China’s latest naval movements suggest that Beijing is doing far more than reacting angrily to a Japanese warship’s transit of the Taiwan Strait. The southward passage of the aircraft carrier Liaoning, combined with the deployment of a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) task group into the Western Pacific, points to a broader strategic design: signaling resolve to Japan, countering the Philippines-U.S. Balikatan exercise (which this year is seeing a record level of participation by Japan), and shaping the military balance ahead of possible high-level diplomacy with Washington.

After the Japanese destroyer Ikazuchi transited the Taiwan Strait, Beijing decided to launch military exercises in the East China Sea on a scale roughly comparable to a joint combat readiness patrol. In addition, on April 19, the PLA Eastern Theater Command dispatched the 133rd naval task group through the Yokoate Channel – a waterway through the Ryukyu Islands close to the Japanese mainland – into the Western Pacific for training activities intended to test the force’s far-seas operational capabilities.

The Eastern Theater Command announced through its official social media account that the deployment of the 133rd task group was a “routine training activity organized in accordance with the annual plan” and “not aimed at any specific country or target.” The composition of the force suggests otherwise. The task group includes the Baotou, a Type 052D guided-missile destroyer often described as a “blade-bearing escort” for aircraft carriers. Together with the aircraft carrier Liaoning, which transited the Taiwan Strait on April 20, these two elements are highly likely to be conducting cross-theater exercises simultaneously, with operations unfolding in both the Philippine Sea in the Western Pacific and the South China Sea.

The military signaling was accompanied by diplomatic and propagandistic messaging. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun stated at a regular press briefing that the Taiwan issue is a non-negotiable “red line” and criticized the entry of Japanese naval vessels into the Taiwan Strait as a provocative act that compounded earlier mistakes. “Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s erroneous remarks on Taiwan have already severely impacted China-Japan relations,” Guo said. “The Japanese side is compounding the wrongdoing by sending the Self-Defense Force vessel into the Taiwan Strait to flex its muscles and deliberately provoke China.”

At around midnight on April 19, state media outlet Xinhua also published a commentary accusing Japan of deliberate provocation by choosing April 17 – the 131st anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki – a date framed in Chinese historical memory as a “day of national humiliation.” Together, these moves have added further strain to already tense Sino-Japanese relations.

Yet the real importance of the current PLAN maneuvers lies not in rhetoric, but in operational geography.

A Countermove Against the Philippines-U.S. Balikatan Exercise

On April 20, the United States and the Philippines launched their annual Balikatan exercise, with an unprecedented level of participation by Japan. In addition to unveiling a range of new military equipment, the exercise marked the first time that the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force projected forces into the South China Sea to conduct joint drills with U.S. and Philippine forces. Japan also participated for the first time in an operational capacity and is set to conduct a live-fire sinking exercise using Type 88 anti-ship missiles in waters north of Luzon facing the Taiwan Strait. This sends a clear signal that the United States, Japan, and the Philippines possess the capacity to interdict or even blockade the Bashi Channel.

The earlier transit of a Japanese destroyer through the Taiwan Strait also symbolically underscored the fact that Beijing does not enjoy uncontested maritime control over the strait. From China’s perspective, therefore, a military response was necessary. Combined with the deterioration in Sino-Japanese ties since late last year, this strongly suggests that Beijing’s actions were shaped by strategic planning rather than being merely a reactive response to the Japanese transit.

A close look at the map is revealing. The PLAN’s 133rd task group did not take the more familiar Miyako Strait route, which is farther south and closer to Taiwan. Instead, it deliberately passed through the Yokoate Channel before entering the Western Pacific, suggesting that its probable operating area is the Philippine Sea. 

Meanwhile, after forcing a passage through the Taiwan Strait, the Liaoning appears, based on its current track, to be preparing for joint naval-air exercises in the South China Sea. Notably, photographs released by Taiwan’s military show that the Liaoning is still embarked with J-15 fighters rather than the newer J-35 stealth fighter.

Since the main theater of Balikatan is centered on northern Luzon, simultaneous PLAN operations by the 133rd task group in the Philippine Sea and by the Liaoning in the South China Sea could amount to a tactical envelopment rehearsal aimed at forces operating near Luzon. That is the deeper military-strategic significance hidden behind the current round of Chinese operations.

A Show of Force Ahead of a Trump-Xi Meeting

From the perspective of major power competition, another point deserves attention: this military friction comes after Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington and before a possible meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping in Beijing. For China, avoiding the perception of being militarily intimidated by the United States ahead of a Trump-Xi meeting is clearly important. Against the backdrop of the Balikatan exercise, China had every incentive to demonstrate its own military strength in order to avoid entering high-level diplomacy from a position of weakness.

There is also a broader strategic calculation at work. At present, a significant share of U.S. military attention is concentrated on the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East. By staging these exercises, Beijing may also be testing whether U.S. force availability in the Indo-Pacific has been affected by ongoing tensions in the Middle East, and whether the United States still retains the capability to manage two regional crises simultaneously. 

For Beijing, then, the current operations are not merely a response to a military exercise nearby. They are also part of a pre-summit coercive signal directed across the Pacific at Washington. This is the larger diplomatic strategy embedded within the military maneuvers.

Limited (But Not Insignificant) Implications for Taiwan

Although the immediate focus of current Chinese military operations appears to be Japan and the Philippines, any PLA naval transit through the Taiwan Strait still poses a certain level of threat for Taiwan. Military exercises in the East China Sea and the South China Sea can directly affect Taiwan’s sea lines of communication and complicate Taipei’s preparations for dealing with China’s future anti-access/area denial operations.

That said, the current round of PLA activity does not appear to have a direct and immediate military focus on Taiwan. The Liaoning, now moving southward, is unlikely to turn toward eastern Taiwan, and the probability of a large-scale exercise specifically targeting Taiwan remains low. A more plausible scenario is that it will move south to conduct training with the Shandong carrier group, possibly as part of early preparations for future dual-carrier or even tri-carrier blue-water exercises later this summer.

In short, Beijing’s immediate military threat to Taiwan in this episode may be limited. Yet the force movements and tactical drills now unfolding in the East China Sea and South China Sea are clearly rehearsing the strategic logic of future regional denial and anti-intervention operations. Taiwan therefore cannot afford complacency.