Tarique Rahman had been Bangladesh’s prime minister for just 11 days when war broke out in the Middle East. He took office on February 17; on February 28, the United States and Israel attacked Iran. By March, disrupted fuel supplies had forced Bangladesh to introduce rationing, putting further pressure on its economy.

Eight months into Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) rule, the results are mixed. Remittances have risen and inflation has eased. But living costs keep rising, businesses remain cautious, and law and order remains a concern. Mob violence continues.

The government inherited serious problems, but its decisions also need to be examined. Constitutional reforms endorsed in a referendum alongside February’s national election remain under negotiation. New rights laws have drawn criticism for weakening independent oversight.

How far is the BNP willing to change the institutions it now controls? And are its decisions making people’s lives better, safer, and freer than before?

Crime and Law and Order

Law and order remains a concern eight months into BNP rule. According to monthly data from Bangladesh Police, the force registered fewer murder, robbery, and kidnapping cases between March and September than during the same months in 2025. Burglary cases, however, increased, while mob killings continued.

Police recorded 2,122 murder cases during these eight months, down from 2,317 a year earlier. Robbery cases fell from 1,159 to 1,077, while kidnapping cases declined slightly, from 628 to 618. Burglary cases rose from 1,796 to 2,022, an increase of nearly 13 percent.

The total number of registered cases increased by 14 percent, from 110,296 to 125,763. Narcotics cases accounted for about 90 percent of that increase, rising from 31,111 to 45,091. The increase alone cannot establish whether drug offenses became more common or police became more active in registering them.

Mob violence remained a serious concern. A comparison of cumulative reports from Ain o Salish Kendra, a human rights organization in Dhaka, gives a toll of 131 people killed in mob beatings between March and August 2026.

On April 11, a mob killed a Sufi spiritual leader in Kushtia’s Daulatpur upazila following allegations that he had insulted religion. His shrine was vandalized and set on fire. Media reports said law enforcement personnel were present but failed to control the attack.

Similar incidents occurred in Dhaka in September. On September 25, more than 200 masked attackers looted and demolished the Radda MCH-FP Center, a maternal and child healthcare facility in Dhaka. A preliminary police investigation found that officers were present but failed to stop the looting. 

A day later, hundreds of attackers stormed a property and vandalized content creator Salman Muqtadir’s studio. Police linked the attack to a land dispute involving the property owner.

Police officers themselves have also faced violence. In June, a mob assaulted two officers in Savar and freed a suspect. In July, three police officers were attacked in Kutubdia while taking a suspect into custody. On September 5, Special Branch Sub-Inspector Altaf Hossain was beaten to death in Savar. More recently, on October 10, a police inspector was seriously injured in an attack by muggers in Khulna.

The government says the police are recovering. On August 26, Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed claimed that suspects in almost all criminal cases filed during the government’s first six months had been arrested within a reasonable time. He said the administration had inherited a fragile security situation and was working to improve police morale.

Extortion also remained a concern. Court records cited in media reporting show that 723 extortion cases were filed across 49 police stations in Dhaka between January and August, a period that includes several weeks before the BNP took office. 

Dr. Md Tawohidul Haque, an associate professor and crime analyst at the Institute of Social Welfare and Research, University of Dhaka, described the government’s law and order record as mixed. “We cannot say that there has been any significant improvement compared with the previous one and a half years. At the same time, we cannot say that the situation has deteriorated dramatically,” he told The Diplomat. 

Haque attributed the lack of progress partly to uneven enforcement and the government’s failure to control its own personnel: “Unless a political party takes a firm position against wrongdoing within its own ranks, the situation will not improve.”

Haque also questioned whom drug enforcement was reaching. While drug users, small retailers, and couriers faced arrest, he said, influential figures continued to benefit from political protection. “The real patrons and powerful figures behind the drug trade remain beyond the reach of the law,” he argued 

Addressing that protection would require deeper changes in policing. “The Bangladesh Police has still not been depoliticized,” Haque said. “Its internal structure also remains largely unchanged.”

The Economy 

Inflation eased during the BNP’s first months in office, but the improvement was uneven. In March, consumer prices were 8.71 percent higher than a year earlier. Inflation climbed to 9.42 percent in May before falling to 8.34 percent in September, barely below the 8.36 percent recorded in September 2025. Prices were still rising, adding to costs households had already absorbed.

Earnings offered little protection. In August, the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics’ wage index rose by 8.05 percent, trailing inflation. The index covers selected lower-paid occupations, including agricultural laborers, construction workers, and transport workers. For these workers, the figures suggest that wages still bought less than a year earlier, despite the slowdown in price increases.

