On the morning of August 12, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and an Indonesian Navy warship conducted a joint navigation exercise in the waters east of Taiwan. It was the first time China had exercised with a foreign military in these geopolitically sensitive waters.

The announcement a day earlier had drawn a swift rebuke from Taiwan’s authorities, which called the exercise an act of political manipulation, “aimed at creating a false impression before the international community that the Chinese communists have jurisdiction over waters east of Taiwan.” The United States similarly called on China “to cease its continuous military pressure against Taiwan.”

Chinese state media indeed framed the exercises as evidence of its jurisdiction over the area. The Global Times, a mouthpiece for the Chinese Communist Party, quoted Chinese military affairs expert Zhang Junshe describing the exercise as being of “great significance,” both because it was the first of its kind and because it demonstrated “China’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the exclusive economic zone east of Taiwan island.”

The exercise came at a moment when Beijing has increased its operational presence in the waters east of Taiwan in an effort to assert its jurisdiction. After Japan and the Philippines agreed to start delimitation talks over their exclusive economic zones (EEZs), which overlap to the east of Taiwan, China sent Coast Guard and law enforcement vessels to patrol the disputed waters in early June. Although the PLAN has regularly held exercises in these waters, it marked the first time the Coast Guard patrolled the region independently. 

The Coast Guard presence, accompanied by law enforcement and research vessels, were framed as a routine expression of Beijing’s sovereignty over the area. Although initially a special operation, it has now become semi-permanent. And now China is roping in third countries to corroborate its jurisdiction, with state media making this link directly.

In turn, Indonesia’s Navy downplayed the significance of the exercise. Indonesian media reported that the navy confirmed a “limited joint training or passing exercises” with the PLAN on its way back from a joint exercise with Russia in Vladivostok. It added that the vessel in question also conducted similar exercises with Japan’s navy and the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet. 

The press statement seemed to deliberately sidestep the question of jurisdiction, instead referring to Indonesia’s “free and active” foreign policy and the “universal naval tradition conducted when transiting through another country’s maritime area.” A later statement dropped the “country” reference, simply stating “a maritime area” instead. 

It’s difficult to assess whether Indonesia was aware beforehand of the sensitivity of these drills. While Beijing emphasized the significance of the exercises, Jakarta called them routine.

The incident is more evidence of a recent trend where China enlists foreign countries to support its increasingly strict interpretation of the One China principle. The old playbook of China and Taiwan’s diplomatic competition focused on Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies and participation in international organizations: Since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the Presidency in 2016, Taiwan has seen the number of diplomatic allies dwindle from 23 to 12. Despite those restrictions, Taipei has proven remarkably flexible and maintains unofficial relations with countries throughout the world. 

However, over the last year Beijing has become more strident in getting other countries to subscribe to its more strict interpretation of its One China principle. As a result, organizations throughout Africa, Oceania, and even in some Western countries have become more hesitant to engage with any official institutions or documents that bear the name Taiwan, or its official name: the Republic of China.

The most notable example of this happened in April, when the Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar revoked overflight clearance to block President Lai Ching-te’s trip to Eswatini, citing their lack of recognition of Taiwan. Although overseas visits have caused tensions between Taiwan and China before, it was the first time third countries were so directly involved in blocking a visit. 

Taiwan’s presidential office blamed Chinese economic coercion. More likely, as the Global South Project argued, these countries spotted an easy opportunity to win points with Beijing, who indeed thanked the countries for abiding by the One-China principle. Eventually, Lai did visit Eswatini after being smuggled in on an Eswatini government airplane. 

Other African countries have also hardened their policies on Taiwan. In June, Kenya confiscated the passports of two Taiwanese academics who traveled there to participate in the Our Oceans Conference, declaring it doesn’t recognize ROC passports. A month earlier, Zambia cancelled RightsCon 2026, a major human rights conference. The organizer cited Chinese pressure over the participation of Taiwanese civil society members. In July, Morocco announced it stopped processing visa confirmation letters for Taiwanese passport holders, causing Taiwanese travelers to cancel their planned visits. Finally, this week, Ugandan officials withheld the passports of several Taiwanese travelers and demanded Chinese passports instead, explicitly citing Uganda’s “One China policy.” In response, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a travel advisory for Uganda. 

While some of the passport issues were later clarified, the closure of Taipei’s representative office in Papua New Guinea seems to be permanent. In July, Papua New Guinea’s Foreign Minister Justin Tkatchenko abruptly announced the closure of Taiwan’s representative office in Port Moresby to align with the One China policy. Beijing welcomed the decision in a statement published before the official announcement.

The issues of Taiwanese citizens and organizations in Africa and Oceania are examples of China’s grey-zone pressure on Taiwan going global. Under the old playbook, diplomatic switches were clearly attributable to China. Passing exercises, visa issues, and passport quirks are more deniable and reversible; they make it difficult for Taipei to put the blame on a single actor, while Beijing gets international validation that the Republic of China does not exist.

This strategy also has its limits. The Indonesian Navy perhaps did not anticipate becoming a pawn in Beijing’s game, but by refusing to take a clear side it still allowed China to frame the exercise as an endorsement. As a Taiwanese intelligence officer said, “Militarily this does not have a direct impact on Taiwan. It has a geopolitical significance.” While Indonesia gently pushed back, would the next country do the same?