Taiwan and China are back at the annual Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Leaders Meeting, returning after all external partners were excluded in 2025. And Beijing isn’t happy about it: China’s special envoy called Taiwan’s participation “very inappropriate” and warned, “There will always be consequences.”

With multiple Pacific leaders not in attendance amid whispers of foreign interference, China-Taiwan competition is on everyone’s minds. While no Pacific country switched recognition in 2026, Beijing’s pressure campaign this year has been more systematic and intense than in any year since Naoero (formerly Nauru) flipped ties in 2024.

Under Beijing’s version of the “One China” principle – which holds that Taiwan is part of China – limiting Taiwan’s international space is an ever-present imperative. For Taiwan, defending its sovereignty entails maintaining, and where possible, expanding its diplomatic presence. 

Competition across the Taiwan Strait is clearest to outside observers when countries switch recognition from Taiwan to China, yet for Beijing it never ends there. China then wants to win repeated rhetorical affirmation of the One China principle, institutional buy-in beyond the government of the day, and concrete decisions to limit Taiwan’s presence.

Across the nine Pacific countries where China has diplomatic missions, officials re-affirm their support for Beijing’s One China principle in roughly one in three publicized meetings with Chinese diplomats, according to The Alliance Futures Initiative’s PRC Pacific Embassies Monitor. That rate reflects China’s embassies’ frequent maintenance work aimed at ensuring incumbent and incoming officials are reminded of their support for One China principle. 

Beyond government officials, China also engages with political parties to secure their institutional backing. In July 2026, a delegation of the People’s Alliance Party of Fiji met with the International Liaison Department (ILD) – the Chinese apparatus for party-party relations – in China, giving its institutional support for the One China principle. Later that month, an ILD delegation met with parties across the Solomon Islands political spectrum. 

These statements carry real weight. Just days before the PIF Leaders’ Meeting, Vanuatu’s opposition leader called on the government to affirm its support for the One China principle. The opposition also urged the government to ensure its actions at the upcoming forum will be consistent with the One China principle. In other words: don’t engage with Taiwan. The government responded by rejecting the opposition’s concerns and affirming its adherence to the One China principle. The opposition party’s call shows how Beijing’s drive for support ultimately leads to Pacific governments taking concrete decisions that shrink Taiwan’s international space.

The most tangible recent case was Papua New Guinea’s decision to close Taiwan’s trade office in its capital this July. Prime Minister James Marape rejected claims of foreign pressure, stating that the decision reflected PNG’s longstanding One China policy, which recognizes Beijing’s assertion of sovereignty across the Taiwan Strait. Taipei responded by suspending spot purchases of liquefied natural gas, yet by keeping long-term contracts preserved some of its presence.

Richard Maru, PNG’s trade and international investment minister, has publicly tied Chinese economic benefits to PNG’s moves against Taiwan. In May 2026, Maru attributed a recently signed economic framework agreement in part to the 2023 closure of PNG’s trade office in Taipei.

The closure of Taiwan’s trade office also followed Marape’s April 2026 visit to China, which focused on expanding trade and investment ties with Guangdong. The week before the closure, Maru met with the Chinese ambassador to discuss the upcoming inaugural PNG-China Business Forum & Trade Expo and other economic matters.

China didn’t need to ask PNG to oust Taiwan; it had already made it clear that PNG would be rewarded for it. 

Following the closure, China’s ambassador to PNG, Yang Xiaoguang, published an article in the local press titled “Closing Down the ‘Taipei Economic Office in PNG’ Will Further Enhance China-PNG Relations and Cooperation.” Sure enough, a PetroChina delegation arrived in Port Moresby days after the closure with offers to buy more PNG gas.

China amplified these developments across the Pacific, with embassies uniformly featuring the closure on their social media. In the Federated States of Micronesia and Fiji, China’s heads of mission published opinion pieces in the local media about the importance of following Beijing’s version of the One China principle, with the PNG move as the highlight.

China’s chargé d’affaires in Fiji, Wang Yuan, used his editorial as a platform to remind his hosts of their next step to align with China’s One China principle. Wang opened by emphasizing the importance of adherence to the One China principle to the China-Fiji relationship, then  went on to celebrate PNG closing the trade office. He commended Fiji for closing its trade office in Taiwan back in 2017 and renaming and revoking diplomatic privileges for Taiwan’s office in Suva in 2019. 

Wang didn’t explicitly ask Fiji to close the Taipei Trade Office. He didn’t need to. The sequence made it obvious what Beijing would like to see next – and by publishing an editorial, Wang put the idea in front of Fiji’s government and public at the same time.

Other governments in the region have also taken steps to shore up the strength of their support for Beijing’s One China principle. In May 2026, Naoero’s Cabinet issued a directive to all government and state-owned enterprise employees to firmly adhere to the One China principle and ensure consistency with it in official practices and communications. The directive also proscribed all official engagements with what it calls “Taiwan Province.”

In Kiribati, President Taneti Maamau just argued for a proposed constitutional amendment that would limit diplomatic relations to only U.N. member countries. In effect, the bill would prevent Kiribati from re-establishing ties with Taiwan. Regardless of whether the amendment passes, the bill aims to bind future officials to Beijing’s preferences. With the timing just days before the PIF Leaders’ Meeting in Palau – a country that recognizes Taiwan – the move suggested the weight Beijing carries in Kiribati, a country that only switched ties itself in 2019.

As these cases show, Beijing’s work to shrink Taiwan’s international space doesn’t end with recognition. After a country first gives its support for Beijing’s One China principle, China continues to expect increasing adherence. By rewarding anti-Taiwan actions, China signals that others will be paid too. 

Taiwan, Washington, and their partners are asking the wrong question. Which country flips next is less important than which piece of Taiwan’s presence will disappear next.