There was more encouraging news from Bangladeshis working abroad. Remittances reached $18.94 billion between March and August, up 13.1 percent from the same months in 2025, according to Bangladesh Bank. These inflows helped replenish foreign exchange reserves and supported families receiving money from overseas. The improvement continued a rise in remittances that had begun before the BNP took office.

Businesses remained cautious. Bankers interviewed by The Business Standard (TBS), a Bangladeshi daily, described weak demand, expensive borrowing and energy shortages. Sohail R. K. Hussain, managing director of Bank Asia, told TBS that factories had unused capacity, giving businesses little reason to invest in expansion. The return of an elected government has yet to produce a strong recovery in borrowing.

The government inherited much of this difficulty. Bangladesh Bank had maintained tight monetary policy, while loan defaults continued to constrain lending. Its July–December policy statement acknowledged that higher interest rates alone could not resolve inflation caused by problems in markets and supply chains. It also announced a 600 billion taka financing package for industry, agriculture, and smaller businesses.

Fuel costs brought another setback in September. The government raised diesel prices from 115 to 135 taka a liter as the Middle East conflict drove up international energy costs. The Energy Ministry said the increase was needed to reduce losses at the state petroleum corporation. For businesses and households, it threatened further increases in production and transport costs, making the recent easing of inflation harder to sustain.

The government is also struggling to fund its spending plans. Banik Barta, a Bangladeshi daily, reported that the record 9.38 trillion taka budget relies on collecting nearly 7 trillion taka in revenue. Yet collections are falling as economic activity slows. 

Citing National Board of Revenue sources, the newspaper said revenue in July–August stood at 518.9 billion taka, down from 547.7 billion a year earlier and 291.6 billion below the target for those two months. Meanwhile, higher energy import costs, subsidies, increased public sector salaries, and major project commitments are adding to expenditure.

Dr. Khondaker Golam Moazzem, an industrial economist, policy analyst, and president of the Knowledge Hub Institute, said that high inflation, weak growth, and rising unemployment pointed to economic stagnation. He argued that the government had shown too little interest in the structural reforms needed for recovery. “The problem is that the government does not have the revenue support required to finance these activities,” he told The Diplomat, referring to its expanding spending commitments.

Moazzem questioned the timing of salary increases for government employees and large projects that he believed could be postponed. One such example is the large expansion of Biman Bangladesh Airlines’ fleet. Its orders for 25 Boeing aircraft from the United States and 10 Airbus jets from the European Union would total 35 new aircraft, compared with its current fleet of just 19. Moazzem warned that without reforms to the airline’s management and service quality, the massive purchases could leave Biman with a long-term debt burden that would be difficult to service.

New spending commitments are adding pressure at a time when businesses and households were already struggling, he added. High inflation, borrowing costs, and an uncertain business environment also discouraged private investment. 

While acknowledging the problems inherited by the BNP, he argued that this could not indefinitely excuse its performance. “After all, this government assumed office with the promise of reversing the economic deterioration,” Moazeem pointed out.

Foreign Policy 

Eight months into his premiership, Rahman has visited Malaysia, China and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York but has yet to travel to India. The delay reflects the difficulty of repairing relations with New Delhi while Sheikh Hasina remains there. Her political activities from India, and Dhaka’s demand for her extradition, continue to complicate efforts to arrange a visit.

Speaking in Dhaka on October 3, Indian High Commissioner to Dhaka Dinesh Trivedi said that Hasina’s return was subject to a legal process and offered no timeline. His remarks provided no assurance of an early resolution to one of the main disputes between the two countries.

Rahman declined to attend the BRICS Summit’s outreach session, with Dhaka objecting that the invitation addressed Rahman as BIMSTEC chair rather than Bangladesh’s prime minister. India replied that it had issued two separate invitations, including one for a bilateral visit. Behind the dispute over protocol were more practical concerns: Bangladesh wants progress on visas, trade restrictions and water sharing. The Ganges water treaty’s expiry in December gives those discussions particular urgency.

China offered a more welcoming reception. During Rahman’s June visit, Beijing backed cooperation on Mongla Port, the Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone in Chittagong, and the Teesta river management project. The two governments also agreed to explore a dialogue involving their foreign and defense ministries, suggesting an interest in closer security coordination alongside investment.

