When Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae visited Vietnam in early May this year, she presented an “evolved version” of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), a key plank in Japanese foreign policy, which is being called FOIP 3.0. The “Updated FOIP” specifies as priority areas “Building economic infrastructure for the age of AI and data,” “Co-creation of economic growth opportunities through public-private collaboration and rule sharing,” and “Enhancing cooperation in the field of security to ensure regional peace and stability,” each with its own items for concrete cooperation.

The FOIP was first proposed by the late Prime Minister Abe Shinzo in a speech in Nairobi in 2016. The keyword for FOIP 1.0 was “connectivity,” reflecting the fact that it was launched in the middle of a major shift in the power balance triggered by the rise of China.

International division has only deepened since, following the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war, and with the rise of the Global South, international politics have become more complex still. It was in response to this that then Prime Minister Kishida Fumio proposed the New Plan for a FOIP, or FOIP 2.0, in 2023, along with the keyword “inclusiveness.”

Building on this foundation, the keyword for FOIP 3.0 as proposed by the Takaichi administration is “resilience.” With any improvement of relations with China unlikely in the near time, and with the United States pursuing an exceedingly unpredictable foreign policy under Trump, Japan faces what might be called a double risk. It needs to deepen cooperation with Indo-Pacific countries to mitigate those risks and ensure autonomy and resilience. The new FOIP is thus heavily shaped by the imperative to revitalize the Japanese economy and strengthen economic security through cooperation with the Global South, including the ASEAN countries.

The idea of connecting Japanese growth strategy, economic security, and Global South strategy has been clear enough since the Kishida administration. That administration adopted the New Policy toward Enhanced Cooperation with Global South Countries in June 2024. It also implemented institutional schemes to strengthen cooperation with the Global South, such as launching the Global South Future-Oriented Co-Creation Project and Official Security Assistance (OSA) as well as reforming the Official Development Assistance (ODA). The Asia Zero Emission Community (AZEC) is another scheme launched under that administration. However, whereas FOIP 2.0 emphasized Japan’s ideal international order and its commitment to that order, FOIP 3.0 does not define an order as explicitly; instead it pushes a pragmatism that more clearly emphasizes economic renewal and the restoration of Japan’s vitality.

The three priority areas specified in the FOIP 3.0 each list their own spheres for concrete cooperation. They are the 17 strategic fields identified by the Council for Japan’s Growth Strategy established under the Takaichi administration, areas in particular where Japan wants to promote development, with special emphasis being placed on AI and semiconductors, digital server security, and information and communications, quantum technology, and other fields that are relevant to digital hegemony.

What the times may call for is precisely this kind of pragmatism: an emphasis on revitalizing the Japanese economy and strengthening economic security in the name of “resilience.” Resilience has become an equally important theme for the ASEAN countries as they navigate what one might call the “geoeconomic turn.” Confronted with Trump tariffs, the energy supply disruptions from the Strait of Hormuz crisis, and related pressures, they have become increasingly interested in cooperation to mitigate geoeconomic risks. Key to surviving this uncertainty will be each ASEAN country’s ability to connect its national interests and resilience to broader cooperation across the region. Through FOIP, Japan aims not only to cooperate with individual ASEAN countries but to support ASEAN’s collective efforts to build resilience, contributing to risk mitigation across the region.

Japan can no longer rely on overwhelming economic power and technological advantage as the basis for cooperation with ASEAN countries and other parts of the Global South. There are limits to cooperation built solely on the pragmatism of shared gains. For Japan to earn the trust of ASEAN countries and others in the Global South, it must also clearly demonstrate its commitment to a rules-based international order capable of constraining the arbitrary actions of major powers. Japan is advancing concrete initiatives, but it must also clearly articulate the worldview behind FOIP — the kind of order it is trying to build — in light of today’s upheavals.