“Abandonment” vs “entrapment” is a classic alliance dilemma in geopolitical crises. A country may fear that it may be abandoned by its allies during a war. Alternatively, a country may fear being drawn into a costly war as a result of its alliance commitment. For U.S. allies, the ongoing Iran-U.S. military conflict has resulted in a new round of diplomatic challenges to navigate between these risks of abandonment or entrapment. 

The Trump administration has asked multiple countries, including South Korea, to form a naval convoy to protect oil transports from Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. South Korea’s response so far has been equivocal. While joining a multilateral statement condemning the strait’s blockade, South Korea’s Foreign Ministry has evaded a specific response on whether and how it would intervene. As the conflict in the Persian Gulf escalates, South Korea’s equivocation strategy, however, faces increased pressure.

As a long-time U.S. ally, South Korea has participated in multiple overseas military conflicts. During the Vietnam War, South Korea deployed combat troops to fight alongside U.S. forces. During the Iraq War, South Korea initially deployed noncombatant troops, but later expanded its commitment to combat peacekeeping forces. During the Russia-Ukraine War, South Korea’s participation was more restrained. While participating in international sanctions on Russia and exporting arms to Europe and the United States, South Korea has refrained from sending lethal arms directly to Ukraine. 

As the South Korean government engages in difficult negotiations with the Trump administration over trade agreements, security deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, and prospects for renewed diplomatic talks with North Korea, it faces risks in declining President Donald Trump’s request for assistance. Even if the Trump administration does not engage in direct punishment, South Korea may suffer costs from the United States’ shifting of strategic resources and commitment. The relocation of U.S. military assets from South Korea to the Middle East, for example, causes security anxieties for the South Korean government.

Participation in the conflict, however, also poses risks. First is the reputational risk. As the military conflict encounters controversies internationally and within the United States, the South Korean government is wary of being perceived as an active conflict participant. Second is the diplomatic risk. South Korea is reluctant to be drawn into a long-term conflict with Iran, which would result in adversarial relations with Iran’s regime. Third is the security risk. The deployed South Korean navy may be exposed to attacks or even casualties in the Strait of Hormuz. With uncertainty on how long the conflict will last, South Korea may become trapped in the Middle East, even as security risks in the Asia-Pacific increase. 

For South Korea, the optimal outcome would be the quick suspension of the conflict and subsequent reopening of Hormuz without the need for international intervention. The prolonging of the conflict and subsequent pressures from the United States, as well as the adverse impact on South Korea’s economy and security, may motivate the South Korean government to consider alternative bargaining strategies within alliance negotiations: leveraging, minimizing, or compensating.

Leveraging is when a country makes a counterdemand for reciprocal concessions. A country may agree to participate in its ally’s war, but bargain for rewards that would substantially offset the cost. For example, in return for its military participation in the Vietnam War, South Korea bargained for expansion of U.S. military and economic aid. In the current Iran-U.S. conflict, the South Korean government may engage in hard bargaining for the Trump administration’s concessions on other bilateral issues (such as on trade tariffs or North Korea policy) in return for South Korea’s naval participation in the Middle East. Ahn Cheol-soo, a legislator from the opposition People’s Power Party, has advocated this strategy.

Minimizing is when a country minimally implements the ally’s request, hedging between satisfying the latter while mitigating risks from conflict participation. During the First Gulf War, South Korea was formally part of the U.S.-led multinational coalition but only contributed non-combatant medical and logistical units. Once again, South Korean government may bargain for minimal participation in the current Middle East conflict. Some options being considered are the deployment of South Korea’s naval units currently conducting anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden for a limited operation in the Hormuz Strait, or supplying air defense batteries to the U.S. military and the Gulf states. Such offers may satisfy the Trump administration to waive its demands for robust naval intervention in the Strait of Hormuz, averting South Korea’s risk of a direct conflict with Iran.   

Compensating is when a country declines the ally’s request but offers a counterproposal to support the latter through other means. During the First Gulf War, Japan declined to deploy its Self-Defense Force units, citing constitutional restraints, but offered to provide financial contributions to the U.S.-led coalition. During the Vietnam War, the United Kingdom declined to participate, but offered security cooperation in other regions “East of Suez.” South Korea may also decline the U.S. request for intervention in the current conflict. Instead, the South Korean government may propose a counteroffer on economic, trade-related issues. The South Korean government has also been considering contributing to the post-conflict demining operation in the Strait of Hormuz. 

For South Korea, the tactics of leveraging, minimizing, and compensating each pose challenges. It may be difficult to leverage for benefits large enough to offset the costs of participation in the Iran-U.S. conflict. Minimal participation, however, could risk offending both the United States and Iran. Finally, even if South Korea can offer alternative compensation that could waive Trump’s request for military intervention, South Korean domestic politics may be reluctant to bear the costs of such concessions. 

South Korea’s Lee Jae-myung government will need to make prudent judgments regarding which bargaining tactics are most effective for engaging with the Trump administration. South Korean policymakers will likely observe the responses of other U.S. allies, including Japan. For now, South Korea’s strategy appears to be equivocating as long as possible, then attempting minimal participation within a multilateral intervention. The minimizing strategy may be calculated as the least risky of the three bargaining options for South Korea. 

For the past 70 years, South Korea has navigated its alliance with the United States by mitigating the alliance-related risks while securing the benefits. The current Iran-U.S. conflict will pose a new test for South Korea’s foreign policy statecraft in the “Trumpian” geopolitical order.