The Teesta River project is of particular interest. The joint communiqué promised Chinese assistance and faster feasibility work; it did not announce a completed financing arrangement. In any event, managing the river within Bangladesh would not settle the separate dispute with India over sharing the Teesta’s water. Beijing’s support gave Dhaka another way to pursue a long-delayed project, but negotiations with New Delhi remain necessary.

The government pursued closer ties with the United States through purchases as well as diplomacy. On September 23, during Tarique’s visit for the UNGA, Biman ordered another 11 Boeing aircraft, taking its orders that year to 25. Biman described the purchase as part of its fleet renewal, but it had a wider diplomatic purpose: increasing U.S. imports to ease trade tensions and protect Bangladesh’s garment exports from further tariff pressure.

The main Bangladesh-U.S. tariff agreement, however, was inherited by the BNP as a fait accompli. Announced on February 9, two days before the election, the deal provided for a 19 percent U.S. tariff and a mechanism allowing a specified volume of garments preferential treatment linked to purchases of U.S. textile inputs. It also locked Bangladesh into substantial agricultural and energy purchase commitments.

The Rohingya crisis remains a focal point for Bangladesh’s foreign policy. At the UNGA in September, Rahman sought a credible plan for voluntary return, protection of refugees’ rights in Myanmar and dependable humanitarian funding. He also acknowledged that people were still fleeing violence into Bangladesh. 

Rahman also sought international backing for his government’s domestic agenda. He outlined a strategy of “recovery, restoration and reconstruction” and asked development partners to support jobs and manufacturing. He called for continued market access and financing as Bangladesh prepares to graduate from least-developed country status. His speech presented economic recovery as a central foreign policy priority, alongside appeals for climate finance and a lasting solution to the Rohingya crisis.

In October and November, Rahman is scheduled to visit Japan and Saudi Arabia on bilateral visits,as well as traveling to Turkiye  to attend the 31st U.N. Climate Change Conference (COP31). 

Political Environment and Freedom of Expression

The BNP’s first months in office brought open arguments between the government and its former allies. Jamaat-e-Islami, now leading the parliamentary opposition, challenged the government’s claims of success. In August, its 11-party alliance questioned the handling of rising prices, energy shortages, and public safety. National Citizen Party leader Nahid Islam also accused the government of withholding opposition chairmanships of parliamentary committees, limiting its ability to scrutinize those in power. These disputes showed that political competition was continuing after the election.

That competition remained restricted, however. The Awami League’s activities were still banned under an order issued by the interim government in May 2025, pending trials of its leaders and activists at the International Crimes Tribunal. The restrictions extended beyond rallies and meetings to publications and online publicity. The BNP inherited the ban, but chose to uphold it. That left a major segment of Bangladeshi citizens without the ability to organize through their preferred party. 

Journalists continued to face attacks, threats and legal pressure. Ain o Salish Kendra recorded 242 incidents of journalist harassment between March and September. The category includes several forms of abuse and does not mean that the government was responsible for every incident. It nevertheless documents the risks that persisted after the elected administration took office.

The treatment of detained political opponents also drew criticism. In August, Human Rights Watch said hundreds of people linked to the former Awami League government remained imprisoned without charge. It reported that at least 10 Awami League office holders had died in prison since the BNP took office, most without having been charged. Families and lawyers alleged that detainees were denied adequate medical care and that fresh cases were used to prevent their release after bail orders. While acknowledging that some former officials faced allegations of serious abuses, HRW called for individual reviews of detention and independent investigations into all prison deaths.

Proposed changes to the cyber law added to concerns over media freedom. In September, the Committee to Protect Journalists warned that draft amendments could expose journalists to prison terms of up to 10 years for circulating material authorities considered rumors or misinformation. It also warned that courts could suspend or cancel news outlets’ licenses when reporting challenged their accounts.

The government said the amendments were not intended to target journalists. Following objections from editors and media organizations, it agreed in late September to form two committees to recommend safeguards. 

Asif M. Shahan, a professor of development studies at the University of Dhaka and a political analyst, saw these concerns as part of a wider problem. He warned that changes to cybersecurity legislation and the weakening of human rights oversight could strengthen the government’s hand against its critics. “We are seeing the beginnings of institutional mechanisms that could be used to weaken the opposition and dissenting voices,” he told The Diplomat. 

Nur Khan Liton, a human rights activist, said eight months was too short for a definitive assessment, but he saw some improvement compared with the period of Awami League rule. “In some areas, we have seen substantial efforts by the government. Even so, it has no alternative but to take firmer action,” he told The Diplomat. 

