Differences over India’s much awaited military theaterization have been simmering for years and the outgoing Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh’s recent remarks have brought the debate back into the spotlight. Singh argued that fighter aircraft must not be permanently divided across geographical commands, advocating instead for centralized control and decentralized execution. 

Three days later, former Navy chief Admiral Arun Prakash appealed that India’s armed forces must settle their differences over theaterization before a serious security crisis exposes the limitations of the existing command structure. 

India currently operates 17 single-service operational commands: seven each for the Army and Air Force, and three for the Navy. The Andaman and Nicobar Command, established in 2001, is the country’s first integrated tri-service operational command, while the Strategic Forces Command manages its nuclear arsenal. Three separate command structures can complicate planning, create duplication, and slow operational responses. 

Theaterization would reorganize this structure around geographical areas of responsibility, where a joint theater commander would exercise operational authority over the Army, Navy, and Air Force assets assigned to that theater rather than having the three services independently command their forces. The most frequently discussed proposal envisages northern and western commands oriented toward China and Pakistan, respectively, alongside a maritime theater command.

The reform has been under consideration for years. The creation of the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) and the Department of Military Affairs in 2019, followed by the Inter-Services Organizations (Command, Control and Discipline) Act, 2023, provided institutional momentum. But agreement on the principle has not translated into agreement on the structure.

The most significant objection has come from the Indian Air Force (IAF). Unlike land and naval forces, the speed, range, aerial refuelling capabilities, and precision-strike potential allow air power to be concentrated where it is most needed. The IAF therefore argues that its principal combat assets should remain centrally managed and allocated according to the requirements of a particular conflict.

While the Army and the Navy seek assured access to air power in support of ground operations, the IAF views it as an independent strategic capability that must retain the flexibility to operate across theaters. The disagreement is not necessarily over the principle of centralized control and decentralized execution. Rather, the root contention concerns where operational authority should reside: with the theater commander responsible for conducting the campaign, or with the Air Force, which wants to preserve the flexibility to concentrate its limited resources across theaters. 

Operation Sindoor offers an important reference point in this debate. The May 2025 military operation demonstrated the importance of coordinating different military capabilities. However, it was conducted under a joint architecture involving the CDS and the three service chiefs, rather than a permanent geographical theater command.

This raises an important question: if the existing command structure could facilitate effective tri-service coordination during the major military confrontation of 2025, what additional advantages would theaterization bring? Proponents of theaterization argue that it makes such coordination a permanent institutional arrangement rather than one dependent on the working relationships between senior commanders.

The prolonged disagreement also raises questions about the role of political leadership in advancing defense reforms. While the armed forces must have a decisive voice in determining operational requirements, the responsibility for resolving institutional disagreements cannot rest indefinitely with the services themselves. Theaterization involves redistributing authority across institutions that have historically preferred operational autonomy. Where consensus remains elusive, the political leadership must provide direction, establish clear timelines, and take responsibility for the final organizational framework. Without such intervention, the reform risks remaining hostage to never-ending inter-service negotiations. 

India has been operating a tri-service command in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands – the Andaman and Nicobar Command, or ANC – since 2001. It was established in the aftermath of the Kargil conflict. However, the ANC cannot be treated as a blueprint for the proposed theater commands because its relatively small force concentration and geographically bounded area of responsibility have made integration more manageable. The proposed theaters would operate on a considerably larger scale, with more complex operational requirements and competing demands on scarce resources.

India could also draw lessons from the experiences of others. The U.S. model of unified combatant commands separates operational command from the services’ responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping forces. It also emphasizes centralized command, distributed control, and decentralized execution, allowing air assets to be coordinated across a theater while retaining operational flexibility. 

However, India’s geographical vulnerabilities, resource constraints, and institutional arrangements necessitate home-grown solutions. The way forward lies in a phased approach that combines the interests of all three services and that requires a strong political will. 

India’s debate over theater commands is an internal affair, but its outcome will be of interest to its partners in the Indo-Pacific. A military that can run a two-front contingency under unified command is a steadier partner for those who want a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. India’s emergence as a consequential regional security actor will depend on developing the institutional capacity to employ its capabilities effectively. Getting theaterization right is therefore part of the larger process through which India seeks to translate its Indo-Pacific ambitions into credible strategic capability.