From the early 1990s through the early 2010s, Cambodia hosted one of the most vibrant, generously funded, and unchecked civil society ecosystems in Southeast Asia. Former Prime Minister Hun Sen once famously referred to the country as a “heaven for NGOs.” And indeed, up to 6,100 registered non-government organizations (NGOs) and associations have been able to flourish, including about 3,450 NGOs and 2,650 other civil society associations. This number of NGOs is very high by global standards, by one count making up the second highest number per capita in the world after Rwanda.

A confluence of disasters has changed all that. The heyday for NGOs effectively started closing following the 2013 national elections, when the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) faced a major electoral threat and began systematically dismantling the public sphere. Viewing NGOs as a vehicle for hostile foreign-backed “color revolutions,” the Cambodian government introduced a restrictive and controversial Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organizations in 2015. It also began to use tax audits, lawsuits, and political pressure – such as monitoring or disturbing civil society meetings, refusing to give permission for activities, and other coercive tactics – to restrict the sector.

Not only are NGOs required to navigate a suspicious and unfriendly political environment, but they also face a critically strained financial environment. Recently, the international development landscape has endured its steepest funding decline on record. As global power relations go through a process of significant reconfiguration and Cambodia simultaneously moves toward graduating from Least Developed Country status in 2029, global official development aid has been dramatically curtailed. This is set to continue.

The dramatic reduction in funds has had a significant and increasing impact on Cambodia and its NGOs. Already 10 years have passed since funding for Cambodian NGOs reached its peak in 2016. A recent survey of civil society organizations in Cambodia revealed that 26 percent of NGOs say they are not financially viable beyond 2027. It is not unreasonable to suggest that only one in five NGOs may survive the next decade.

In response to this calamity, there have been calls to redesign the ecosystem of civil society in Cambodia. These are led by the Cooperation Committee of Cambodia (CCC), which serves as the professional association of NGOs. A roadmap prepared by the CCC points to how major transformation can be achieved. Options being considered include increased reliance on local philanthropy; the reinvention of NGOs as social enterprises or technical assistance offices; blended financing; increased sharing of resources and organizational infrastructure; and, if there is interest, mergers.

If undertaken, these initiatives would together mark a profound shift away from traditional NGO models toward leaner, more specialized structures grounded in local ownership.

But it won’t work. And here’s why.

First, local philanthropy is captured almost exclusively by the CPP and, for the purposes of making merit, by pagodas and other institutions associated with Buddhist practice. There is little appetite among everyday citizens for giving to NGOs, and it seems unreasonable to expect NGOs to try and compete with entrenched political parties and organized religion in their fundraising efforts. A notable exception to NGOs’ failure to inspire local giving is the Cambodian Red Cross, which is skilled at generating significant donations from wealthy individuals. While this is a large and prominent humanitarian organization in Cambodia specializing in disaster relief, it is also compromised by political entanglements – its president is Hun Sen’s wife Bun Rany – and is the recipient of questionable major donations.

In any event, international philanthropy sometimes funds the wrong things, as any effective altruist will tell you. Well-meaning donors tend to give to projects that look good or feel good, not necessarily those that do good. Just this week, Sunrise Cambodia, a Cambodian NGO that has traditionally been very successful at fundraising in Australia, was in the news again after a former chairman of the Australian Cambodian Foundation, the registered charity raising funds for Sunrise Cambodia, was found dead after being charged with possessing child abuse materials. Financial support for Sunrise Cambodia will reportedly continue.

Second, there is no demonstrable demand for technical assistance offices or social enterprises on a scale that may mop up excess NGO programs and human resources. To date, no evidence has emerged that presents a sensible business case for this model of transforming NGOs.

Third, blended finance models may be excellent for particular types of NGOs, such as larger organizations working in agriculture, water, sanitation and hygiene, and health. But it is not a suitable approach for smaller, grassroots NGOs and those that have adopted strong social welfare, human rights, and poverty alleviation mandates. Expectations of financial return sit awkwardly alongside such priorities.

Fourth, sharing of resources is laudable, but it will not magically make more funds appear. Local NGOs tend not to take the sort of decisive and strategic action that would support mergers, and there are simply no examples of local NGOs in Cambodia merging. Some, like the author, might wish to see the CCC and the NGO Forum on Cambodia merge and show other local NGOs how it can be done. However, this would require high levels of sustained support, including access to legal advice, and advice about governance and organizational structure, human resource management and change management, and program delivery, among other things.

It is unclear if international NGOs and other donors will have an interest in supporting local NGOs with such logistics when the prospect of a merger starts to become more real. Of course, international NGOs can and do rationalize themselves at scale – consider, for example, how Oxfam and ActionAid continue to consolidate administrative functions at regional levels, how Corus International formed, and how Save the Children absorbed Merlin – but this is not a pathway that is visible nor even conceivable to local actors. For the most part, merging is akin to death. Certainly, mergers are anathema to the idea that NGOs bring income and status to their founders and leaders.

A bigger and more important question is: are NGOs really worth saving? The answer to this is not straightforward. Let’s remember that NGOs are not the center of the civil society ecosystem in Cambodia. NGOs were imported by international donors and shaped in their own image. They have a short history and are not indigenous to Cambodia. The functional equivalent of Western-style civil society in Cambodia is the intersecting business and political networks and complex patron-client ties that dominate Cambodian society. NGOs have supplanted rather than augmented or strengthened local forms of organizing. Community members are unlikely to regard NGOs as capable of representing them. NGOs are attentive to what powerful actors such as international donors, the Cambodian government and, to a lesser degree, service users and community constituents expect of them, which means they are less adept at leading societal change on their own terms.

However, there are some NGOs that can be regarded as essential. NGOs that focus on human rights and advocacy such as Licadho, Equitable Cambodia, or COMFREL should be a priority for international donors, as it seems highly unlikely that they will secure sufficient income from local philanthropy or national government grants.

It is entirely possible that large numbers of NGOs have already collapsed. Informal advice is that many of the supposed 3,450 NGOs are no longer functioning but are either unable or unwilling to deregister themselves. The collapse of NGOs will thus remain largely invisible. The Cambodian government makes it difficult to deregister NGOs; there is no clear process for doing this. Moreover, it serves the government’s purposes to be able to point to a large number of NGOs as evidence of a supportive and enabling environment for civil society. This has the potential to deflect any criticism that may arise in response to further crackdowns on civil society.

What should we expect then? And what is to be done? It is true that the future is bleak and adaptation is required. The CPP has tried and tested strategies that have proven successful in exactly these types of situations. The trade union movement and media organizations have been undercut and diminished with the entry of government-supported institutions into their respective spaces. If the playbook is followed again, it seems likely that a rise in the number of government-organized NGOs (GONGOs) will also follow in Cambodia.

In this light, a more realistic roadmap for NGOs in Cambodia may involve calculated and conditional acceptance of the demise of NGOs. It may be appropriate to learn from the experiences of the trade union movement and media outlets. It could also be necessary to cede space to GONGOs and look for opportunities to collaborate with and strengthen them. In particular, this could involve working to transfer knowledge that has been accumulated by NGOs in recent decades – including the human resources that hold such knowledge – to the emerging GONGOs.

Finally, it may be necessary to return to older models of civil society that privilege hyper-local community-based care, perhaps linked to Buddhist pagodas or other community-based institutions. In particular, this could involve systematically transferring assets and other remaining resources held by NGOs to smaller community-based organizations in rural areas. Such organizations reportedly number about 25,000, or one per 724 Cambodians, which seems adequate for the task of providing a much-needed network of support for Cambodian families and community members.