Xi Jinping’s scheduled meeting with Kuomintang (KMT) chair Cheng Li-wun next week is set to be a smash-and-grab attempt by Beijing to set new norms in cross-strait relations and anoint Cheng as their preferred interlocutor. It could backfire on both parties.

On February 4, Wang Huning, Xi’s top official in charge of Taiwan work, hosted KMT Vice Chairman Hsiao Hsu-tsen at a think tank forum in Beijing. At the meeting Wang stated that Beijing would base ties with the KMT on “implementing the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important congratulatory message to Kuomintang Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun.” 

This formulation, the “spirit of the congratulatory message,” is Beijing’s way to name Cheng as Beijing’s preferred interlocutor and codify her pro-Beijing stances as part of KMT-CCP ties. Cheng – the KMT’s most pro-Beijing chair in a decade – looks willing to play the part. But her time as chair might not be as long as Beijing would like. Signs have emerged of an internal party split between moderates and pro-China hardliners, meaning Beijing may soon lose its preferred partner.

What’s in a Congratulations? 

Xi’s congratulatory message to Cheng upon her election as KMT chair in November insisted that both parties adhere to the “1992 Consensus,” oppose Taiwanese independence, and embrace the “One China Principle,” all of which Cheng agreed to in her reply.

The “1992 Consensus” refers to the disputed outcome of 1992 talks between Taiwanese and People’s Republic of China (PRC) representatives. Both the KMT and CCP claim that the meetings resulted in a consensus that both sides of the strait belong to “One China,” but Beijing insists that the “One China” in question is the PRC. The KMT has traditionally adhered to a “One China, Different Interpretations” policy, which allows both sides to agree to disagree and nominally preserves the possibility of Republic of China (ROC) statehood.

But Cheng’s reply omitted the KMT’s traditional commitment to “One China, Different Interpretations”, the “agree to disagree” formulation which traditionally guides the KMT’s statements about cross-Strait relations. The last two chairmen to be congratulated by Xi, Wu Den-yih and Eric Chu, both included some reference to “Different Interpretations” in their responses to Xi.

In his congratulations, Xi also hoped Cheng would help build up Taiwanese people’s “resolve, backbone, and confidence in being Chinese,” a reference to her public statement that Taiwanese people should “proudly say ‘I am Chinese.’”

Xi’s “spirit of congratulations” is at least in part the CCP’s attempt to codify Sinicization and the absence of “Different Interpretations” as the basis for KMT-CCP cooperation while Cheng is at the helm.

The CCP has actively looked to distort the basis of KMT-CCP dialogue, conflating the “1992 Consensus” with their own “One China Principle,” which holds that Beijing is the representative of China. Xi will be looking for Cheng’s help to distort it further. Critically, she only needs to align with Beijing’s definition once for them to hold onto it forever.

Beijing has always ignored the KMT when it mentions “One China, Different Interpretations,” but it is hoping to get the KMT to drop the formulation themselves. Hsiao Hsu-tsen emphasized “Different Interpretations” in his meeting with Wang Huning, but Beijing, as it always has, will pretend it never happened.

Tensions in the KMT

But Beijing and Cheng are walking a tightrope. Cheng’s visit next week will stoke the anxieties of the more moderate faction of the KMT, which is already uncomfortable about her proximity to Beijing. 

Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen, widely viewed as a favorite for the 2028 presidential election, spent a recent tour of the United States framing herself in opposition to Cheng. Lu has even proposed her own version of Taiwan’s defense budget with up to 1 trillion Taiwanese dollars (US$31.25 billion) in spending with an emphasis on drone investment, dwarfing Cheng’s far smaller NT$380 billion plan.

On March 30, Lu remarked that regarding the defense budget, that her “personal opinions do not represent all.” In other words, the KMT’s prospective candidate in 2028 is fully aware she is acting against the will of the party center.

In a separate press conference on March 30 Cheng refuted the idea of a schism between herself and Lu, stating: “Mayor Lu and I are as close as sisters.” The evidence suggests otherwise.

Cheng has other reasons to be concerned about KMT loyalty. Her vice chair, Hsiao Hsu-tsen, is facing allegations of financial misconduct from former president Ma Ying-jeou’s camp. That led Cheng to remark at a meeting of the KMT Central Standing Committee last week that members of her party were serving as the “knife in the enemy’s hand” and looking to divide the KMT.

The result of Taiwan’s local elections this November are the next fork in the road. KMT victories would strengthen Cheng’s hand, but KMT failures might see her ousted by rival factions. If KMT infighting worsens, it could have disastrous electoral consequences for the party.

When the KMT Splits, the DPP Wins 

On paper, the KMT is as well-placed to win the presidency in January 2028 as it has been since 2012. But the KMT can still snatch defeat from the jaws of victory if Cheng’s alignment with Beijing deepens.

The KMT has habitually failed to reconcile the differences between extreme pro-China hardliners and moderates, resulting in multiple party schisms over several decades. These splits have benefited the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), allowing them to go from a cash-poor grassroots movement all the way to the presidency quicker than would have otherwise been possible.

In 1992, members of the hardline pro-China New Kuomintang Alliance split from the KMT and formed the pro-unification New Party, costing the KMT vital local elections across the next several years. The most important of these elections was the 1994 Taipei mayoral election, where KMT-New Party vote splitting allowed the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian to win with just 43 percent of the vote. 

In 2000, the schism between pro-unification Taiwan Governor James Soong and nativist President Lee Teng-hui resulted in Soong running as an independent against KMT candidate Lien Chan, who had been Lee’s vice president. This split the vote again and allowed Chen Shui-bian and the DPP to win the presidency for the first time with just 39 percent of the vote. 

In 2016, the KMT fielded a hardline pro-China candidate, Hung Hsiu-chu, for the presidency. Her strong pro-China stances led to her being panned in the polls and replaced on the ticket by moderate chairman Eric Chu. Hung would later take Chu’s job as KMT chair, and travel to Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping. The whiplash of party identity caused by Chu and Hung swapping places contributed to an extended political mire for the KMT. 

Frictions between hardline pro-Beijing voices and more moderate members of the KMT are on display again. For now, Beijing will try to seize the opportunities presented by Cheng’s time as chair – starting with her visit next week.