Starlink’s global experience illustrates why governments would want safeguards

Elon Musk’s broadside against Mukesh Ambani and the Indian government over the delay in launching Starlink in India is poor optics and unlikely to speed up the process. Accusing an Indian industrialist of effectively controlling the government is hardly the best way to persuade the Centre to expedite regulatory and security clearances. The Centre has the prerogative to examine the security implications of allowing a foreign-controlled satellite communications network to operate over India.

Starlink’s global experience illustrates why governments would want safeguards. In India, authorities sought information from SpaceX after a Starlink terminal was found on a Myanmar-origin boat carrying more than 6,000 kg of methamphetamine in a record drug-smuggling case. In Ukraine, Kyiv has reported that Russian forces obtained Starlink terminals illicitly and used them on the battlefield, something SpaceX has denied. In Sudan, Starlink terminals smuggled into the country have been used extensively in areas controlled by the Rapid Support Forces, despite the service being unauthorised there. And in Southeast Asia, Starlink terminals have been reportedly used by scam camps. None of this means Starlink is responsible. But it does demonstrate the enforcement challenges posed by a satellite network that can provide connectivity beyond the reach of conventional terrestrial infrastructure.

The charge that Ambani has somehow blocked Starlink does not sit comfortably with India’s satcom policy history. When the government liberalised the space sector, it was opened to private and foreign participation despite opposition from existing mobile operators, including Mukesh Ambani’s Reliance Jio. On perhaps the most important issue, spectrum, the government once again went against Jio. Jio argued that the government should auction satellite spectrum to ensure a level playing field with terrestrial telecom operators. Instead, the government decided to assign satellite spectrum administratively. The regulatory framework was not designed to keep Starlink out. For instance, the Centre rejected the regulator’s proposal to fix an annual charge of ₹500 for urban satellite subscribers.

However, the government needs to answer some questions. If security concerns are now significant enough to hold up the rollout, why were they not resolved at the policy stage? Why encourage foreign investment through policy and then allow the process to drift? The case for satcom in India is compelling. Fibre and mobile towers are expensive or impractical in mountains, islands, border regions and sparsely populated areas. Satellite connectivity can fill these gaps and provide backhaul where terrestrial networks cannot. The government should therefore decide quickly. If security is the issue, enforce conditions. If foreign control is the concern, India can lower FDI thresholds in such sensitive sectors, as in the past. What India does not need is either Musk’s public pressure campaign or an opaque regulatory limbo.

Published on October 11, 2026