In 2025 there were waves of protests in several Indonesian cities as students, urban youth and precarious workers mobilised against corruption, economic insecurity and the growing authoritarianism of Prabowo Subianto, elected president in 2024. But the mobilisation lacked a political vehicle capable of translating protests into demands, and demands into strategy. The unrest subsided. Normality returned.

The episode raised a broader question. Why, more than a quarter century after the fall of Suharto’s brutal New Order regime (1965-98), does Indonesia still struggle to produce durable organisations capable of opposing policies that feed social anger? The answer lies in how the left is organised and the ideological premises through which many workers interpret social issues.

Until recently, the political era that succeeded the New Order regime was widely described as a democratic transition. During the early Reformasi years, organised labour secured tangible gains, including increases in the minimum wage, expanded social security schemes and improved employment protections. Industrial zones across West Java, Banten and Central Java became a focus of worker mobilisation. New union federations proliferated, replacing the single state-controlled Confederation of All Indonesian Workers’ Unions (SPSI), and May Day was celebrated once again.

At the time, pro-labour activists believed Reformasi might produce not only more democratic institutions but also an economic policy less hostile to organised labour. More than two decades later, they are still waiting. Indonesian capitalism remains anchored in oligarchic alliances linking political-bureaucratic elites to large conglomerates, while largely excluding other actors. Meanwhile, labour faces renewed flexibilisation, deepening precarity, expanded outsourcing and regulatory restructuring that prioritises capital mobility.

This trend has accelerated under President Subianto, a general under the (…)

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