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Orgo-Life the new way to the future Advertising by AdpathwayChina is building the world’s largest hydropower project on the Yarlung Tsangpo River in Tibet, designed with a massive 60,000-megawatt capacity. Construction was formally launched in July 2025, much to the consternation of people across the border in India.
“China has already begun construction of a dam in Medog County, around 40 km from the border… without consulting us or sharing any information,” warned Chief Minister Pema Khandu of Arunachal Pradesh. He called China’s $167 billion mega-dam in a seismically active zone an existential potential “water bomb.”
The Medog dam is not an isolated incident. It’s just one sign of a larger crisis extending across Asia’s river basins, where downstream nations face upper-riparian infrastructure that proceeds unilaterally, without environmental impact disclosures, binding legal frameworks, or genuine transboundary consultation and governance.
Downstream states urgently need a collective voice, built on shared demands for data and transparency.
Known as the “Water Tower of Asia,” Tibet is the source of 10 major transboundary river systems that flow into 10 downstream nations. These vital waterways sustain ecosystems, agriculture, and the livelihoods of 1.8 billion people across South and Southeast Asia, nearly one-quarter of the global population. No other single territory matches this human impact in supplying transboundary freshwater to densely populated downstream nations. That gives Tibet an unparalleled position in global hydrology.
Tibet also stores more freshwater than any place on earth apart from the two poles, which is why it is often referred to as the Third Pole of the planet. However, Tibet faces a dual crisis: it is warming at roughly twice the global average while its high-altitude environment is also continually battered by mining, deforestation, and industrial activity – a combination that threatens the stability of Asia’s major rivers.
Tibet’s glaciers, permafrost, wetlands, lakes, and high-altitude ecosystems regulate water availability and influence downstream hydrological and ecological processes. Large-scale damming on these rivers, much of it is in highly seismic terrain and without transparency or treaty frameworks, deepens downstream uncertainty over water flows and flooding risks that cross borders.
China rejects these concerns outright. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun stated that China has carried out cooperation with downstream countries and has had necessary communication with them. The spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in India, Yu Jing, insisted that the dam project on the Yarlung Tsangpo will not have a negative impact on the ecological environment, geological conditions, and the rights and interests related to water resources of downstream countries. Rather, she claimed that it will “to some extent, help with their disaster prevention and reduction and climate response.”
However, downstream nations have deep concern about the absence of binding agreements. China voted against the 1997 U.N. Watercourses Convention and has no binding water-sharing treaty with its neighbors, while the non-binding memoranda that once underpinned data-sharing have lapsed. Many analysts therefore fear that China could weaponize Tibet’s water and assume the role of “Asia’s water hegemon,” driven largely by its favorable geopolitical position.
As China controls the headwaters of three major Indian river systems – the Brahmaputra, Indus, and Sutlej – opaque upstream water governance has become an acute national security concern for India. China has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to weaponize water transparency. During the Doklam standoff in 2017, China abruptly halted providing crucial monsoon-season water-flow data for the Yarlung Tsangpo (which becomes the Brahmaputra in India), citing station upgrades, an explanation many Indian analysts doubted as it was sharing the same data with Bangladesh. Cooperation has since eroded further, with the expiration of bilateral data-sharing agreements on the Sutlej in 2020 and the Brahmaputra in 2023.
Now, China is building the world’s largest mega-dam on a seismically volatile fault roughly 40 kilometers from the Indian border, risking catastrophic flooding across Arunachal Pradesh and Assam and endangering millions of lives. The 2000 Yigong dam breach in Tibet showed how violently upstream surges can hit downstream countries – the ensuing flood displaced 50,000 people across Arunachal Pradesh and Assam.
In 2024, 10-Point Call from Tibetan Experts in India demanded full environmental transparency for the downstream nations, immediate halt to large hydropower projects lacking local consent, and adhere to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent to prevent forced relocations and cultural destruction in Tibet.
India is not alone in expressing concerns about China’s unilateral approach to water issues. It’s also a recurring point of frustration for Southeast Asian countries on the Mekong River, known as the Lancang in China.
In 2016, a severe drought hit the Mekong Delta in Vietnam. The Stimson Center later published satellite-based evidence that upstream dam operations in China restricted river flow even when the upper basin recorded above-average rain and snowmelt. During this upstream squeeze, 166,000 hectares of rice-growing land was rendered infertile, leaving 2 million people without adequate drinking water. The Vietnam’s Ministry of Agriculture estimated that $4 billion was required to combat the drought and salinization in the Delta region.
Mekong River Commission (MRC) projections warn that cumulative damming could cut total delta sediment by up to 97 percent by 2040. Moreover, according to the World Wildlife Fund, the Mekong Giant Catfish stocks declined by 90 percent over the past two decades – a warning that could slash the world’s fourth largest fishing industry.
Despite the challenges and risks to the downstream nations, they have opted for cautious diplomacy and an emphasis on domestic adaptation. Vietnam has frequently raised concerns over China’s upstream dam construction, though subtly: it takes part in Lancang-Mekong Cooperation meetings, while also supporting Mekong minilateral groupings and partnerships to address Mekong-related challenges and serve as a counterweight to China’s dam projects. An ISEAS report argued that although Vietnam’s response helped maintain stable neighborly relations, continued upstream exploitation is putting socioeconomic stability and environment at increasing risk. ISEAS called for a more proactive strategy.
Among the downstream nations, India has been the most vocal, openly treating upstream water control as a core national security issue. Following approval of the Medog dam project, India formally conveyed its concerns, asserting its rights as a riparian user and demanding transparency. New Delhi has raised the issue during high-level engagements, including the border-affairs Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination, while pressing for an early meeting of the bilateral Expert Level Mechanism (ELM) on transborder rivers. According to the Ministry of External Affairs’ parliamentary briefings, restoring China’s flood-season hydrological data-sharing pacts for the Brahmaputra and Sutlej rivers remains a top priority to prevent sudden downstream flooding.
Beyond their evident geopolitical and economic ramifications, mega-dams also inflict severe disruptions on indigenous communities, downstream livelihoods, cultural heritage, and ecological systems. Consequently, downstream regional solidarity must transcend narrow national interests to forge a unified, holistic governance response.
A collective downstream voice need not begin as a confrontational bloc. One approach would be for governments to agree to a common minimum set of demands: year-round hydrological data, advance notice of reservoir filling and large releases, and transparency in transboundary assessments of seismic safety for projects. Second, there should be stronger coordination between the existing platforms, including the MRC, bilateral expert mechanisms such as the ELM, and regional bodies like the International Center for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD).
Finally, it is high time for downstream nations that share the risks of upstream dam construction in Tibet to take responsibility and establish a coordinated mechanism for transparent data-sharing and a unified official coalition.
Speaking at this year’s United Nations General Assembly, Nepal’s Prime Minister Balendra Shah proposed to establish a Himalayan Climate Resilience Mechanism led by Nepal, India, and China to share satellite data, monitor glacial lakes, and strengthen early warning systems. Himanshu Takkar, coordinator of South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People, similarly argued that the downstream countries have the right to receive that information, while the upstream country has a duty to provide it.


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