On October 1, Pakistan’s military said that representatives of several militant groups had met in Kandahar in August to discuss coordinating manpower and operations against Pakistani security forces. Military spokesperson Lt. Gen. Ahmad Sharif Chaudhry said the meeting was chaired by Mullah Shirleen, the Taliban-appointed governor of Kandahar, and involved representatives of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) seeking additional fighters from networks associated with Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a Pakistani militant leader based in North Waziristan. A separate intelligence report identified figures linked to al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) among those present. 

For the BLA, the significance of the meeting lies less in the presence of other militant groups than in what access to Afghanistan could provide the organization: additional manpower, relationships with established militant networks, and a deeper operating environment beyond Balochistan. The reported discussions therefore point to a possible expansion of the BLA’s external support networks at a time when the group has been developing more sophisticated operational capabilities. 

Afghan officials denied that the meeting took place, and the allegations have not been independently established. Pakistan has long accused the Taliban government of sheltering militants, and relations between the two countries are openly hostile. Fighting in October 2025 killed dozens and nearly closed the border; cross-border strikes resumed in February 2026 and continued intermittently through September. Each side’s claims therefore deserve caution. But we can still consider the basic question: what role is Afghanistan playing in the BLA’s evolving military capabilities? 

A United Nations Security Council monitoring report published in August found that BLA members had access to U.S.- and NATO-origin equipment left behind in Afghanistan, including M4 and M16 rifles, reconnaissance drones, night-vision devices, and thermal equipment. The report also cited information from a member state that BLA members had trained alongside Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) personnel at facilities in Afghanistan, including in drone and urban warfare.

The BLA’s January 2026 offensive illustrated these capabilities being put to use in its operations. On January 31, the group claimed simultaneous attacks across Balochistan, including Quetta, Gwadar, Noshki and Panjgur. Pakistan’s military said 18 civilians and 15 security personnel died and that its forces killed 92 militants, while the BLA said it killed 84 security personnel. Neither tally has been independently confirmed. 

A February assessment reported that the group had used drones, satellite communications, and U.S.-made weapons, linking some of the weaponry to equipment left behind in Afghanistan. That does not mean every drone or rifle came from there, however, since commercial drones, communications equipment, and weapons can be obtained through multiple channels. 

One such channel is Balochistan’s western border with Iran. BLA and Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) members have reportedly maintained a presence in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchestan province, and in January 2024 Pakistan struck locations there that it identified as belonging to the two groups. The BLF denied having hideouts there, and there is no established evidence that Iran supplies the BLA with weapons. Afghanistan is different, because the U.N. report documents both equipment access and training. 

The BLA’s outreach to Kandahar may also reflect pressure rather than strength. The Associated Press, which saw the intelligence report, paraphrased the document as saying that “BLA representatives told participants that Pakistani military operations had left the group short of fighters and resources.” According to the report, Afghan intelligence officials responded by assuring the BLA that militants with the TTP and AQIS could provide manpower, weapons, and logistical support for operations in Balochistan. 

The same report alleged that Afghan and Indian intelligence officials helped arrange the meeting. India has consistently denied backing the BLA, so that claim also warrants scrutiny. Taken together, however, the reported discussions suggest that the BLA may be looking to Afghanistan not simply as a sanctuary, but as a source of personnel, equipment, and connections that could help offset pressure from Pakistani military operations. 

Meanwhile, Pakistan has escalated its response to the Taliban’s support for militant groups. Hours before the army’s briefing, Pakistan said it had carried out airstrikes in Helmand and Kunar provinces, while on September 24 it reported strikes on 10 locations in Kandahar, Paktia, and Khost. Such airstrikes may disrupt specific sites, but they do not by themselves cut the flow of weapons, training and recruits.

Three indicators will help clarify the extent of Afghanistan’s support for the BLA: independent verification of the Kandahar meeting, further U.N. monitoring of equipment and training links, and whether the group’s use of drones and coordinated assaults expands beyond the scale documented in earlier operations. The evidence of BLA access to equipment and networks in Afghanistan is significant. What remains unproven is how much of the group’s growing operational sophistication can be attributed to that access.

For Pakistan, the way forward is to address the BLA threat without reducing the wider Balochistan issue to a security response alone. Preventing militant groups from using Afghanistan as a source of recruits, training, and equipment will require continued engagement with Afghan authorities, particularly over the TTP and other groups operating from Afghan territory. 

At the same time, greater attention to the security, economic and political concerns of Baloch communities can help separate the grievances of local populations from the armed groups seeking to exploit them. A combination of diplomacy with Kabul, stronger border coordination, and targeted counterterrorism measures, alongside greater engagement with communities in Balochistan, would give Pakistan a more sustainable way to contain cross-border militant networks while reducing the risk of further regional escalation.