In the leadup to the U.S.-China summit in September 2026, President Xi Jinping attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and the BRICS summit in Delhi. He also visited the Middle East — all between August and September. What is notable is that in speeches delivered at both the SCO and BRICS summits, Xi made heavy use of the term “Global South.” This reflects China’s positioning of the SCO and BRICS as gatherings of the Global South, even though Russia and Turkey are among their members. How, precisely, does China understand and deploy this term “Global South” (全球南方, Quanqiu Nanfang)?

In academic usage, “Global South” originally carried the meaning that “South” issues exist within developed countries too, and that the North-South divide should not be understood in spatially separate terms; South issues are, rather, global in character. From around 2020, however, the term began to be used differently in international forums. In particular, following the war in Ukraine, a view spread — especially in Western countries — that sharply delineated the advanced democracies against China and Russia, drawing an axis of confrontation between the developed world and China, Russia (plus Iran and North Korea), and treating the remaining countries as the “Global South.” China responded to this by becoming very wary of the term, viewing “Global South” as a Western-originated concept designed to drive a wedge between China and the developing world. China’s self-identification has been as a developing country —indeed, as the representative of the developing world. For this reason, it was unwilling to accept a term that would separate China from developing countries.

Despite this, the term “Global South” became increasingly prevalent globally. In particular, when India hosted the “Voice of Global South Summit” online on January 12 and 13, 2023, and did not invite China, this appears to have come as a significant shock to Beijing. Yet even after the “Voice of Global South Summit,” Chinese criticism of the term continued. The shift came in the period following the enactment of the Foreign Relations Law on June 28, 2023. That law, in Article 4, calls for upholding the five principles [of peaceful coexistence], and also uses the term “developing country” (发展中国家) in two places, reaffirming China’s identity as a developing country.

From July 2023, Foreign Minister Wang Yi suddenly began using the term “Global South” at international conferences, albeit with quotation marks around it. At the Meeting of BRICS National Security Advisers and High Representatives on National Security held in Johannesburg on July 25, when Wang used “Global South” in quotation marks, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning then offered a definition of the term at a press conference: “The ‘Global South’ is the family of emerging markets and developing countries.” Wang Yi listed “independence,” “development,” and “justice” as the defining qualities of the Global South, and declared that “China is a natural member of the Global South and will always be part of the developing world.” This was a definition of the Global South that clearly differed from that used in developed countries.

China has offered no explanation for this shift in approach. The most plausible interpretation is that, as the term came to be widely used globally — particularly among leaders of developing countries — and as the term’s definition remained unsettled, China made a deliberate policy shift: to define the term itself, on its own terms, and thereby shape global discourse in its favor. This too can be counted as one instance of China’s pursuit of what it calls “discourse power.”

Subsequently, not only Wang but Xi himself began using the term with quotation marks. This signaled that the term had become domestically usable within China as well. By the end of 2024, quotation marks began to be dropped from “Global South” in Chinese documents, and in a piece by Wang published in Qiushi in 2025, the quotation marks were also absent. There remain, to be sure, some inconsistencies in usage (instances can still be found in 2025 where Chinese officials used “Global South” with quotation marks) but these have gradually become less common, and at the SCO and BRICS meetings in 2026 cited at the outset, Xi Jinping’s use of Global South carried no quotation marks.

Globally speaking, “Global South” remains a term without an agreed definition, with each actor investing it with its own meaning. China has positioned itself as a member of the Global South and has come to behave as its representative. China defines Global South as “the family of emerging markets and developing countries” — which amounts to the “non-West.” The contest over this term “Global South” throws into relief the differences in worldview between the developed world and China. The contest over this seemingly simple term, it turns out, is anything but.