The European Union is reviving a contentious proposal that would compel tech companies to scan private messages for child sexual abuse material—even on end-to-end encrypted services.

Branded by critics as “chat control,” the measure is back on the Council of the EU’s agenda this autumn under Denmark’s rotating presidency, with a key Justice and Home Affairs meeting expected in mid-October.

At the heart of the plan is “client-side scanning”: software on a user’s device that examines messages, photos, and files before they are encrypted and sent. Supporters argue it is necessary to disrupt child-abuse networks.

Privacy regulators, security researchers, and civil-society groups counter that it amounts to generalised surveillance, erodes the promise of private messaging, and creates new vulnerabilities that criminals and hostile states could exploit.

They warn of false positives at scale and a legal collision with EU rights to privacy, data protection, and freedom of expression. Politically, the file’s fate hinges on whether a blocking minority of member states resists a Council mandate to negotiate.

Europe’s “Chat Control” Returns Under Danish Presidency—And Why It Matters Beyond the EU. (Photo Internet reproduction)

Several large countries remain undecided, making the next weeks decisive. Even if courts later pare back the law, companies would face immediate pressure to re-engineer products or withdraw encryption features for EU users—changes that rarely remain confined to one market.

This is not a European-only story. Brazil is one of the world’s most intensive markets for encrypted messaging, and its tech sector exports digital services into Europe.

If the EU compels on-device scanning, multinational platforms could standardise surveillance-ready builds globally to avoid fragmentation, or degrade privacy for users with EU contacts.

For Brazilian media, activists, lawyers, and businesses that rely on secure communications—including sources and clients in Europe—the risk is obvious.

The stakes are simple: whether governments can require pre-emptive screening of everyone’s private communications as a condition for using modern messaging.

As Denmark seeks a deal this autumn, the outcome will shape not only Europe’s digital rights but the technical baseline for privacy far beyond its borders. Now is the moment when that choice—between targeted policing and mass scanning—moves from principle to policy.