Liton pointed to alleged extrajudicial killings, deaths in police custody and prison, and attacks on Hindu communities. Mob violence was another persistent concern. “We are witnessing people being labeled in different ways and then subjected to violence by mobs,” he noted.

Political freedom also remained insecure, Liton said. He cited the September 26 incident at the Dhaka headquarters of the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JASAD), or National Socialist Party. The party alleged that activists from the BNP and its youth wing, Jubo Dal, assaulted participants at a scheduled meeting before police detained a large number of people. Police said they were acting on information that Awami League members had gathered there; JASAD rejected that account. A Jubo Dal leader denied assaulting anyone. Liton described the incident as both undemocratic and unlawful, saying he had seen no legal action against the attackers. 

Liton also questioned whether recent legal changes would leave people with fewer protections against state abuse. He criticized the replacement laws governing the National Human Rights Commission and enforced disappearances as weaker than the measures they replaced. In his assessment, they would limit the commission’s ability to respond to violations by law enforcement agencies. 

He feared that proposed cyber legislation would further restrict expression, while attacks on media workers continued. “We cannot say unequivocally that journalists are safe under this government,” he said.

Reform Promises

By late September, the government was still consulting on constitutional changes that voters had endorsed in February’s referendum. These included limits on the prime minister’s tenure, a second chamber of parliament, and stronger safeguards for judicial independence. 

On September 29, Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed said the parliamentary committee aimed to finish discussions by December. A report and an amendment bill would follow at an unspecified date.

Disagreement over the reform package began almost immediately after the election. The July Charter implementation order envisaged elected MPs serving separately as a Constitutional Reform Council, with 180 working days from its first sitting to complete constitutional reforms. BNP lawmakers declined to take the council oath, arguing that changes should follow the existing constitution. Jamaat-e-Islami and NCP lawmakers took both oaths and insisted that the referendum required the council route. The timetable was thus tied to a process the parties could not agree to begin.

The government instead formed a parliamentary committee in July, leaving five places for opposition nominees. The opposition refused to join. This dispute also concerned who would determine the substance of reform. The BNP maintained that its objections recorded when signing the charter must be respected; its opponents argued that the referendum provided a mandate for implementation. 

On September 29, Salahuddin offered room for compromise on those objections if opposition parties joined the talks. He reaffirmed support for a 10-year limit on any individual’s premiership, but said the caretaker government’s structure remained undecided.

Other institutions had seen action, although that did not always amount to the changes promised. New appointments in August restored the Anti-Corruption Commission’s leadership after a 168-day vacancy. That allowed it to resume work on accumulated complaints and investigations. But the appointments followed the existing law. The Center for Governance Studies’ Reform Watch noted that they did not establish the independent appointment mechanism envisaged in the charter. Restoring an institution’s functioning and reducing political influence over it are separate tasks.

September’s legislation raised a more serious question about the direction of reform. Parliament passed laws on the National Human Rights Commission and enforced disappearances on September 6. The disappearance law provided for prosecution, victim support, and compensation. Yet it placed investigations involving security forces with another force chosen by the government, rather than the independent commission. 

Human Rights Watch argued that this reversed protections introduced under the interim government. It also criticized restrictions on the commission’s ability to investigate security agencies directly and the restoration of government influence over appointments.

The restructuring of the Rapid Action Battalion drew similar criticism. September’s legislation replaced the Rapid Action Battalion with the Special Response Battalion, transferring its personnel, powers and property. Human Rights Watch said the change lacked adequate provisions for independent oversight and accountability. For families seeking answers about disappearances and killings, the practical question remained whether investigators could examine security agencies without depending on those agencies’ cooperation. 

Eight months into BNP rule, constitutional promises were still being negotiated, while some laws already passed were being challenged for preserving the powers reform was supposed to restrain.

Shahan, the University of Dhaka professor, said holding an election was only the first step toward rebuilding democracy. Institutions also needed the independence to check government power. “I do not see any clear direction regarding how the government actually intends to build democratic institutions,” he told The Diplomat. While Shahan cautioned that eight months is too early for a final judgment, he said moves to weaken independent oversight raised concerns.

Shahan feared that the BNP would choose which reforms to pursue according to its political interests, despite voters having endorsed changes in February’s referendum. He cited the proposed separate administrative office for the Supreme Court, intended to reduce its dependence on the government. The BNP had not formally opposed that proposal, yet it was not moving forward. 

“I think the BNP will ultimately proceed according to its own preferences and priorities,” Shahan said.