the victims were female. 

As the U.S. and Japanese governments increasingly worry about conflict with China in the Taiwan Strait, which borders Okinawa, they must work to prevent these crimes to ensure the stable operation of their alliance. 

Crimes Committed by U.S. Servicemembers Contribute to Okinawa’s “Base Burden”

Several factors impact Okinawans’ perception of the prefecture’s “excessive base burden.” One is the fact that Okinawa hosts 70 percent of the U.S. soldiers stationed in Japan, but Okinawa’s landmass is just 1 percent of Japan’s total area. Okinawa also has a contentious and traumatic history with Tokyo, which increases suspicions that the central government doesn’t have the prefecture’s best interests in mind.  

A major factor that contributes to the perception of the U.S. bases as burdens is the negative externalities that periodically come from U.S. bases and troops. That includes various forms of chemical pollution, such as Agent Orange (historically) and per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) (in recent years), and other environmental issues.  

Crimes attributed to U.S. military personnel are another type of negative externality. Violent crimes such as sexual assault and murder may be especially likely to mobilize protests against the U.S. military presence, in part because of the strong emotions that they can invoke. These events serve as opportunities for anti-base activists to remind Okinawans and mainland Japanese citizens alike of the island prefecture’s traumatic history involving both mainland Japan and the U.S., such as the Battle of Okinawa during World War II. Through this lens, crimes committed by U.S. military personnel in Okinawa are interpreted as further examples of the ways that the U.S. and Japanese governments have and continue to marginalize Okinawa in the name of national and regional security.

Unsurprisingly, anti-base protests in Okinawa often occur after a crime such as the murder of Anna Yagi. For example, the 1995 kidnapping and rape of a 12-year-old girl by U.S. servicemen kicked off a massive wave of protests against the U.S. bases, and more recently, the 2016 murder of Rina Shimabukuro by a U.S. contractor was followed by protests with tens of thousands of participants. 

Despite the election of Koja to the governorship, which some observers may interpret as a sign that Okinawans are deprioritizing base politics, protests are likely to follow Yagi’s murder. They have already started in Tokyo, as well as Naha, the capital of Okinawa Prefecture. 

The Threat Perception of China Can’t Overshadow Crimes

For some observers, Koja’s election win signaled that Okinawans’ concerns about potential Chinese hostility in the nearby Taiwan Strait may trump their concerns about the “burdens” from the U.S. bases. Koja himself stated that “the fact that the security environment around Okinawa has become more severe is something we can’t help but acknowledge.” He said that “we have to have the ability to defend ourselves and deter aggression,” presumably referring to the U.S. and Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) bases in the prefecture. 

However, it would be a mistake to assume that the perception of China as a threat to Japanese and Okinawan security will automatically counteract the negative impacts that crimes committed by U.S. soldiers have on public opinion toward the U.S. military, at least in the short term. Recent research has suggested that threat perception does not always increase support for a U.S. military presence. 

Some of my own research found that crimes committed by U.S. personnel have a negative impact on public opinion toward the U.S. military. Furthermore, it is unclear if the presence of U.S. bases makes locals feel more or less secure, particularly in the event of a military conflict, especially given Iran’s recent attacks on U.S. military installations in the Middle East. In Okinawa, surveys suggest that a majority of residents worry that military bases (which could include SDF bases as well) in the prefecture could serve as military targets. 

Therefore, although recent surveys suggest that Okinawans, like mainland Japanese citizens, are wary of Chinese military aggression, U.S. and Japanese officials should not assume that threat perceptions will automatically result in Okinawan public support for U.S. bases, particularly when a crime linked to U.S. personnel is in the headlines. 

An Ounce of Prevention Is Worth a Pound of Cure

If the U.S. and Japanese governments believe, as they say, that the bases in Okinawa Prefecture are crucial to regional security, they need to take more proactive measures to prevent rather than react to crimes allegedly committed by U.S. military personnel. Even if Anna Yagi’s accused murderer is ultimately found innocent, the damage to civilian-military relations between U.S. soldiers and Okinawans is already done. 

For his part, Koja has issued a formal protest with the U.S. military and expressed his “outrage” at the crime. Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae has lodged a “strong protest” with the U.S.; meanwhile, U.S. officials have temporarily prohibited U.S. soldiers from going off base in Okinawa. However, reactive actions by officials are not new, and Okinawans are wary of the crime, protest, and apology routine. As one Okinawan resident put it, “I am deeply disappointed by the same kinds of government comments we have been hearing for decades – that they will protest or that they take the matter seriously.” 

One of the biggest elements in preventing such crimes against civilians is the training that U.S. soldiers receive when they deploy to a specific location. Such training may impact soldiers’ perceptions of the host communities in which they live and with which they interact, as well as how they interact with host community civilians. In the case of Okinawa, a recent study suggested that the orientation materials that U.S. Marines are exposed to depict Okinawans as obstacles to be overcome and the media as agitators of anti-base sentiment. In doing so, these materials delegitimize opposition to U.S. bases, instead of asking how U.S. troops can avoid stoking anti-base sentiment. This study drew on training materials from the 2010s. Since then, the materials have hopefully been updated in a way that seeks to better understand where Okinawan anti-base sentiment comes from and the role of individual U.S. soldiers in facilitating (or inhibiting) the Japan-U.S. relationship. 

The U.S. military and its municipal and gubernatorial partners also have a role to play in shaping the narratives around the U.S. military presence in Okinawa, which may help ameliorate the negative impacts of crimes on civilians’ relationships with U.S. soldiers. Recent studies suggested that contact between U.S. soldiers and civilians in base-hosting countries can facilitate positive public opinions of the U.S. military. The same research found that contact combined with exposure to base-related crime – being the victim or having a friend or family member who is a victim of such crime – does not consistently lead to negative attitudes toward the U.S. military. Thus, creating and strengthening the relationships between U.S. troops and the community members that host them is essential to maintaining a positive Japan-U.S. alliance. This can include activities such as base festivals, English or Japanese language courses, or other exchanges. 

Anna Yagi’s murder comes at a time of other high-profile cases of violence against women, and joins a history of crimes committed by U.S. military personnel against women in Okinawa. For the stability of the Japan-U.S. security alliance, it is imperative to facilitate more positive relationships between U.S. soldiers and Okinawan citizens; crimes attributed to U.S. soldiers have the opposite effect. While the United States has tried to address this issue in the past, it is clearly not enough, as Koja has said. 

Until the U.S. military and its Japanese partners can solve this puzzle, waves of Okinawan anti-base sentiment and protest, which threaten the Japan-U.S. relationship, will continue in the wake of every violent crime.